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Ab! tnd
This thes is anal yzes the ro les of factionalism and ideology as factors in the
political defeat ofthe first female leader of theProgressive Conservative (PC) Party
of Newfoundland and Labrador . Lynn Verge was elected leaderofthe party in April
1995 by a narrow margin of three votes and defea ted by the electorate of the
pro vince on February 22, 1996 before resigning as PC lead er several day s later .
This thesisargues thatLynn Verge's electo ral defeat was preceded by internal
factional infightin g which denied her the opportunity to deve lop effecti ve leadershi p.
Historical issues affecting the leadership ofthe PC Partyare examined, including the
effects of accommodation and ccaljtion-bullding on party ideology through both
good times and bad - when the PC Party formed government and when they were
in opposition. It is argued that the factionalism which split the party was just one
of four factors which led to the defeatofthe PC Party in the 1996 provincial election .
The three co ntributing and inter-related factors which exacerbated the factionalism
included: the opposition status of the PC Party between 1989 and 1996; the
introduction of the ideo logy of feminism to a party already split along right - left
conservative views ; and the incapac ity of Lynn Verge as leader whe n authority and
legitimacy ofleadership were denied her by the PC caucus.
iii
Tbe greatest influence on the PC Party in the period under study was the
competing values of thetwo &ctions within c:auc:us. Tbc:secompetingvalues became
much more rigid wbca. the influeoceofLynn Verge's feminismcaused those on the
left of the conservati ve political spectrum to move slightly further to the left, and
lbose on the right of thesame spectrum. to becomeresistant to attempts: by Vage and
her followers to change the party .
The PC Party had been in oppos ition to the governing Liberals from 1989.
and an entrenc hed opposition syndro me worked against the pany ' s efforts to
establish itse lf as a viable alternative to the Liberals . The thesis argues that
leadership of a politicalparty is one of the key infIueoces to mitigate against factional
infighting and the opposition syndrome, and that Lynn Verge was denied the
opportunity to lead because she failed - because of inaction - to meet the challenge
of leadership , and she failed because she was deniedthe legitimacy of leader5bip by
a divided caucus.
iii..
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Introduction
1.1 Leadenbip in. CODteIt: The Progressive COIltet'Yative Party of
NewfoUDdlaad & Labndor
The Prograsive Conservative (PC) Party ofNewfuwxUand and Labrador eb:ted a
wommasparty ieader at as IcUcrsbipcornamn beld April2S .29, 1995. This wasthe:first
timeany major NewfoundlaDd and Labrador politicalparty badelecteda woman as leader .
In less thana year, thePCParty suffemi ODe ofits worst political losses in twenty-three
years. winning only nineseats inthe~. ODe oCtile candidates to lose was the patty's
new leader, Lynn Verge .
racewhichlcd up to tbeparty's April 1995 Ieadersbipconvention. the 302 days Lynn Verge
was Ieader.and tbcparty"s IosiDgCllq)llignintbe 1996pmvD:ialelcd:ion. The paper argues
that one of tbc n:asons thePCParty of Newfu und1aDdand Labrador lost the 1996 provincial
election wasbecause it wasdividedintcmaIIyalong idcologil;ally-t:.scdf8cti0ns. and that this
divi<lioo wasdeepcoodbrx:augea WOIDlID badbeen elected party leader for the first time in its
history .
Following Confederation wilh Canada in 1949. it woukl bemoretban twemy-tbrce
years before ue PC Party ofNewfoUDdland and Labrador was to win a~r role in the
political drama of Canada's tenth province. It bad a1wa}'splayl:dan.insigDificaDl secorxl
fiddle to PremierJoseph R. SImIlwood. •Joey' SmallwooddomiDab:d theprovirx:cas Liberal
premier from 1949 until 1972, whena cadreofold guard. Tories aDddisendIantedformer
Liberals finally unseated Smallwood and took power UDderleaderFnmk Moores..
Moores sen'Cdtbreeterms 85 Premier. 1&first termwun1972 and fullowed the
debacle of 1971 when Smallwood stubbornly chmg to power aod attempted to nm.a
governmem even tlxtugb theTories bad piDed one more seat than theLiberals, with Tom
Burgess oftbe New Labrador Party(NLP) bolding the baIaDceof power . Members were
crossing or threatening to cross the floorofthe House ofAssembly almost evayotber day.
The early 19705 wm: atulmkoous tim: inNewi>urxDaPd politics. Table 1 clIroDicies the rise
oftbe Tories at tbedcctoral expense oftbe ollf»powerfid Liberal Party . The Tories tinafly
Ta ble 1: Elettio a Ra. 1Dbv Seac · Newro. . dl..d 1.elr_tare 1971-1915
PC ..... NU
.....-
.... ..... T_
1971 I 21 I 20 I I I 0 I 0 I 42
1m I J3 I 9 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 42
1975 30 10 0 4 1 51
1benurnberd_.itlthelePlllUre_IllaaocdIoSljustbri:ftthel97S~deUioD.
SoUIft: Jo" C. C..-bie. N. HoI4s1llurwI: My Llfl br Politics (Tomato:
MeCleU. . d Ie:Scewart. 1997) pp 86-131•
secured a tigttter bold on govemment in the March 24, 19n election when they won thirty-
three seats to the Liberals' nine. The third term for the Moores-led Tories started OD
September 16, 1975wben, inafifty<O()De-seat~ the PCs defeated tbeLiberals, led
by Ed Robens, winninga majority aCoine seats. The Liberals took.sixteenseats andthe
Liberal Refuan Party, underSmallwood, won fuur, with one IDdependcotLiberal. Analysts
havesuggested etbts by SmllIlwood to cq to power, by funniog hisLiberal ReformParty
rump, splitwbatcoukl-~ beelrrI:.ibmd-majority-and-cnsami·. ·Torywin-as-lDIII::I:TliIClItS
were-~cbsdyc:ontc:stcd.l Four- yan IaterMooresresigncd:lUXItltparty-launchcditself
into-a hotly COIIlcstcdbdersbip-~tbat was-to -definc-the-furureofthe part)"-fiom
IlJ79-to the late-1990s-. Tbc-c::oIn'CDi:m.cbo9c-Brilm.-Pcckfurd. the-youngaad- brashMini,uer
of Mines8Dd-EnersY intbe-M00re9 govemrnent. Tbege-were-tbe-days ofearly-of&l:Joteoil
exploration intbe province.and ·P«itOrdwas-rrU:iog-a name fur bBDselfas a protector of
NewfuundIand'"s iDterests againstfJoth-the Ii:deral-governmentaDd·tIie muh:i-DlIliomJ oil
companies. His-rminriwl-.ws.BiIlIJoody, apartystafwart with deep Tory roots. Pc:dfurd,
on tbeothcr baud., badhisstartmpoliticsas-a-YOWlgLibp'al.
peckfotd- was a-Icaderwhose star was. risiDg.. He _brought the-- PC Party m.new
directions aod:.re.establisbedan.ironJaw ofpolWcs inNewfouod1and.~a plliIicaLpatty's
longevity-as:govmmJc:DI:was basedupon-thestmngIb:ofil:s leader. Likc:Smallwcod:before
him, Peck:ford led Ncwfutmdlmd ami Labrador-his-way. Peckfurd ruled his party with the:
contest . The 1989 corwemion oncc-againchMe-another former Liberal, as Tom Rideout
narrowlywon over bBDeIIre9t-rival.Len Simms. MeanwbiJc, the Libmll party bad reached
back:into its ownpotitical pest-and-crowned-fOnnc:rcabindministc:rClyde Wells as leader.
RiOOoutcalleda quiCk erection toIIOwingIiiS-convention-win, basing _decision on ~blic
'For a first..lJaod-acwum of tlJe Moores-years, see Jobn C. Crosbie. No-lIDIds
Barred: MyLife i1l Politla(Torouto:-McCIcIIml&.SteWart, 1997)-..particularly 86,-131.
opinion polls which showed the Pes weDabcad. The polk also preWcted a Torywinjust
threedays before theYOtc.2
But the quick election was a disaster for Rideout, for aIlmugh theTories narrowJy
won the populatvote, they lost the clection. l Rideout's watch at the belmofthe PC Party
ofNewfuundlandand Latndor was to bejust: 44 days. He resigned as leader, and the party,
still reeling from the election jess, appointedRideout's convention rival, Len Simnts. as
interim.leader. Simms' leadership was confirlJBl at a party convmioo SOIre monlhs later
with little ~filre andlittle mediaattention.
The early 19905wereDOt kind to the Progmisivc CoDSCn'8tivcs. Liberal Pmnier
ClydeWeDsgaDw:d 0II00ual promD:ncc with hisopposiWo to the6liD.f Meech Lake Acrord
and hiscoostitutioIBI bllrtIes with PrimeMinisterBrian Muhoocy. TheprovincialTories just
could oot COrqJde wilh the mdiooalprofiJecstabIisbed by Wells. With WeDscontrolling the
national agenda.andthe Tories bettered by their poor bandling of a provio;ia1 issue - pay
and pensions ilrtbe pro\'irx:e's teaebers- tbcLiberals underWells badIittJetrouble against
"There were two polls publisbcda week. before the April 20 vote. The Omnifacts
Research Ltd. poD suggested the Tories could win a majority, as 52.1 percent indicated
supportfur-the Pes, 41.6 percent: for the Libel1llsand6.3 percent fOr-theNDP . The results
of the poDwerepublliibed in The EveniDg Telegram. April IS, 198900 the front page under
the head1inc; Eoough lOr a solid majority: PoD gives Pes 11 point ad. (pat Doyle, The
Evening Telegram, April IS, 1989, 1.) A Rcsc:an::bAssociates poll, conducted fur The
Sunday Express andpublishedthe QCXl day gave the Pes a six:-poiDtleadwith SOpercent
supporting the Tories, 43.9 percent supporting the Liberals and6.1 pen:eDt rorthe NDP .
3'fhcLiberals woo thirty scats to theTories' twenty-two wbilctheNew Democrats
wercshutout. (Sourcc :TbeEvcningTcIegram,.April21,1989,l.) TbcstoryBloffwith
the beadIiDc rrs A LIBERAL MAJORITY! in large ktters across the top oftbc from pege.
Siams and his bsndofTorics inapro\liDciale~ncaIledin May 1993.4 DisbearteD:d am
unable to rally Tory support. Simms amounced be would resign in late 1994. His
rep1al:elmm was eJectc:d at a party convention on theweekendofApril 2&.29, 1995. Unlike
the two previous PC leadership conventions in 1979 and 1989, with both having a healthy
slate ofC8lldidates. the 1995 campaignattracted only two Ieadenbip contenders: Loyola
Sullivan aDdLynn Verge.
Sullivan was a relatively new Tory member oftbe House of Assembly. He was
elected in the 1989 campaign in the dimict ofFerryland,. a mostly-Catbolic district on the
"southern shore" oftbe Avalon Peninsula. south ofSt. Iohn 's, which badconma:eutIy voted
Tory. He was weD-liked by caucus coDeaguesand had a reputation as a hardworker. He bad
a wried background as a b.ISinesmIm, a merchant who worked the fiamilyfishtrade with 1m
brothers, and as a teacher eed high school principal Despite 1m reputation as a hard,
dedicated worker , some ~h be bad OlE drawbllck. Coming from the soutbcm shore, Sullivan
spoke with the cbaracteristic southern shore Irish lilt., a brogue which haslasted generations
inrural parts ofNewfuundImJ, partkularlyalong the soutbemsbore and into St. Mary's Bay.
Sorce party insiderswere concerned that thepeople oftbe province. particularly Protestant
voters in once-Tory.strong St. lohn' s and on theprovmee's northeast coast, would have
trouble warming up to Sullivan because ofms dialect; particulartybecausePremier Clyde
Wells., an Anglican and a constitutional lawyer, was well-spoken without any hint of an
"TheLiberalswon thirty.four seats to theConservative's sevemeen andthe New
Democrats' one. (Source: TheEvening Telegram, Wells WInS ina Walk, May 4, 1993, 1).
Lynn Verge. ahhough yoqertbanSuUivan, was. Vd.cnmoftbeperty's yean of
good fortune under Peckfurd. She was one of the first two women in the history of
NewfOurdIand lIDI1 Latndor to be appodcd to CIbinet. She was first ebi:tcd in 1979 in the
district of Humber East. Articulate aud bright. she bad • law degree fiom DaIbousie
U~ and bad worked rora sborttime in theCornerBrook: law firm partDeredby Clyde
WeJk, She defeated WeDs in the HumberEast district in the 1989 election when be led the
Liberalsto provincial victory .' Verge servedwttb.distinction as Minister ofEducation and
Minister of Justice in the Pcckford govemmr:nt and was Deputy Premier duriDg Tom
Rideout's l:rieftalUre as Premier. While in opposition, Verge was to prove her mettle. She
regular ly challenged Wells in the legislature, and outshone most ofbet coUe8gues on the
opposition beecbes, Whi:nsheamoun::ed bet decisionto geCk the leadershipofthe PC Party,
many party supporters feh she hadwhat it would take to defeat Wells.
The Ie:adership contest betwccnSuIIivanand Verge was a bitter affilir . Vergewon
by only three votes. The~ ofher victory was not to last very long. as the intemLI
partybittemess was soon to mum.. T1x:Tories were fOcusedon defeatingClyde Wells and
the LiberalParty. bJt theymlb! themselves emboiled in a winter election campaign against
a LilieralParty led - DOt by Clyde WeDs. wbom they were convinced they coukl defeat-
'LkndEdJoyoe,_ ........ elo<tedm_Bayof ...
seat just afterbeiPB eb:tcd to gM WeDsan.easy ride into the IegisJature. as the PCs. as wen
astheNew Democrats. were unableto field acaDdidate aud WeUs won by acclamation.
but by Brian Tobin, wbo badtaken Ova' the rem oftbc Liberal Party fullowing a quick and
vohmtaryexil byWeOs. TobU WManaccolq)lisbcdp8rliamc:marian whobad bonedhis skills
in the HoWIC ofCommons,both as a rnenftr oftbc Liberal '"Rat Pact'"while in opposition.
andas the Minister ofFISberics andOceans in theJean QrCticn ti::deraJ. govcrnmcm..
Verge and tbcPCPartywere dcfcatcdintbc 1996 provincialelection.1osios seven
oftbesix1eensearstbeybeldgoing no tbceJccOOn. VCI'gC. hmclf; wasdefcated fortbc first
time in Humber East.IosiDa: by a eevee-vote IDlIIJin. SuDiwn won handilyin Fenyland. and
as happeoed in the Tom lWeout-Lcn Simms situation. be SU&X.eCdc:d Verge and became
interim party leader .
This is thebBtorEaI context ofleadetsbjp within thePro~ Con.scn'lltivc Party
for the past: twenty-five years. Chapter Two narrows the fucus to examine the ideological
inclinafuns oftbc various &ctionswbicbcame togctbcr to form theprovincialPC Party . The
party's_logyhos been """""throush~n ...._I>illdmg. Thccbapter
looks briefly at tile brlluenccofthose wbo opposed Confederation withCaDada in 1949on
the ideological makeup of tile modcrrt party . as weD as the other inftuenccswhich have
resultedin a party tim gets it strengths andits weaknesses from thevarious coalitions which
haveHI:times eiIber workedtogetheror workedagaD5t eachotber' over the twem:y-fivc years
oftbc rnodetDera ofthe party.
CbapterTlncsbupens the focus to analyscthe JeadersbipofLym Verae from two
perspectM:s; the firstexammes the influeIx:coftbe ideologically-b8scdparty &ctiooaJismon
her leadership. and the other examines the infIucnccofgeDier. Thepeper argues that the
ultimate failure ofthc PCParty under Lynn Verge was due to her failure to dcaleffectively
with the fac tionalism which had traditionally split the party , and make s a link between the
ideological differences that contributed to the party ' s factionalism and gender as a focus for
ideology. The link is the ideo logical influence offeminism.
Chapte r Four builds on the argument that Lynn Verge's failure as leader of the PC
Party of Ne wfoundland and Labrador was not only due to the reluctance of her caucus to
support a wo man as leader, but also to the crippling effect of tbe internal struggl e within
caucus - a symptom characteristic of political parties in opposition - a phenomenon
politica l scientist Geor ge Perlin has called the oppos ition syndrome.6 As an opposition
leader, there were lim.itsto the power lynn Verge bad at her disposal to enable and assist her
efforts to demand and receive caucus loyal ty . This chapter also discusses the problems
created for the caucus when, strugglin g with their leadership issues. the y were caught off-
guard by the liberals when Premier Brian Tobin called an unexpected February electi on.
Chapter Five presents the conclusion. The party 's ideologically-based factionalism,
the gender ofits leader , and the opposition syndrome, combined with a fourth characteristic
of lead ership that was to destroy Lynn Verge 's attempts to be the first female premier of
Newfoundland and labrador. That fourth characteri stic was LynnVerge' s own fatal flaw.
"George C. Perlin, The Tory Syndro me: Leader ship Politics in the Progr essive
Conservative Party (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980) pp. 197-198. Also
see Mark Graesser, "Leadership Crisis in an Opposition Party: The Liberal Party of
Newfoundland." in Leaders and Parties in Canad ian Politics: Experiences ofthe Provinces,
ed, Kenneth R.. Carty , Lynda Erickson and Donald E. Blake (Toronto ; Harcourt Brace
Jovano vich Canada, 1992) pp. 32- 52.
She did DOt meet the cbalJenge of adership quiddy enough. She was much too slow in
bringing berown styIeofleadersbip to the PC Party . She never did get control ofthe party.
1.2 Sbtemdt orMet..odo...d Eridellee
Tbisisane:xaminltionofwby Lym Vergcdkl DDtmil couki not get comol oftbe PC
Party ofNewfuundIaDd and Labrador after bet election as party leader . EvideDcc bas been
gathered through a series ofinteniews with key infurmants- PC Party caucus colleagues
who worked with her. aDdsome oftbose who worted ap.inst her - as well as others who
hell keyroles w:ilhinthe psrty~ am those whowere consuJted as paid.aD! voluntary
advisersto the leader. Attempts by the author to interview four ofthe major players during
the periodcovered wereunsuccessfuL? The list ofintcnicws appears in the Sources section
at thebegimiDg oftbe thesis. All intcnicws but one were conducted &ce-to-mce aDd were
taped and tran9cribed. TheinteMewwab lobo Laschinger wasconducted by telepbone and
wasDOt transcribed. Notes wereusedfrom the Laschinger ioterview to support statcmcnlS
and fOrattribution. Text from the transcribed inteniews basbeenincludedas Appendix A.
The key informant portion ofeachof the traD!Jcriptsbasbeen included for geoeral iDterest
because it is original material The interviews werenot conducted with a prescribed set of
1Requesu for inteniewswith PC MHAs Bill Matthews, Ed Byrne and Roger
Fitzgerald. aDdLiberal Rick Woodford were unsuc:cessful Mr. Matthews did not return
telepbone ca& 10 hisoffice. I:otcrview times were !IICtup with Mr. Bymc on threeoccasions.,
but be cancelbt an three . Althoughboth returnedtelephone calls, Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr.
Woodford were unableto give . time commitment for an interview.
questions aDdquestionswee DOttran9Cribcd.
A second source ofinfummion is my ewa personal obsemdions dwiDgthe period
UIlderstudy. [was hired byLyun Vcrgcto work as a mediarelations coDSUltam: during ber
Ieadersbipcampaignin 1995. 1be DeXt)'all' [was hired by the PC Party ofNewfoUDdJaDd
and Labrador to wort as a cotmnmicarions consultant during the 1996 provincial election
~
As an insider fur both the JeadcrsbipcaqJaign aDdthe proviDciaJ. election, [ was part
oftbe decision-making team. and attendedstrategy~ aDdassisted in developing and.
delivering campaignmessages. [bad full8CCCSS to infurmation within the Verge C&Iq)&ign
team during the ieadc:rsbip. and full access to information within the PC Party' s campaign
team during the proviocla.l election. Naturally. I did DOt haw: access to any information about
the strategic thinking that went into the Sulliwn CIIDtJllign during the 1caderstUp. In tact. it
basproven d.ifficuh to ptber that information. lnfurmants who werekey players in the
Sullivancampaignwbo bad agreed to speak with me were reluctant to disclose much about
the strategic thinking behindthecampaign,and. asDOted., [ was unable to interviewa number
oftbe key players from the Sullivancamp .
In the writing of this thesis it wasdifficuh to compensate for the dfireut levels of
accessto infurtDaD>n thal I wasaffimJeddumg and aft« the leadership campaign. However.
I have tried to let the words of the informants speak tOr themselves without any biases
imposed.by an insider's bowledge ofevents. That is one reason why [ have iDl::ludedthe
verblltimcornrnems of those~ [have depeDded upon their accounting ofevmts
10
with collaboration fromotben wbm aDd.where possible.
\I
2Lead.rship aud Ideology
2.1 A _ uribe Role urldeology in the Progressiv. C.....rvativ.
Party of NewfOlllldland and Labrador
The Prog:re:ssive Consemltive (PC) Party of NewfuUDlilard and Lahndor bas
struggled with a factionatismthat bas split the party sinc:eits early begimingsfollowing
Confederatio n with Canadain 1949. Tbcrc have beentim:s when the party wassuccessful
in dealingwith tbe split; other timesit wasnet,
F8CtioDalism refi:rsto a dMsionor dissensionwtbinagroup. such as a political party.
For the purposes of this dikussion. factionalism will be viewed as an explanation of a
weakness within the PC Party ofNcwfoundJand andLabrador. as factionalism: "oormotes
illegitimacy, if not maJcvolcol:e and pathology . . • often to explain party wcabesscs.
disintegration of unity, corruptioD, and opp:munism among party leaders . . . factions lU'C
said10 producesIrife. bding to stresses and strains andother disordersofa malfunctioning
organizatioo. " l
BeIlerandBeDoniarguc that the historic view ofpolitical factionalismbasbeenused
to explain party weaknesses whichultimdely lead to a maIfimctioning organization. This
view is usedto supp>Jt the lU'gUDICDlS in this paper. Tbc PC Party ofNewtbundJand aDd
'Dennis C. Beller and Frank:P. BeDoni.Faction Politics : PolitiaIl Parties and
Factionalism in CotrrparatWe Penp«live (SantaBarbua" CA: Clio Press. 1978). 6.
LaIndorhas survivedasaroalitioo.ofinteresls sinceits modembegirmingin 1949. During
percds of good times,MIen thelDctions within the party worked together, theparty enjoyed
electoral success. Electoral sua:ess bredcoopemlion,coopenmn bredelectoral success,aDd
the glue that seemedto biB! thetwo filcfuns togetherwas strong, effectiveleadership. When
1eadership was strong, the factions withinthepllltyWCIC secondaly, andinstead ofidentifYing
the factions within the party ina negative way, ifindced.they were identifial. they would be
referred to in a positive way - as coalitions. But in opposition, whenthe leaderbad little
powerto controlcaucuslIlCllilers, fiIctionalism.split the party even deeperin10an <us versus
them' grouping, which most often manifested itselfin open criricism. oCtbc party leader .
ThefiIctioDalism within thePC Party ofNewfoUDdJarxl aDdLabrador is the rcsult of
a split along a Ieftlright ideologicalpredilection, with party members, for the most part,
falling into the ranks of <progressives' - those on the left of a conservative political
spectrum, and ' conserva tives' - those further to the rigbL party membershave long been
aware oCthcse differences, and therebas beenandcontinues to be a predilection by party
elites toward a consistent view. Party members often split into differentpolitical camps
(especially during Ieadersbip~), and, for the most part. teDdto group together with
the same people. Many membersoftbc party see nothing wrong with being labeUed <RighI:'
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or 'Left '.Z Partynenbenoftcoacll:mwk:dgcthediffererJ:e with a view that those with the:
approa:h. Tbefi9callycoIlSen'lltivc Tories on the right have a teDdeDcyto ran in the socially
conscious Pes on the left; just as the left 1e:aniDg Red Tories would say they temper the
businessh"beraJism ofthc Conservatives.
WIlliam Christian and Colin. CampbeU present the position that in Canada,
conservalism, as expressed by the PC Party ofCanada, has a tradition and a character distinct
from libeIaIism,as~ by the Liberal Partyofeam.ta, aIlmugb the two national parties
at timesbear a close similarityto each other.l Thetwo provincial parties in NewfoUDdlaDd
and Labrador have similarities with their natiooaJ. COUDtcrparts. However , the roots oftbe
Newfouo:Uand partiesare diUJct fromthe mDmal parties, resulting in some sligbl variations
in ideological persuasion. ThisisespeciaIlytruc furthc provincial PC Party. The initial ranks
of the Newfo undland Tories included many of those who opposed Newfoundland's
Confederatio n with Canada, mainly because their political rival of the day, Joseph R.
SImllwood,. was aLiberaJ.whobad alignedbimselfwith the national LiberalParty which was
~or exaqJIe. JoIDOttenbcimcr: "I don 't mindbeingcalJeda RedTory. " (Interview.
October 10. 1996). Also LoyoJaSullivan: " We Deed some strong rigbt-of-eentte policies if
weare to continue to attract votes. We've relinquisbeda right -wing agendaandwe've BOne:
more to the left . And that's DOtOur ideology. 1feel we have to be to the righ1-of--cemre."
(Interview October 10, 1996).
lWtlliam Christianand Colin CampbcIl,Po/iricoJ Parries and Ideologiesin Ctmada
[Toronto; McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1996),84.
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badfiWedaDd. a slim majority of the provinc:e 'o'Okdto join CanIda in 1949.
Their choice '"wu wbctbcr to ramin a b:aJ. puty or to aDy thcmsdveswith the
Govcmmerd: and those from the Ecooomic UDioD with the UDited States Party met in
FeIxuary, 1949. <Qrlaofaat:w of dissidents ' the [Newfuundland aDdLabrador] Progressiw
Conservative Party was born... United against • cormm n fOein SmaItwood, the anti-
Confederates bad to fit tbelmclves ioto a PC ideology. Therewas Iitde doubt tbal the
influence of the strong anti-Confederate mo vement would be reflected in theImlkt up ofthe
provincial Pes. andit is !till expressed within.the party's ideology not as an anti-Ca.nadian
positio n - but as a pro-NewfOundlandposition..Thelink betweenthis ' crew of dissidents'
and the modem PC Party is • IcndeDcy by an element within the party toward •
UIdcrpmings IblIC nBY bl\'C led to what the rmdcm PC Party ill NewiHmd.1aDd now stands
for, Susan McCorqwdale does provide • very detailed bistorica11CCOUIJl of the troubled
times for the PC Party from the early years wllowing Co nfederation in 1949 imo the early
1970s. She arguesthat their troubles stemmed mUnIyfrom their iDabilityto convince.
majority of the electorate that thiscoalition of IIDti-CoDfederates andbusiness liberalTories
'S_M<OnquodaIo, _ _ .... '" Change, PhDC' ,", LaM<mcCOOse,•
in Carwdimr Provincial Politics:~ Party Systems a/1M Ten Province, 2ndedition. ed.
Mamn Robin (Scarl>o..ugh ON , Pm>tioe-HaIlofConada. 1978), 146 .
IS
was worthyofsupport.. Theelectoral tide finally turned fortbe Tories underFrank Moores,
when, bytbe sIigbIestofnmgim. voters rejectedSmallwood - aftertwenty-three yean:-
and the PCs came out infrunt in a 21·20-1 split, although it took: lhem aoother year to get
Smallwood oUl of office. as he stubbornly hung on, l:l'yiDgto convince the Lieutenant
Governor that be and theLiberalsstil1badthe right to govem. !
Moores' successor, Brian Peckford, drew upon his early years as a young man in
rural Newfoundland to develop a version of Newfuundland nationalismthat formed an
inlegraIpart of tile PCParty's "progressMf' neology oftbe early19805. Because Peckford's
fathermovedaround the proviDccas a welfilre officer, the Peckford tiunilybadlived in many
parts of tbe provincedurir:lgyoung Brian'ISformative years and bewrote that even tiKlugb he
wouldhave been quite young at themne, hewas awaresomethingsignificantwashappening
during the debates leading up to Confederation with Canada. Later hewould reflect: on the
national angst experienced by Newfoundlanders during that period..6
11 is likely that because of his experiences as a young man growing up in rural
NewfowxUand, theoationaIt5t ideologyoftbe PC Party underBrianPeckford was coloured
by a Newfoundland brand ofjingoism. particuJarly in the area ofjurisdiction over Datura1
'See Table I, page 2.
6A. Brian Peckford.. The Past In The Present : A Personal Perspective on
Newfoundland' s Future. (St. 10m's: HarryCuffPublications, 1983) "I remainoftbe opinion
the NewfoUDdJandersgenerally bad DO knowledge ofwbat was being negotiated. I'm sure
very fi:w reaIi2J:d thBtour say in fisbcrics matterswould beSIDlD. andinsignificant." pp. 4~SO.
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resources," Yet, there is little doubtthatparty idc:okJgyundetPeckfurd wasom: that had wide
supportboth within the party and among theelectorate.
PecldOrd. particularlyin hisfirst two manJatcs,demaDdcd aDdreceived party loyalty.
Hiselectoral SUlXleSS~ the Libemlsin the Houseof Assembly in total and complete disanay
often commanded in the years ofLiberal domination. '
NewfouodIaDd comervatism. as cxprcssc:d by the PC Party, hasshown a deep aDd
abiding care for individualism. and h"berty. However, one of its major straDds bas been
economic hbcralism. Economic h'bera1ism. - or business Iiberalism,as Christianand
Campbellcall it, stresses theoriginal CODCCnlS of h"beraJism to remove restraints on personal
freedom, hQaricaJlynnst often iqktscd by governmentregu1ation. ' This is thecornerstone
of the group I have called the conservatives within the PC Party of NewfuUDdlaDdand
Labrador .
Welfare liberals, on the other haDd,look to the state, which they see as an effective
counterweight to the large corporatioas and tradeunions, to give substance to the formal
"For an examination oftbe "nationalistic" ideologies of Brian Peckford. see Doug
House, "The Mouse that Roars : New Direc:tions in Canadian Politica.l Ecooomy ~ the Case
of Newfoundland,. " in Regionalism in Canada. cd. Robert 1. Brym (Toronto: Irwin
PublWUng, 1986),1'1'. 131-135.
IMark Graesser, "Leadership CrisU in an Opposition Party: TheLiberal Party of
Newfourdlard,.. in Leaders and Parties in Cmtadian Polidcs: Experiences oflhe Provinces,
ed. KennethR. Carty, Lynda Erickson and Donald E. Blake (Toronto: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich Canada, 1992) pp. 32-52.
'Christian ODd Campbell, 6.
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liberty of all by ensuring an acceptable minimum. standardof social resources by the
redistributionofwealth through the taXation systcmand socialwel&rc: programs. Welfare
liberals consider the &tc ofthc smaDbusincsspcrson who c:anJXlt compete with the large
monopoly. and the poor who have only the freedom to be poor. Welfiuc I:ibcrals also
maintainthat to protect thermre iqJortam human rights. it is justifiableto restrict economic
rights by introducing progJe5Sivc taxation andextensive government imcrvention to regulate
economic Iifi: and.socialprograms.lO 'I'lU is the aspect ofwelfilR: Iibcrali5m which contributes
to the makeup ofwbat I havec:allcdthe progressives within the PC Party .
It would be more thancomaDent ifthe word conservative meaDt only an association
of ideologies within the PC Party. But the word conservative basa varietyofadditional
meaningsin onlinary specch.. "It would be tempting to ignore them were it not for the fact
thal these altcmatiYcmeanings also shed light on the pbenomem we are exploring. ODeuse
ofconserVcltive is to describe those who are hostile to change. andwho prcferthingsjust as
tbeyare. "ll Christian and Campbcllarguc that this is not, in itselfa politicaldoctrine. but a
disposition which dislikes rapid changes in idctrtity;which prefers change to be slow and
cauOOU5; which regrets any alteration in the state ofaffairs that threatens to destroy what is
known and loved; and resistsany argument that theremight be anadvantagegained by
l°Cbristian and Campbcu,. 131.
I I Christian andCampbell. 132.
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the change .u This,. too, isacbaracteristic of the group [bavccalledcomervativc:s.
On the other band, the ImIkeup of the pro~ group included • strong beal:
toward Newfoundland DIlionatism, originatina from the fight agaiDst the proposal for
NewfoundlaDd's Confi:deration with Canadain the late 194Os, aDdspurredon in the late
19705 and early 19805 by Brian Pec:kfurd's strongly held belief that Newti:tUDdJand and
Labrador should stand up for ftselfagainst: Ottawa as weD as the imrusion13 ofinlemational
corporations in the NewfuUDdJand and Labrador economy.
My~ oftbis group. t.ed uponLym Verge's speec:besduringthe leadership
campaign and the election campaignof 1996 aDdthe policy development process which led
up to the 1996 provincial election, is that they also believedfervem1y that the people of
NcwfoUDdlaDd andLabrador should maketheir own way , with their own resources - both
humanamnatural- tOOthatsuccess would be achieved through intcma1aHJperation and
inclwion. 14 lbis was a contributing elemeut of the group that made up the progressive
fuctionofthc PC Party .
IZChristian aDdCampbeR, 133.
~ 'WOld"irnrusX>n" is usedto express the belieftbat the external dependency on
directfureign iIM:stment in theNewfoUDdllmdeconomy, particuJarlyin the resource sector,
wasa ncgati:ve infIIxa:e on theprovD:e's growth. See VaJcrie Summers, "Resource Politics
and Regime Changein the Federal Era, 1949-1991 ," in The Provincial Slate : Politics 111
Canada's Pruv lllCes tmd Territories eds.Keith Browmcy andMichael Howlett (forouto:
Copp Clad:: Pitman, 1992), pp. 9-30 .
l"Scnator Gerald Ottenbcimer, personalinterview, October27, 1996. "Lynn Verge
shared with Brian Peckford and with other Conservatives, • realiDtion that we in
Newfouodlaod should, to the cxteDt possible within• federal state, detemriDe our own
futme."
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TbecomemdiYe &ctionbastr8ditiJnaIly stayed close enough to the progressives to
be able to work wiIbin the same political plIlty. but this group differssigni&:am:Iyin tbeit
strongly held belief that NewfOundlandalii Labrador's resource-t.sed economy should be
developedwith the assisCIn:e am co-opcrBtionofowKIe iDftucD::cs. aDdthat the government
oftbe proviDceshouldbea an-t8ka'. tqmJCIIIing theproviDcialmdlocal industrialimerests
in resourcede-ielopmcotwhile goingabout the businessofproviding thebasicnecessities of
education. bcaJlh and socialseM::es,tm:mportation and munici(:BI infrastruc:ture. and passiDg
legisIation that would tIIlkc it easier fin' business - either bcal or tbreign- to develop the
ecooomy." This isaootberaspcctoftbccoD!lel'Yldive group. Lynn Verge's leadership ofthe
PC PartyofNewfuurdlm:llllld LaI:ndorwas c:hallenged by thesecceservetbes in the party .
ConserwtiveIDCIIix:n. whoheldpositions ofpower within the party . putic:uJatly in caucus.
strongly resisted- indeed resented - the changes Verge represented. Tbe icon or
symbolisln ofa woman as ie&derunnerved the conservative element oftbe party .
ThecoDSeI'Y8tMs withmtheparty could not ac:cept• woman as leader . although the
party bad made some effurts in the 19805 10accommodate moderate fi:minist ideology.
E lements o f feministpolitical ideology were introduced imo the mainstream o f PC Party
ideology by Brian PecldOrd when. at Verge's initiative. he introduced the Matrirmnial
" Loyola Sullivan. personal interview. October 10. 1996 . "'I think we need to have
sound. economic-based policics. I feel that job c:reationwithin smallbusiness is the main
thiogthat·s going to drive theecommy. m:l ~ can only have soc:ial programs depending on
how the economic:sector performs,not at theexpeme oftbe business sector."
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Property Act. 16 He also created the province's first:Advisory Council. on the Status: of
Women. and estabtisbcd a Ministry Responsible fur the Status: ofWomm.
Lynn Verge was to take this addition of ""fCminjsm" within the psrty's ideologjcal
conservative majority in the caucus was unwilling Of" unable to support her bcawsc oftbat.
While a majority of the ClWCWi fi:ft that way, party executive meuiIerswac not only
o~ things could change. but feft that a woman as leader was something the party and
the electorate should aDdcould support. This coDflict betweenthe negativityoftbc caucus
and the optimism ofmemhers oftbe party's ocwly eiected executive was to prove to be
devastating for Lynn Verge and thePC party.
l6[.ym Verge, pc:noml Dcniew, April 9, 1997. "I had beenpushingfof" matrimonial
property law refurm during theIcadc:rsbip pI'OCCSS aDdhe immediately iDlroduccda biD.
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Lcadenbip, GeDder aDd IdeclIocY
3.1 The Inllueoee of Lyna Verge on the Ideology 01 the Progressive
CODServative Party ofNewfOlllldJaad aDd Labrador
Lynn Verge wasjusr: twa:dY-sDt. when,as a practisinglawyerinber home to\W of
Comer Broo k, she wasurgedby .members oCtile Comer Brook Cotmeil on the S~ of
Women to seek the oomination fur the district of Humber East fur the Progressive
Conservative(PC) PartyofN ewfOuI::KIIaDd. aM Lalndor in the 1979 election. M a founding
.lDellDcrofthe CorDerBrook Status of Women's CouociL she was guaranteed the support of
bad much experieDce in elected politics. UntD. the emergClXCofLyonVerge in public life,
women never bad anyone to champion the MfeministM e:ause at theprovinciallcveL
Other womenhadbeen eJectedto tile legislature. I but DOllie camefromor claimedto
represent thisnewpoliticalideology celledfeminism. The other women elected in the same
era as Lyon Verge came from the ranks ofmunicipalgovemmcot anddidnot have the same
kind ofideolo gjca1 co DStituencyas Verge .
'Lady Helena SquDes (wife of formerNewfouo1land PrimeMinister Sir Richard
Squires) was elected to the NewfoundlaDi Iegis1ature in 1930. L)'DIlVerg e aDd Hazel
Newbook - eb:tcd in 1979- were the firsl women to be elected to the provincial House
of AsgeDillyafter 1949 wbcnNewi:lundJlmdjoiDedc..da. Both Verse aodNewhook. were
inD:ncdilttcJyappoDedtocabinet by BrianPcckfi>rd.Newhookh&d bcenMayorofGander.
Another municipelpolitician, Ida ReidofTwillingate was elected for the Pes in the 1985
provinciale1ection.
No oaeclallengcd Verge fDrtheright to n:p!'CSetIt thePC Party in the 1979 dcction
in Humber East,am she won the maDman by accllaDItiDn. AJtboughLynn Verge hadbeen
much thought to numing as a C8IXtidate hersel£until just befOrethe election call in 1979.
At the urging of friends. Verge madethedecimn to seek the nomiDalion in Humber East.
Most observersdidn't give bet much of a cbance to win agaimt Liberal George Colbourne.
a ComerBlOOk~and brother-D-lawofC1yde WeDs. But she aDdbeesmall group
offeminist fiimJs worked well with the ok! guard Tories in lI1unberEast.brought together
bycampaign.D:mlllger Lome WbccIcr.1 This unlikelyalliance won the seat.and by Verge's
own admission,she won it on the coattailsofleader Brian Peckford.
WIth her 1979 election, Lynn Verge became one of the first two women in
NewfoWldlandto beappoiDtedto the cabinet- Hazel Newbookas MinisterofMwUcipal
Affilirs, andLym Verge as Minister oCEdueation. It was DOtIona: before Lynn Verge. with
an influenceon govemmenl: . Under Verge, the Departmentof Education iDtroduced a
numberof prog:ressivemeasures. Theprovince's school cmrit:ulmn was expanded at all
levels to iDcludc tmre Newmundlm1 m11.abrador'COlJlcDt. Thesenior high school program
:r.ome WhceJcrwas to playa signi6cant role in Lynn Verge's growth as a politician,
as her trusted advisorthroughout muchoCtile rest cfber career. as he was Deputy Mi:rUster
ofEducation when she was the Minister. He was particuIarfy invo~ as a policy advisor
after the defeatoCtile Pes, when Wbcclcr was retainedby the Pes wben they watt into
Opposition. He was bet first campaign rMDllgCt in 1979 and also made a significant
contribution to her leadership campsign in 1995.
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was significaDtlyreorpni:zr:d wilh the iDtroductioa.ofGrwic 12, aDdsociaJ.advanccs wac
made by the depert:mcm. suc:b. as the imegraaioa of chiIdrm. with disabilitiesdo the
mainstteam.oftile :ICboo1 JlI'OIr*n.
Vergc was appo imed Mini:sla'ofJustice aDdAnomeyGemral in 1985_ Here, 100.
she was to put a~ li:miDist stamp Od the depert:mcm. fiJDowiDg throuah Od
Ped:ford ' s initiatives in tile arcaofMatrimonial Property rigbl5 aDd i:ruoduciD& IegisIlItion
to makeif:easier fur divorced womento collect coun-ordered~ f8)'DICIIlS fiom
the ir former malepartDers. Verge was also the Minister Rt:sponsible for the Status of
Women.
Following the resignatio d ofBrianPeckford as PrmDeraDd party Seaderin 1989.
Verge served as Deputy Premier in the short-lived governmml o f Tom Rideout., who bad
succecdod PecktOrd. Rideout quicldy waIl to thepeop~ with ane~n call, but the Pes
IoSl:to tbe Liberals.
Poliricalamlysts suggest one of tbe ma:HlS R.iXout lost W&! due to his u:nwilIiI:Janes
- or hisinabilily- to presert bimselfaDd the PC Party as difI"ereu fiom theI*tY led by
BrianPedi:lrd.J E"CI1though the Pes wen: aheadinpublic opinion p:tlls conductedbefure
cmqyajgn, the lead &iIed to traoslalc into a ID8jority of IC81Swon on eb:tion day. The Pes
wo n~~ o f tbc popular vote to lDrty-!C'\'ell pm:ent for theLiberals. but they
Jlohn Lucbinger andGeofficy Stevem. Leaden and uU4!r Monal~:BQekTOO'"
Politics in Ctmoda (Toronto: Key Porter Boob. 1992). 192.
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Il:llIIlllger for the TGrieschrilathe elcction aDdbe asks in his own book: "How could • Ic.1
of twcDy -six.p>iDtsdisappcllr a dcw:n or twdYe days"" Luc:birlsa'turm to the resuIls o f
a .lll.llDbctof""rolling'"polls conductedby poIlstcrADanGregg fOrthe answer . Gregg. who
was with Deem. Research at the time, had conducted a IIUIID=rof PJIIs for the
Newfu uod1and Tories goina: info the 1989 eb;tion. l.aschiDBcr wriles :
(T]bc clues [to the PCloss] are in the firstDec:ina poD.the one on wbX:hRideout bad
made hisdecioJion to caDthe cJc:ction. Greggasked Newfoundlanders wbetbcr. on the
one band, they ttw:MJatc the Comerw:Iivcgovernmenlwould stay much the: SlUDC with
Rideout~Peckbd.or wbetbcr. on the other band.lbcy thoughtthe election
o f Rideout would mean a new approachto govemmmt in NewfOundland. Only 40
pereeD:~ there~ bea new 8ppOlICh; 56 per cent tbougbl:theiO~
wouJdstaytbe8IIDC (4 pcrCCd hlIdooopinioo. ). Yet 76 per ceut ofthe respoDdents
had ocgativc views oftbe perfOrmmce oftbc: Pcekford sowmmmt. mtiDg it cida
u (44 ...._> o<"""' (32 ...._ >__. o..a fi>und thot S9 .... _
agreed w:ah tbeSLllJ;lC!itiJn tbII: tbePectbd govcrDIDeIJI: bad startedoffwencnougb.
10 yean cartier . but tbaJ: iIs perfOrmaD::e bad worxocd m the final couple of~'
I...asc:birlgc: suggests tbII &om.themmlbltion Otea t.d gIemcd from his in:itia1 poD
in 1989 thai.NewiJun:IIanden were unhappy with thego~ Pecl:1Ord bad given than
in the final few years of his .dministtation (the specific t:raIJS8teSSion was fundmg oftbc:
Sprung GreenboWJe,the fdcd hydroponics developmmt). and they WlIDled. change - .
4Laschinger andSte\'CllS,1992" 192.
JLascbinger andStevens. 1992" 192.
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unable to d.istam::e his Icadc:nbip &om the style and subslaDce of Brian Peckiml Yet
One day after the 1989 PC defeat, ex-prc:mierBrian Pc:c:ki>rd (who bad joDed Ed
Roberts as lID eic:ctioD-Digbt teJevisioa.c:ommeIlWOt) pubtidy biImed the bss 011
ine:&ctM: ka\cnbip by his1lIlXltS9OI', Tom lideout. 1D. the same Dc:nriew. he waJl
on to say that " if Mr . Rideout is DOt aNe to UDitethe C8UCUS aDd. a dispKitcd
opp)SiDon syrdromc~ m. tbcnthequestioQofbis bIdenbip could arise. But tbIt
coWl!be aycaror more away .'"
Clyde Welb bad endedsevmteen years ofTory rule in thepovioce. Wd1:s decided
to tun in hisold district of Humber Eastagainst L)1IIlVerge. yet be lost inbis bid to unseat
her. Wells was elected ina by.C&ection shortly after. nmning unopposed in theDeigbborilla
~ ofBay ofIslands. For Verge. berdefcatofWells in Humbcr East was to remain.
Iasmgqacy in her bid b the bdcnbip ofthc PC Party. Her opposition stU alsog....-e bet
more~ ix bcr adcrsbip aspDti:lm, tm:MIghher high pofilc critic responsibilities
o f j.lstjcc. theconstitution. and tbe office ofthc PrmDcr. Sbewu also able to make pom
in her lessereojes as aitic fOr~ the status of twmen. and DergoYmJmmta1 affairs..
Shewas exr:remelyvocal inside the IegisJature against D:BD)' of the initiItiYcsof the UberaJ.
go~ iocludiDg theirplan to piYaI:izlco; NewfourdJand Hydro .
' Mark Graesser. "I..eadenhip Crisis in an Opposition Party: The Liberal Party of
NewfDurdlaJ:d,.. in Uoders and PDl1ies in CanadianPolitics: E:q1vienc:es of tlw Provinces,
ed. Kenneth R. Carty. Lynda Er1cbon and DonaklE. Blake (Toronto: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich Canada, 1992, 48. Tbc Pcckford quote is ftom TIw Evening Telegram, SL
lohn's, NF, April 22, 1989.
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During his tenure as premiet, WeDswas a strong. irolPwillcd, bider. He was
frequctJy lIOCWlCd ofrurming a ODe-IDlDslDw. Most often his accuser wasLynn Verge. the
lone WOlDlll on the Oppositionbcncbcsandan accomplisbed debeter. Verge gained a wen-
deservedrqJUtldion - particularly ror irritatingWells- and she shone in opposition wbiJe
manyof her caucus colleaguesslipped into obscurity. It was as ifWeDscould never rorget
his loss to Verge in HumberEast in t989. The public~ conviDcedthat Verge and
Wellsbad somekiPdofpriwtc grudge against each other , with Verge more than williPg to
standaloneagainst: him andquite often initatiDghim.7 However, Vera:edeDies allY persooal
motivation. insistingtheir frc:queDtsparriDgwasmerely part oftbe thrust ofparfiament.ary
debate.' One incident stands out as an ~Ie of bow WeDswould, at times, put himself
inanawlcwm1posimnsDlplybytcfusing toac:quiesceto a request from Verge. In a private
member'smotion tabledDecember S, t990, Verge asked the legislatureto observe a minute
ofsilenccas agesru:reto ranembertbc fourteenyouoa women who weremurderedby Marc
Lepin at Ecole PolytecImiqucin MontreaL It was a simple m{UCSt that would DOt teve
detracted from the businessof tbc legislature, however, WeDshad his Government House
Leader, Wmston Baker, refuse saying it wouldbedisruptive. A more obvious observation,
however, might be that Wellsdid 50 to spite Verge.
Many PC supporters thus ranked Verge higbly when lobo Lasciringerconducted an
7 ..Wttbout WeDstokick around,VergebIIslost berbiggest political asset." Editorial,
The Evening Telegram (SLlohn 's, NF) lanuary 24, 1996, 4.
'Lynn Verge, pcrsonalinlervicw, April 9, 1996.
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internal party poD in lit e 1994 fOr Verge when she was considering runni:ng iJr the
~' PartyItElliJen gave beI'. high approval. ratiDs: b die most J&l because ofber
pcriln:mnce in the House of A.sse:mbIy. Her c:hdIen8e would beto impro'o'eon this k:iDd of
pcrformanc:eonceshe bid won die bde:nbip of tbc puty.
leadership caq:.ign. be POt only buill:on her reputation as ODCoftbe tmre voc:al.mcmbcn
of thc Opposrixl, but also - like Rideout- her clolCassociationwithPeckfurd llIId her
own success <hri:tghistmm as Pmnier amberwork: ill the EducatiDn aDdJustice ponfulios.
Leadership conventions usually provide delegates wilh opportunilies to assess the
leadership candidates on irq)ortant iRa of policy andparty direction..'o Laschinger mew
that the delegaJ:es to the PC Party's convention in 1995 would ba'o'eDO such opportunity to
belp tbcm diffi=raliBlc betweeu the two c::ao;tidates fiom the~ofpolicy, forifLym
Verge aDd Loyola SuJ&.ran. the only two coDteDden., differed.on po6cy. these difI'amces
party was "to m id the loyally of' the~ people who\,: supported the party tt.ough
thickandthin.tu we'YeaI90sotto rc:echout llIId welcome other peoplewith ideas - sood
'10M 1.aschiPger.personal interview. August 17, 1996.
'!lR..M. Punndt, Selecdng the.PartyUader: Brital" i" GnnporattwPe~cttve
(London: Hanrester Wbeatsbcat 1992), 103.
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ideas. and eoer'IY aDdCDlbusiIsm.-1I Sullivan buill his pIItfixm on promising "souDd
economic direction.m the J-OYince...12
Otb<r thon -....- to -loP......."..,.,. .. -. ........
""""""" made_oC roots_the_"""",,,"" In_
neither caodidatc produced• policy cIocumem or iDfOrmation boc:lure duriDs the cdire
carq:raign. The radc..... 6Ir:pmytubIiJI were left to decidethe CXIDlC:Sl on pc:nomiliI:y. put
political record...t their own IeDSC ofwbo they wouldbe nusl<XlllrlOrtabk: wilhas tbcit
leader. When party members made the decision aboutwhich oftbc two candidates they
woukl SUPPOrt. they split along traditionalliDes. as IDInYof the peop5ewho supported and
worked for Lynn VeTBewere the same people who had supported and worked for Tom
Rideo ut in 1989 aDdfOrBrimPeck1ixdin 1979. Loyola Sullivan's core workers came from
the same ranks as those who hMlsupported Len Sm. in 1989 andtboscwho bad thrown
their support bdriDdBiD.Doody in 1979. This was more tbm . CXIiocideooc. The split in
support was ideol0gica1Iyb&scd amfDDoWQi the sp lit betweenthe progres.sM:s (Vcrae.
Rideout and PcckfOrd) and theco~ (Sullivan. S~ and Doody ).
\\'bile Lynn Vqe downplaysthe iDflueDce ofidcolo&Y in the cho ices she and her
supponers madeCOIElerDiDa po licy ~Iopment tOr her adenbip platiJrm. she does qree
there have been differerK::es based on preferences exhibited by party members that carried
IlLym Verge . lDterviewwith cae Television News. CBNT St. John's, 14 Feb.
1995.
l~yola SuI1ivan,. penoaal imerview. OcIober 10, 1996.
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tbroughaRdnet-tYbdcnbipCOllYClbxBofthe r:oodems-tY fiom 1979 to 1995.u The
provdcd~Domwthe~dcrngeswidliD.tbeputybave been iKmed
and how they in1hIcDcc:d the modern party ira1995-.96. Sena!of' Ottc:meimr::r bid • 10..
history within the Newfuundlaod aDd Labrador PC Party , servms as r-rtY leader and.
OppositionLeaderduring part oftbc Snmltwoodera. NJ. rapccted Senator', bebad often
provided the pmvin;:ial party with timely remiDden of its roots. Sources also indicated that
"'the Senator ," as be was referred to by party insiders,was oneoftbe fi:wputy in1JucutialJ
who stood firmly apDt the irumal bickeringthat wasworkina: to undermineL)'DD Verse's
~.14 When asked directly ifbe bad inlervmed. Senator <:>nenbeinrr said be didn't
wU to speak.puh&:tylIboutthe psrtY's dc:rml squabbks. He did say that be bad continued
to support Verge throughouther Ieadc:rsbip.
I supportedLym Verge in thebIdmbip~ ha"C. Yay high regard fOrher,
kDowbcr veryweDandsrc:r-d in cabinet with bet. Her bdcnbip was typified by .
deep socialc:oac:an trd • recognitionthat tbe:sesocialtmtten coWdonly be haDdkd
within apo&;:yoffiEal~. Newi:M.nDmd,ftapective of political parties.
is in some ways:• YCr)' smaI1-c conserutiYe society . Tbd.a:y weD havebeenan
element that worbd against her as • woman kader. Also being • smaIk:
co~ or traditional society, perhaps people are more used to • style of
Ieadersbip wbX:h isnme n.cbo' in the seD9Cof~ w:rt.1 aggression. It may
Ilyerg e.
l.Katby DunderdaIe. personalimerview. September 12, 1996; eed Calvin Powell.
personal imerview. October 26., 1996 .
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havebeenabothat__no!_ fioqumtIy ji,Jt ...... thanutiouIated.
more perhapssubjective rather'thanol:ljective;that these maybavebeenat work-
and uay still beat work.not only inNewbmdland society, but:in that element oftbc
NewfuundlaDdsociety that makesup the PC Partyu.
The PC PartyofNewfollDlilaDdaDdLabrador. 8lXOrding 10 8eDlItorOttenbeimer. is
basedon a coalitionofintcrests. When the PCParty baswon support to form a governznem.
it usually means thaI the coaIitmn bas beenresewed and the coalition basworted." While
it~re~to~~tbe~mtbecoalitio~~~~~~m
the aspects are the smaJl.c c:olL'!llCl'\'llli win b1 rmre comfiJrtabIc with theoWTllll approach
or inleIlectua1 fiamework: oCtileparty . Tbentbere wouldbepeople whoput grealet empbasi5
to be what they are, who are apprehensive of government intrusions mo areas where
government is DOt necessary, aDdpeope who, without necessarily articu1ating it. support
subsidiarity - the principle that the organisation best suited to fulfil a fimction is that
organisation or level of government whkh is closest to the problem. Senator Ottenbeimer
saidthat subsidiarity helps describe the relationship betweendecentraJitation anda sbariDg
of power. Ottenbeimer. in describingwhat [have suggested wouJdmake up amtber aspect
oftbe 'progressive' elcmcnloftbc party, said that people are more ' progIaSive' ra1ber than
' conservative' iftbeysupplrt the coacept ofsubsidiarity - believingwhat can bedone by
"Senator GeraldOttenbeimer. personal inteniew. October27,1996.
l'scnator Ottenbcimcr . The analysis which follows this quote summarizes
Ottenheimer'sviews expressed through the iDterview.
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a community . sbouldbe done by. CO'lIJDJDiry,.md. what ClIIl hea be done by a prminciaI
order of gove:m1D19 is best doDe thereaDdonly those things which • fedcnJ. order of
government is required to do, should.in fact.be daDeIII u.aIr:\Iel 0t:1c:Dbeimer sbI. tt.t
tfae arcalsotbe people who take . bistoricor geoerationaI~ofpoliDcs, wbo arc aware
of responsibilities mIf:rIm ofNture gmenlioDs. Eklctq: a&O~ is,.be sUI, like a
form of trust that the living set up fin the yet to come. This is aoothet elcmcnr:of the
' progressives ' wi1hin the party, .md. it is thesepeople who place • stronger eqJbasis on
provmcialid=>y.
SeDator0Itc:0bcimcrsaidthat bevie'Mdthe PC Party inNewfinmdJand arx1Labrador
from a number of pcrspectives. talriDgthe premise that there is a reasonably coberenl: aDd
consistem perspectiw.orframewor:k.ofvalues, which typifies the party. andwhich bas been
fuirIy COB5Ud iJr the JB'l~ years. Hesaidthat there is aIsoa Deedto counter~t.1aDce
that framework of w1uesby the requiremcut fOr the PC Party - and ewry party - to
upda:le ils appOllChiDspecific areas to make sure tbal the J*tY" s policies are cotaeqJoraty
and mewr.totbeproblemsoftheday. Th:ongoing Dl:lEld iJr patics to aDaIyzle their policies
to ensure tbc:yare relevant should be a colll:iDuiDg pbeoomemn, be said.~ that
~itcould bsve been doneover aDUIDber of yean... But. in today"s politics the rate
o f cbaoge is iruasiDg and partiesarc having difficuJty coping with that rate ofcbange. So,
besuggested,OD the ODe band thereis • coDSistent.coberm., identifiable core ofvalues aDd
approaches to !Ocio-politic:a1 issues which typifies • political perty - which be calls an
intellectual frame of reference- and the process of making that inteJJectuaJ. frame of
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refurencespc:ci6c in tams ofparticularissues bas to be constandy revised. But <>ttcnbcimer
change. should alsobe cognimnt ofthe need to stay true to c:ertainvalues that define the
party.
You can adaptto specifictbinp wabout having to change your fimdamenIaJ. political
values. Lynn Verge sbam1 with Brian PecktDrd. and with olber CoDSelValives. &
realization d:w we in NewfoUDdJaod should, to theextent possible within a fuderal
stale, determine our own future. That doesn't make us less CaDIdians. it isn't a
negalivc . it isn't anti-Canadian. It's pro-NewfuundlaDd. ADd alsothai:the fuderal
goverDJDmt should not intrude in matters whicharc very local and specific to the
Newf01md1aod character. I would say that that basbeen a sort ofcodinuiog stream
within theCooservative Party. Tbmtbcre are others [within theparty] who. while
DOt necessarily denyins those prixipJcs. attachless~rtance to them.11
Senator Ottenbe1mer resisted the temptation to pigeon bole Lym Verge's ideology,
but be did suggest:she fit thenatioIBlisti': bmt ofBrian PecldOrdso wen that it would appear
she was cut from the same bolt ofcloth as Peckfurd.LI Ottenbeimer alsoraiged the spectre
oftbe~ roots oftbe PC Party, and. as would be expedCd from the progressive
ranks. turnedthe nationalistic sentiment around to a more positive, pro·NcwfoUDdlaDd
position. MuehofLymVc:rge'spolibcswas intluencedbybcrpro-Ncwfound1aDdposition.
according 10 Senator Ottcnbcimer.
Tbereis aI90the strong wd&re liberalelement ofher b&ckground. which iDcludes her
association with the fCministmowment ofthe provinceaDdthe nation. andher support for
L1Senator Ottenbeimer.
l'S enator Otteubeimcr.
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the arts and cultural collZlDDlily. A close association can be made with Verge aDd the
progressive iegisIlItionshe introduced wben she was Minister ofEducatiDn and whenshe was
MinisterofJustic:c aDdAnomcyGcneraL While Lym Vergcrmybave been a PC. she was
definitelyto the left:on the COD9CfVlItive plliti:al speclnmL She-seemed to go to unusual cuds
to disassociate berselffrom the drab. c:onserwtive. tory demeanour that is at times given to
the PC Party. In&ct. both in the written andspoken word.Verge dislikedthe term "Iory,"
and was very insistentthat her speech wrilers and mediarelatiom peopleDeVer' refer to the
party as "the Tory party, - or to party members as "Tories- in her speakingDOtesaDd news
releases.Sheal9od&hd~theteDm~-lIJ:ld "ProgressivcConservat.ivcs."
She always insisted on her prefereDce, which was "the PC Party," or "PCs.." She said that
sbe wasDCVCI' comfurtable wilh the -c:onserwrive"label Perhaps this wu an ideologically.
basedquirk.
Because~ inthe PC Party is so loose,ideological labels are applied not to
the rank and file oftbc PC Party, but to the party elites and those who have.over time.
remainedto wield power withinthec:auc:us andthe bac:kroomsofthe party.
There is actually no formal membcrsbip in the PC Party of Newfolmdland and
Labrador. Some districtassociationshave in the pest c:hargcda nomiDaJ. teefur membcrsbip
such as $2.00 or $5.00 andissued membcrsbip canis, but this is DOtrequired by the party's
constitution am,whenimp1emeDted, was usedmostly fur fimd·raising purposes. While this
oon-structuml anaugemcut may give the appcaranc:e ofopenness andacc:essI.bili:ty. it is. in
fact. an impediment to c:arryiDg on internal party business. Informal Detworks based on
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friendship. kiDsbip. community and ncighbowboods nay work within local district
essocerces, but the lackofa fOrmalmcmbenbip structure bas hi:txfeml thepartys ability to
bw1dam DJBirUin a s:tn.:ms membc:r.ibip network throughouttheprow.:e. A Imre darmlging
clelm:ntofthis lackof.rncui:lersbip stnx:ture 'ML' seea time aDdtimeagain during the delegate
selection process leading up to the 1995 leadersbip convention. as the two competing
candidaIe caqlS tried to recruit the PC fiaithful in the fifty.two districtsacross the provintc.
The search fOr delegates WCIJl wen beyond the bounds of those who WCIC
t:radirioID1lypolitically aligDedto the PC Party. From some districts thcte werereports that
the Sullivan<:aq) feUto recruiting well-lmown local Liberalsandsupporters from the raDks
of locaJ.comunmity groups and service clubs, such as the Kinsmen. l ' to nm as delejates or
to vot e at the delegate seiection meetings. ThePC party also opens its party membership
during internal political processes. such as leadershipconveotioos. candidate selection and
delegate selection D:JCetings, to persons as young as 14. It may bearguedthat the intent.
which is to open the politicalprocess to young people. is laudable. But. the reality is that
many oftbese people become "instant Tories"or "tiny Tories," andhave DO realafliliation
with the party or its internal processes. However. people this young arc espcciaIly
!>1L'iCeptibIc to lIIllDipulatDnbyadult stratePts. wOO usctheyoUDgpeople as cheerleaders and
"go-furs" dming pstty C'Ymls,ot -mevm more sinister utility - cajoleor bribe the young
l~thLoyola Sullivanand former party leaderLen SimIrwwerenatioDlllpr=idents
of the KirJsIbm Clubs of Canada and. bad extensive octworb within this serviceclub
organi7Jnion throughout the province .
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tbepartytoo...enum. the resultsof adelegate sdccbon meetiDg bdd on Fogo Islan1DdiD&
up to the 1995COIM:IIlioD.. This neot is detailed in Appeodix B: The Fogo 1sIandIDcidmt.
The 1995aiasbip~oftbe PC Party ofNewiOuDdlaDdand Labndor was
decided. not on ideas., but on penoDality and 1Orm.. The pmx:cupation oftbe bdcnhip
teams was wah the bitter~ O'oU'ddegatc9dcction. not the developmenr: of candidalc
or party policy . The 1995 PC leadership coDVeDlion was \'UY typical of the modem
leadership geb;;tion prooc:ss UDderstress. HeatherMadvcr suggests -tbeee are many things
that go wrong at~ conventions and there are many things that are wrona: with
them. >020 The criticisms cited by MacIwr include the extraordinary am:nmt of money
involved in nmniog a Iooa kadership campaign (and the PC Icadership campaign was
bighcosts to deieples. These aDtInaIen the viability ofleadersbip conventions., am even
tho ugh some abuses are iDcgjtimate. some are deemed~.
of l 995 \liiastheU3COfaofidate 0slalc:s.' Each ofthe fifty-two PC Party district associations
XIJIeatbcr Mach'Or. Women andPolitics in Canada (peterborough. ON : Broadview
Press, 1996), 14.
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oames fur each of the eJnoeo.deiega1:e PJSitioas from the district usociatioo. Ew:rypenon
who voted atthe dek:gale selectionmeetmg was ax:ouraged to vote fOrthe CDtire slatefOr
UDusual tactics. Two ofthe dislrictassociations whichwere iaplaoe befure tbccaIl of the
leadership coDVelltion. bad oraaoimd and elected tlrir executivesbefore the bitterness
betweenthe two~ sound. the delegate selectionprocess. For example, atSL John's
North, thec:nttefuoe.pcnoaexecutivc decided to supp>rt Verge, as did thesix delegates at-
large who were elected to 8ltend the conveatioo. All this took place without anyinput from
tbepartyD::Emberswm supportcdLoyoIa SuUivm. Unfornmately fOr Sullivan,the St. John's
Nortb sdecti:Jn llZ!etDB wastbc firstto beco\'t:mi by • reporter from The SL John's Evmiog
Telegram.. The storytJ'UlItle'tiaa Verge's success was publisbcd the next day onthe paper' s
fi'oct-page.l:2 n.. publicpen:epboo was to set the tcee iJr theDCX1two mortths, as Sullivan
feh be was being pushed iIJto• DUIJlbcrs game.. and claimed be was gettiDsmany more
delegates than Verge as the ddegale selecb:tn pI'OCCS mowd aJoog. In an deniewwitb
2 lA district association'seJevende~ to theconveution consisted of the five-
penon executive, as weDas six eeeese~ specificallyto bedeques at theIcadersbip
conventioo. Very few d.ist:rict &5SOciations actually bid duIy--electcd exceuti¥es at the time
of the convention caD - wbicb indicates the lack of organization the PC Party was
experiencing ecross the province at the time.
:ncraig Jackson. "VC1lle Wms First Round,," I'M Ew ning Telegram (St. John' s,
NF), F.bnwy2.199S, 1.
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CBC Tele vision early in the campaign, SuUivansaid he was ~confident that we are a good
campaign that the rauIts of the 0veraD. selcc:tion processwere very close. as both sides
seemed to be wiming as mmy as they were IosiPs. The ballot at the convention,. with Verge
winningby ollly three voles. showed her interpretation to bemore accurate. Following the
convention,.SuIIiwn blamed the newsmedia for twisting hiswords by continually suggesting
througlxlut the campaign that be was saying he wasahead twc-to-cee , He claimed be bad
stoppedsaying this himse l( andit was the media which perpetuated the ~myth~ that hewas
extremely fiIrahead.24 Thistwist in logicfiom Loyola Sullivanwas a publicpeek at thekinds
of tac tics employed by his campaign workers that were often kepi from the public . Three
such tactics are detailedin Appendix B.
Verge supporters were cc oceeeed about the bitterness ofthe rivahy , and thcywere
appalled by what they regarded as thedirty tactics and dirty tricks from the SuIIivanside.
Where all this anger and bitternesscame from. I've never beenable to filtbom. No
cee is ever happy wb:n they Jose. but how were these peop le ab le to keep that anger
goibg ror a Y=l"!- w wbatdid wedo that golthcm so damn mad ? EverythiDg that
I saw, every deEgalc selcctionmeeting that I was involvedin, there was nothingthat
we did that was untoward, everything was above the board. I can 't say thesame
thing for them. fmafraid that thesimple answeris that we elected a woman.l'
A more co mplex answer is that themajor &ctionally.b8sedconflict within theparty
23"Here andNow,~ CBCTelevision News, CBNTSL John's, Feb. 14, 1995.
24Here and Now,~ CBC TeleWion News, CBNT SL John's, March 28, 1995.
2SKathy DunderdaJe, personal interview, September 12, 1996.
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explains the wiIIiDpcssby DfividuaIswtD held a d.iffemJIidcologX:alview thanLynnVerge
and bet team to \Wrlcagainst: b::rm1 to U!ICany kind ofmanipulativetactic or dirty trick:they
could muslertoundmnineber. 1besuggesOOniomKalhyDunderdale,. wtm co-chaircdthe
campaignteam SlJAX)rtiDg Vc:rge'sleadersbip bid, was thatan element ofthe party could DOt
and would not aa:ept the election of a woman as party leader. Dundetdale said sheand
Vergewereaware that they wac tnaking DeW ground byoffering a woman as leaderof the
party . ButDl.mdcrdalesaid her ownexperiencemay havemade her think::a little diflm:rdy
about theprocessthan Lynn Verge did.
I kneoN that thiswas an old boys' club andwe badsome reaDystrong sexistattitudes
and views towards women that I wasn't particularlycomfortable with. I Imcwthat
evenn the stigIust way, it was about changing attitudes, andattitudes needed to be
changed, C\aI in the way I cooductcd myselfwben I wasaround them. What struck
me about Lynnbecoming leaderwas that this wasan going to become easier . That
we could relax a Iittle more . That a staDdard wasgoing to be set that people were
goiDgtohaveto try to aspRto ina publicway, ifoot ina private way, wfUcb. wouJd
bavemade life easier. It's aUvery naiveDOW wben I look:beck on it.:l6
Therewasa reescnDuPderdaIe suggested that thiskindoftbirtilg was too simplistic
and naiv e. She saidwhile the party may have wanted to porttay itself as an open, clear-
thinking politicalorganization thatprovided equal opportunities to women as wen as men.
the reality ofwbat transpired as thedelegate selection processunfolded was a re6ection of
anything but opermess. She cited one exllIq)le of the PC Association on the campusof
Memorial University .
[Attbe] MUNPC Club,wesawyoung, educated men. who were supportiDgLoyola
"DundmlaIc.
39
SulliwD, wbo ..... downright........ to deIoplco.......,;aIIy""'" de........ W.
caDDOt ignore the influencethis must have bad on YOUl'lgpeople.particuIadyyoung
women. We bad delegates fi'om MenmiIIlUnivaaily whowac third and fOurthyear
Women's Studies majors. and they're having a look III this andthey'resaying"No.
definitely DOt. rmin the wrong place. I just:don't fit here ." [think we turned off
more yow:tg people in that process.:rr
it still olfends her. She said thatifouc does DOt believein thecquality ofpeople andifODe
deeper concerns. because. she maintain:s. rarely do individualshave just a singleprejudice.
She saidit becomes very dif6cult for a prejudiced person to be &ir at other levels. The
prejudice that shewas cxpericDcing was &ctiomlIy.bBscd. The 'us w:rsus them' mindsetbad
taken overthepBrty. The ooaJmnwas ect wodciDgaDd. intact. was tearins the pany apart.
For . not only was Lynn Verge a woman with a teministbeckground. shewas an
ideological nationalist and a wel&re liberal, UDCOmpromising in the equity she wanted for
Newfo und1aDdand Labrador society . She was in clear conflict with the faction within the
party which chmg to economic h1lctalismand toryism. particularly the aggressive business
liberals, who have sbcwn a cormiderable impatience with the demands of ideological
compromise and collaboration requested by the progressives UDder Verge.
By thc 1995 comanion. the fisctions bad beenfightingbitterly during the Ieadersbip
campaign and bad stopped coopenting with each other. Thenmia began referring to the
PC Ieadersbip race with unfJanering nicknames - the"'fOodfight, .. andthe "cbickenwars"
- because of various methods used by the two CIIIqlS to enticevoters to the delegate
sd ection meetings. The bitter ieadershipecetest of 1995 betweenLynn VergellDll Loyola
Sullivan had IIlllldcthe uodc:rfyKIg problan ofparty &ctiomlism rmch worse for the PC Party.
The two-penon eoeresr was split along factional aDdideological tiDes. Disgnmtled caucus
members., representingtile more conservative elemcm ofthe party, openly cbaDcngedtheir
leader. As opposifun leader. Lym Verge bad110 mcchanismatberdisposal to demaDdparty
loyalty. otber than her narrow. albeitIegmmBle. win. the convedion. Her detractors denied
her the k:gitimacyofthat win. The leadership contest. with only two ClIDdidates. split the
party caucus m:I petty members into two distiDct caIq)S - with Sullivan andhis supporters
representing the rigJx.ani Verge and her supporten OIl the~ The factiom worked against
each other with such a fury that caucus memberJack Byrne, in the midst of the leadership
campaign. said be'"thought theelection againstthe Liberalswould be the war andthis (the
leadershiprace) would be a smallb8ttJe - but this mthewar.-
TheimernalpartybickeriDg that followedLynn Verge' s win at the 1995 convention
was kept within the ranks ofthc caucus and party executiveandfor sixmoDths it remained
on the inside and never became pub6c . This started to change by late October lIDdearly
November of 1995. CBC Radio's The Morning Show carried extensive '"insider"
infurmationabout troubles within the pIIrty. Theradioprogram did not report any anti-Verge
hysteria, but tberc were quiet mumbIingsfrom w:lDlIJDed caucus members.:l!l' Then the
lila Byrne, personal interview. October 26. 1996.
lI'CBCRadio,1beMoming Show," November 4, 1995.
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mumbliDgsgrew louderandck:arer in early Dec:enilerwhena public opinion poll indicated
that support fur the Tories bad dropped sharply. The Corporate Research pon. released
November 28, 1995, showed that more than half (fifty·five percent) of decided voters
"'"""'" tboywould _ Ubml (... """_po.... liompolling =Uts in A.....).
wIWesupport iOr'tbe Pes lCllto tlmty-two percent: (down fiveperccnt).)OThe TorydiJemm
was exacerbated by the sudden resignation of Premiet Clyde WeDsjust befurc Christmas,
1995. The"coronation" ofBrian Tobin as Libcrallcadcr came even fBstcr in early 1anuary.
Trying to rc1OcusonaDl:W, apd uncxpet1Cd. opponctt Ic:admg the LibcralParty, Toryaux:us
members andpossilje caoJidlItcslBl to make a decision whenBrian Tobin caned a surprigc ,
snap eiec:tionfur Fcbruary 26. 1996-tbc middle ofNewfoundlaDd's often bittcrwinlcr-
they would haveto citbc:rsink or swim.with LynnVerge .
Not~jurqlcd no tbeTorypooL Rick:Woodixd, a caucus mcmbctwbo bad
supported Vcrgc ' slra;icnbip, "c:rossedtbc floor" aDdran as a Liberal Other PC amdidatcs
to work with her, others feb: they hadgood reason to actuaIIyworle against their leader.
Their argument was that shebad fiWcdto provide coherent Icadcrsbip during the
school refonn debBtcsoftbc late summer of 1995 Icading upto a provin<:ialreferendum. in
~Neuman andDon Mills. ..SatisfiactionWith the WeDsGovemmcnt Remains
Stable, But Liberals WIdcnLead in Voter Support" (Hali&x, N.S .: newsrelease issued by
Co rpo rate~ Associates, November 28, 1995, photocopied). The SUIWY of 400
voters inNcwfuuodland miLabradorwascxnxbK:tedNovember 7 to 16, 1995 as part oftbc
Onmibus survey ofAtJaDricCanadians.
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September, aDdthey said she was slow to put a cohesive adersbip tcaDl in place.l l But
caucus memberssuggested that her wont down&Jl was her i:ncftCctiveDes eedher inability
to deal with the problems within the party. Although Verae was urged by supporters aDd
caucusoutsidersto dealQh thesepobIcms which stemDed from the t:raditiom1 &ctioDalism
which bad splil:the p&rty, sbewasunableto do so. Ifthe putybad bcenable to coDftont aDd
deal with its 13ctionalism" it likely could have mounted a much more cohesive election
caJJ¥lign But, unfOmmateIy iJr Vqcandthe PC Party , it was not in the imerests oftbose
who oppo sed her to cooperate. Tbr::y bad been plaoning to oust bier. but the election call
mubbed their plans.
I I Alvin Hewlett, personal interview, October26, 1997; Harvey Hodder, personal
interview . October 14. 1997 .
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Leadenbip WODand Lost
4.1 An AnalysIs ortlle EveDts that Led to the Defeat orL)'IIll V.'1Ie
WbenLynn Verge was ejected leader oftbe Progressive Conservative (PC) Party of
Newfuundland andLabrador on Apri129. 1995. she declared inber acceptm;:e speech that
nothing was going to stop the PC Party from Conningthe DCJl1: gowrmnem. Yet 302 days
later, sheandhcrputysufleredacrusbing defeat. losing sevenoftbe sDcteenseats they held
going into the February 22. 1996 provincial election - includiDgVerge's own district of
HumberEast which she hadheld for seventeen yars..
John Lascbingcr.~ manager for the 1996 PC eicction campaign. futmd the
Tories fifty points bebindthe Liberals in bis own polling at the beginning oftbc campaign.1
Laschinger feared that the Newfoundland and labrador Liberals could match the New
Bnmswd. LibcraI PartyundcrFnmk McKennawbcnMcKenna's Liberals won all fifty-eigbr:
seats intbe NewBnmswick legislatvte in their October13. 1987 provincialelectioa. taking
sixty pcn:eD1: oftbc popu!a:r vote. 'Ibe &ct ttBt the NewfOtmdlarxlPes wereableto close the
gap to withinlOurteen percentage points in the popular vote on election day was, according
to Lascbinger.duec:otq)lcteIytotbewotk:ofVcrge. He saidLiberal insidersadmitted to bim.
after theFebruary 22 eiection that ifthe campaign bad gone on another week the Pes could
lJobn Lascbinger. pcnoDalinterview. August 17. 1996.
havewon thepopular 'YOlc.l Theproblem, according 10Laschingc:r. was that theprovincial
Tories bad 100 niJclJ. grourd to DIke up. Their imcmaI. bcl:cring aDdinfightingbad left them
indisamly. TbeprovD:ialPCs.. mired in oppositioll furalmost te.nyears. werevuJncrabIc 10
internalcontlict, as outlined by Georgc Perlin in the theory be bas labelledIhc Opposition
Party Symrome.3 Perlin explains that because oCtile perty's exclusion from office its
membersleDdto interact in imcmal party politics onlbe besis oCmotivcs that makeconfticl
difficuh10 resolve. Because IXmIlicIsfCICUI'ftequcntJy 8id Ihc party is subjectto manifest or
latent factiooamm. it is unable10 achieveoptimum organizationaleflectiveDessaDd, in nun.
projects an imagc of internal insIabi1itywbich UDdermincs pubtic confidence in its abiIity to
govern. Thus.electoral defeats contribute to coDflict in the party aDdconflict in the party
contribut es to elect:oral defeat! Not only was Lynn Verge. as leader . unable to queU the
intema.L conflict within the PC caucus aDd address thelictioualism which existedwithin the
party. she hadtroubie acknowblgiog that the split was open C"o'm. wider thanusual0\1:1' the
issue ofber leadership. Sbedidkmwtbatb::rgendc:rwa!lcausingtroublc:for somcmembers
of caucus. But she did not sec the coDDCCtion between that and the ideohgically-based
factionalismthatbad split the PC Party. Lym Vcrgclmew the party. perticularlytbc caucus.
was divided over her leadership because she was a woman. but she thought she could
2 Laschinger.
lGco rge C. Perlin. The Tory Syndro_: ullliuship Politics i" the Progressive
Conservative Party (Montreal.:McGiD-Queen'sUnivriy Press. 1980). 198.
"Perlin, 1980. 199.
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overcome tlose doubts anddealwith themopenly. 9t'bIItshe did not realize wasthat some
members of the~ mde dominatedc:aucw; would coospirc against her behindher
back. and not dealwith the issue openly. Verge believed tbe1: the inlemal party imriguc
played a signi6amt role in the defeat: of tile party in the 1996 provincial ek:ction.
A womanleaderani potc:ntiallyaWOIIBIl premier was a new and differentburdle that
wasmore tbIma considetable numberofpeople could surmount.. I choose to take a
pl~ inlerpretaIDnofl. AMI do still believethat the pltenl.ial was tbctc, despite
the intrigue which was there within the pvty. and even with tile Ul'ICOnscious
reluctance 01' deliberateprejudice of people wilhin the party that it could have
bappencd, that I could ba~ k:d the Pes to victory.'
Thereferences to an "unconscious re1uctaDce"anda "de liberate prejudice " indicale
that LynnVerge was aware of tile cleawge within the party . Even so, she did DOt put much
credence in tile argument that the party was split aloDgideological lines. Was she rigbI:?
WhatLynnVergebe~ wastbattbeewas a continuation ofwbat she called " camps"-
infonml groupingsof indMduaIswithin the party whoworked together andsupported like-
minded candidates during the threeleadership conventions of tbc modem era oftile party.'
However, there was mare at play witbin the 1995 version oftbe PC Party thanthe Verge
explanaOOn tbat thiswas~ a continuation ofC4q)S- Theseinformal groupings ofparty
elites bad a strong iieohgical eIetMm,based upon thetraditional factionalismthat bas existed
in thepertysince 1949. Tbisis supported bySemtorGerakl Ottenbeimer"s assessment oftile
roots of the party .
SLynn Verge. personaliDterview, April 9, 1997.
'V.....
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Tbc~J~PBrtyisccrtainlybuedon acoalitionof.iolc:rats. It
s diffi:ull to idedifY aDthe aspectsoftbcc:oalitioa,. but some oftbcm.are the small
,_ODd[........... uetbeJ .-ypa>plewbo"",-r"J....-
on the vab: ofirdMcb.al.liberties. DlividlaJ. &eedoms. iDdiWtuaI. choices, [md] the
right of people to bewhat they are. •• '"
The split aloog fiIl:ticIOO 6nr:swas DaICb. more proOOUlJCed in 1995. Lym Verge
reco gnized that there wascataiD!y IOIDe plottiDggoing on behind her t.d: wbilc: she was
leader. HoW'C'Va', she admincdthat her iIDnediateasse:wnenl of the siluarioo./CD shart of
At the time I did POt put much stock irtto the ability oftbc:se people to successfuIty
conspire against: me •• • UDdoubtedlythere wasa lot going on that I didn't witness
and that I might not have guessed was bappeniDg. The term 'conspiracy" sugests
to me solllCCbDg plamcd, deh'ate andco-ordinItcd. From what I've observed over
the years,. most people aren't iDdustrious mo. or txi&ht enough to do the
organizatio n.'
Lym Verge was to disc:oVtttbat DOt only was thereacoospDcy against ber wbic:b
wW~ in the auIUmD of 1995, but that this would have a~ inftuenceon theabitily
of the party to moUIIIa suc:cesWI election.campllig:a: ill early 1996. The opposition party
syndrome was in biahgearwi:1bin the raub ofthe PC caucus in late 1995.
Another aspect ofPmiD.'s opposition party syndrome whicb has relewnce for the
Newfouodlaod ud Lalndor Pes is the asses:sD::JeIIfthat: opposition pctics have trouble
some members ofClllX:Wl mD\IDlcd considerableresistance to the inclusion oftbe kinds of
7Senator Ottenbeimer. penonal inteniew, October 27, 1996.
'Vug..
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pcopk: Lynn VerJC, as bdcr, was attracting to tbepaty.
with the party before Verge's adenbip bid.but whot-i prori:led a pear:dealof support
1995 10play a key role in me dndJpmenr ofpllrty po licy. VcrF bid. D:Illintaincd since me
begioning of me Ieadc:nhip CIIIlpIjgn that iD.order fur me P'C& to win the govemment, tbc:y
woul! haw:to e:xp8Dd their c:onstituerq' by anr.:tiDg a difbml andwiderbase of support.
AtteqIts to irdde uese Dl:Wpeople were resisted by influentialmembers oftbc PC
ca ucus by October o f 1995, and this resistaDcewidened the split within the c:aueus.
So wbiicLyu::a Vergebid becomethekaIct. there wu abo an attempt: by that group
to put <theirpeople' in place at the executiYc kvd u weD. That only added to the
sense ofi90lltion and the sense offtusttation within the pany.'
1bc~~ to her attc:rJtllS to droduce a DJJrC modcnte elc::mmtto the
party thla fiM:Jum1her progressM:lid nationalist Yicws deniedVap theopportunity to lead
the party in a new direction. Verve did not inspireconfideoce within her an-maJc caucus,
mainiybeeeese the fifteenlIED, nc ludiog all of tbe .Dine who bad supported Loyola Sullivan,
and at least two lO of the~ who bad supportedher in the Ieadenhip. were~ to
VCIiC'Snew dRction and her 8tteI:q:Its10 Delude DeW pcopC in the decision-makiDgprocess.
'Harvey Hodder, penouaI interview, October 14, 1997.
loAlvin Hewlett and Rick Woodfurd.
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A lot of caucus aarce with my view . Evcn. brine the bdcnbip. the IIIIjority of
caucus maDben saw my views as beiDa ID;Ift~ of 0 .... pet)' .-.d
~to:IICofmoppommilymtourpcty,oWl'thcJons-term, to set t.ck rm
gmaDDID). [ tbm [~to:IICof~!be JWtYis IIDd where the ~has
to go . Some oftbc peoplewho supported bet haW\' sin;;c indicstcd to me tbd ill
rarospect she djd DOtlIrticuIatcthe cataiD. taD: pbiIo!opbies that the PCPwty has
tradiliooally stood u. L)'Dll Verge' s visionofthe pmy was pc:n:::eMd as beingaD
over the place. II
to secw Icadcrsbip. Caucus mel:Iilen complained tbet wIillethey were looking for :!IOIDC sign
ofbow she would lead the party , very shortly after she had won the Ieadetship she closeted
herselfaway in her o ffice with the door closed andrarely met with the caucus.
She became kader in May amwe were witbollla staff; she didn't make decisions.
••• What she djd wassbe came inandoseted bmaelffur kngtby periodsoftir:ne in
ber of6ce with berdoor dosed... Tboseofus 'Nt.:.were~oftbe otber
side~~ ill our own household. I'm sure we fi:1t more tike stnmgc:n than
sbc illteDded fix us to be sttaDger'S.12
Verge's slownessc pamg together a team wasp::rb8psthe rcsuII oftbe loss ofher
cb9c:st dcmaiadvi9cr, Lome Wbee'er , who had rctimI as Policy Advisor to the Opposition
just befiJreshe was electedbdet. Wbee'er wu extremely eood ill his dealings wiIh
disgrumIed caucus membenand often helped mJOOth ruffied featben.
It was a terrible loss that Lome retired befOre [ became leader, ahhoughbe stil1
"Loyola Sullivan, penonaJ interview. OCtober to, 1996.
l2JIarvey Hodder, penooal interview, October 14, 1997.
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contributed. He was basically only a phonecaDaway and any timeI asked him to
come aDdmeet with me l3ce-to-tace or anytime I asked him.to come aDdchat with
1Mcaucus as a &roUP or individual members,bedidn't besiIate. But not having him
in IMoOice daily was a terrible Ioss.IJ
Without \\'beeb to confide:in and with her caucus growing more dUgruntJed by the
day it took: only about six months before the caucus beganplotting againsttheir leader.
Resistance to Verge's leadershipstyle was growing. By October of 1995 the resistaD:eto
Lynn Verge's feminism.andthe pcn:cptions ofbow a fCminist leader would reshapethe
character oftbc PC Party was beingarticuJatcd bya majority ofcaucus-a cbamcter that
had the potential to become ancotrenebcd ideology that could. give moderate feministsa
niche they could identify with and where they could find support fur feministideas and
policies. As caucus supporter Jack:Byrne suggested. tbercwasa very difficulttask waiting
for LynnVerge when she won the party leadership, and that difIicultywas to stay with her
right through to the provincial election campaign.
There are people who never acceptedher win within the party • .. There were a
number ofreasons, but the predominaDt [one] was that some ofthesepeople - and
it was prevalentduring the election -just could not accept a WOtnllll as 1eader.1•
Jolm Laschinger abo supports this contention that the nine members of caucus who
opposed her bid fur the leadership tefused to co-operate with their leaderbecause they coukl
oot accept a woman as leader of the party . If Verge bad been premier, according to
Laschinger, she woukl havebadmore po9oU andinfiueDcc with which.to bring the rebellious
13Lynn Verge, personalinterview. April, 9, 1997.
I.Jaclri: Bymc, personalimerview. October 26, 1996.
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caucus members no line: '"Sbccould have removed. tbcm from cabiDctor takenaway other
petksand privilegestIJIIttheprmj:t oftbc province would have had conttolovcr."" But as
leaderof theopposition. she bad DO such power. La:scbingersaid that wbcnhe coDductcd
a numberoffucus group sessions w:ith. randomly selected voters while Verge was leader, he
foundthat whenbeMkcdquestionssuch as who hasthebest ecoDOmicplan for the province,
orwbo basthe best plan to dealwithsocia1 policy, tile Liberals wereconstslenl1ytwenlYto
thirtypoints abesdofthe Pes. Yet. bc pointcd out, at the same time, pollingindicatedthat
Verge was consislemJycloge to IlIId,at a numbetofpoints ahead 0.( Premier Clyde Wells in
people'sestimationofwho would make the best leader ror theprovince. "So. in &ct," said
Laschinger, ~tbc party was draggingher down...I~
Whatwashappeningwithin the ranks of tile maJc..dominatcdpolitical.elite oftile PC
Party of Newfoundland and Labrador was typical of other jurisdictions in western
democracies. 17 The mldeelites believed a womanas leaderwould hurt the party's eIectoral
chances.
The real problem for Lynn Verge was DOt an aversion by voters to vote for women;
"Laschingcr.
l~er'.
17See, i>r exlIIq)lc, SylviaB. BasbevkD, Toeingthe Lines: Women and Party Politic3
in English Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) or SandraBaxter, aDd
Marjorie Lansing. Women and Politics : The Visible Majority (Ann Arbor: University of
MichiganPress, 1983)01' JoniLovendusldaDdPippaNorris,eds.• Gender and Party Politics
(London: Sage Publications., 1993) or Heather MacIvor. Women and Politics in Canada
(pete<borougb. ON., B....m.w Press, 1996).
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A lDIIjorityofthe malecaucus meniJers bad. problemacceptingVerse' s bIdcrsbip
because o f the inter-reIatioDShip between Ieadenhipand authority and authority aDd
[L)c:d:nb:ip t.s the e:t...1cristic o f Dami autho..-y. Thus bdc:nbip is more than
simply having infIueDce or powu. or beirIa ableto I::ringsomeooe to do what)')U
war:him to do. rqardIes ofbis Dcmions or desires. r.e.Jcnbjp iuvoMs authority
andauIho rily impI;os_.~
The majority of caucus, despite Verge 's wiD at the convention. demcdher the
legDnacyof the positionof1e8der. This jed to. breakdown iDcomm.mic::arion between the
party and the:elcctorate. puticu1ar1yon matters o f policy. Tbc inftuco:e of this inability
within the PC Party to collDlW1icate its policies was10 prove cripplina:fur Verge. She was
una ble to do anything about it because of the stubborn~ mowrted. by caucus
IIJCDters.Ew:n tbough Verset.d _the support of1bcDIIIjorityo ftbe party , ami CDjoyed
the support of tbe DeWpKty~ thecaucus remaiocd UDCOOpentive.a In fact, Verge
fomd benelf tavns to dcalwilh the executiveof1be fCtYiD isolation, andbadto tIIIb bet
l'Tom Brook. & lring Elft:tN in Canada (Str.tiJrd. ON: Mercury. 1991). 81.
l'Williarn A Webb. uotkn and Elites (New York: HoJt.RiDehartandW"D'JSlOn.
1973), 18.
JO<:alviD. Powen. personal interview. October26, 1996.
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0lW. dti.n'ts to includeperty presidentCalvin Powell in thedecisio...making process. WhiJe
PoweDwasappn:ciativeofthe effurts ImIdeby VeIF, beknew tbId the rcsistanc<: lOOunled
by C8UCU'i would ultimately semusly b.ut the party.
[The party executive] bas as much right to detennioe the dinlction of this party as
thosepeople who areelectedby the people in Ibeir dSricts. because we, ourselves,
areelectedby the party, aDdwe have to espouse the views of tile party . And.with
thegWdaDccoftbeeJectedeaucusaDd withtbe MQun:es oftbc fifth floorl'we could
work together. This is the way we wanted to help develop the puty's position on
bealthca:re,.educ:ationandsofOrth.2:1
Powell saidthathebad asked thateucutive members be includedin caucus mcetiDgs
and was to ld by caucus that it was just eot the right thing to do . He said that while be
believed the decision was another example oftheus-versus-tbem menta.I:ity that dominated
the caucus, it badthe result ofcreaIiDg amther division witbDthe party andit was "very clear
that the ClWCUS wamedto ramin incomrol ofdecision-lIIIIciDg...n Powell conteDdedthat the
refusalby caucuswas anotbcr~ofthe growing rift between theVerge supporters, who
bad takenmany of theexecutive positiomin theeJection immediately following the leadership
convention. andthe caucus, themajority ofwbombad worked against Verge . Powell said
that beand Vcrge continued to communicate. andthatbe would try to bring her the views
of the executive . But when Verge left the leader's position following the 1996 election
defeat , communication betweenthe party executive and the caucus was practically DOD-
21Tbe PC Oppositionoffices.including the MHA's offices,secretarial, research and
public relations staff; are located on the fifth floor ofConfederation Building in 81. John's.
"Po_1l
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existent . Powell said that in the seven-month period betweenthe departure ofYeIF ftom
the party leadership aDdtheemoftus own term as party presidem in October. 1996, "the
truthoftb: lDIttcris dRlttbeexecutive bas gooc ooc warin terms oftrying to do something
arout this andthefifth&ot _ BODe theother way. 1'ben: basbeen no true colJKJlUDication
between the interim leader andthepresident.aDdthat basbeenvery sad...u
This rift between the party caucus and the party executive never su:dilced publicly.
And wbiJethe rift betweenthe caucus andits leaderwas also kept relatively quiet, it erupted
in lateNov=nber, 1995 wilhmedia reports ofcaucus in-figbbng. Lynn Verge saidthemedia
reports bad to be haged on insiderinformation.
[ suspcatim beine that [time] membersofcaucus werevery blatantlyundermining
me by talking "otfthe record" to Doug Letto [CDC Television legislativereporter]
and other reporters. Therewas OBjor self..infIil:ted danBge by then. The CBC
MorningShow did a coDJIDeDtatY about goings on inour caucus whichbad to come
fromthecaucus, therewas too nweh detail for tbem to get it aoyother way.zs
Lynn Verge's leadership ofthe PC PartyofNcwfoUDdlaDd and Labrador bad &ilcd
byNovember.I995. By thispointinbcrtcnureherinabilily to do anything about the internal
bickering and infighting was becoming public knowledge, and the publicbickering was
preceded by an organized effort to undermineVerge. to embarrass her and~ her
1eadernUp.
The plot to UDdenniDe Lym verge's leadershipwas revealed during the party"s
executive coum::i! moc:ting held in October, 1995 -just six months after Verge bad become
"veege.
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leader. AdistrEtpn:sidcnt. RobertLUIKirigan. fired the firstvoUeywben be stood up in the
meetirlgandaa:uscd.Verge ofusing party funds to pay JohnLaschiDget tOrtbc work be bad
done on her Jeadersbjp c:ampeign.:Ill
MyxJ(Gerry 0ttcDbcimcr tal10MCarter were tile only ODeS on our teet. outraged
atwlmWllSbcinginsinJaled. [Bythis time] tb: attacltwascoming from an over the
room, not fiomjust thisoaedislrict presided, it WBS~ weJl co--ordinatcd aDd1was
lookingat her [Verge] snd it WlIS akmst:as ifshe wasn't getting it. like the pennywas
not droppingwith her. We badpeople who weren't in any c:aD1'asking what was
going onandthen we bad dBt ixJlofa pmytreasurerstaDd up aDdsaythat beWlISD.'t
in charge of tile rmncy. bedml't know wbcre tile money bad gone. and tile (n:5ident
said that be never approved any party money fOrpa.,ymmtto John LascbiDger and
that. in fact, no party money bad been paid to 101mLucbiogcr and then other
membersoftbe~ got up aDdtuicaJlycallcd tbe JRSidmt a liar - it wasvery
ugly."
DurderdaJesaidthat. in the beginniDg. Lynn Verge didoot seem to te ewee oftbe
severity of theaccusations . But when she realizled what was being insinuated,she was
annoyed by the end oftbc day.
Shewastrulyupset because she was50 innocen1: and it was 50 far·fetcbed to suggest
that shemight bemisusingfunds,she just couldn't fBtbom it,.[ mean it just wouldn't
go into her brain that someone would suggest this. ShecaUcdme that Digblaround
midDight. 1 decidedto speak very plainly with her . I lold her that shewas goillg to
baveto get tmse tiillows inQlUCUll UDder control - because this is wbcre Ibatcame
from, thecaucus -aDd sbe wasgoing to have to get them UDdcrcontrol DOW. You
don't have any time and any other option but to do this. It wasn't long before I was
told thattbc:Ic wasaplot to oust:her and10 oust:her beforeChrisImas. Iftbere were
two or threethat would sIand with her. that was aD..2:lI
Dunderdale, aod otben iDterviewI:d, have suggested Bill Matthews played a major
lIIKathyDunderdaJe. personal iDtc:rview. September 12. 1996.
"DundmlaIe.
"ThmdmIaIc.
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role in orcbestratiog the plot against Lyun Verge.l'J Yet. Verge defi:Dds her decision to
appoint Bill Ma1thewsas Opposition House Leader. \\'bile be bad beld the position before
Verge became leader. why would she appointed him to the position againconsidering his
vigorous work to defeat her?
I honestly kl tim: be wasthebestcaucus member fOrthat job. And it seeeed to me
to beabappy coiDcideDce tbitt beprobably would bethe most important memberof
caucus givm hisstature withinthe groupto bne on myside. to try to meld the group.
He blIdsupporUdLoyoIa SuIliwnahbough [bad the impression at that time that be
didn't have anything in particular agaiDst DJC. In retrospect. perlIaps wbar:he bad
against mewas that I amfemaic.lO
The majority oftbe PC caucus badgrown more uncomiOrtabJewith tbeir leader .
Much of the public focus of this discomfort came from Verge's wrique position on the
cducati:lnrefOrmi!NJe duringthesunmetrDDrt:hsofl99S.
"
Premier Clyde Wellsbadcalled
a province-wide reterendwnon the denominational school issue,with the vote to take place
September 5, 1995. verge provided her own lUIlI1ysis of bow her position aftb:ted her
I wascalledupon as a poIiticalleadcr to make publicmy own personalchoice in the
retmDiumaDd my positilnand. my reasons were. adminedJy. vay difficult for people
l?yergc. Laschinger.
lOyergc.
JlLynn Verge's position. wastim: theprovincialgovcmmcnt's proposed constitutional
amendment didn'tgo filr enough md the amendment '"furtherelltrcDchesthe power ofthe
churches runningdeDominatiol:B1 schools. " She said that rather than. provide for significant
change,as thego~ claim:d, the proposak wouJdentrench the right ofdenominational
groups 10assign and dismiss te:lIdlenon di9criminBlory. non-\\Odtrdated grmmds . "Because
ofall these uncertainties andbecause I do support education reform, I will vote No in the
refurendum." Source: The Evening Telegram (SL John 's, NF.) August 23, 1995,3.
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to understand • •• I took quite a beatiDg. who knows bow it filtered out a month or
two later. but at the time the DeWS media and the COIIJIDeD1atOrs behaved like a
mindless herd• • •That caused!lOIDCproblemswithinawcus, puticu1arlyamong those
whose constituents voted No heavily. But we got through that. I sutICml some
damage because of it and some oftile reporters created the impression that I was
insincerein my approach,whichI think was themost damaging criticismofaU.n
The government narrowly won the educational rc~ with a ten percent
majority.JJ The p>1itica1 climate in NewfuurdJand wasextremely bot . Theclose vote was a
set·back.fur tbe WeDsLiberals. But thePC caucus was much too divided to takeanycmiit
or win any advantage from the closeness ofthe vot e. \Vhile some members were trying to
head off"a public squabble over theleadershipquestion, the leader' s unusual position on the
education refurm issue gave others newammunition with which to work to oust bee.
'fte big thingwe badlying inwait torus wasthataftersbe got the leadership. [Clyde]
WeDsdecUd to approachthe[education]issue iicologic:aDyandthat forced betbaDd
andshe got ideological on it andlesspolitical aud less practical At the timein her
school of tbo ught. with regard to her own position. there wasno more than five or
ten percent oftbe population [with beT]. The rest wereeither for it or against it on
vario us sorts of broad gut terms. Sbe was the only one who made a fine-tuned
analysis and stuck by it. But it was to berpoliticaldetrirnent ifnot destructioll.)oI
Lyno Verge latet discoveredtherewere things going on behind thescenes within the
party thatshewas not aware of. She did not immediately see the co DDCCtion betweenwhat
"verge.
"Tbe final vote was 110.614 (54.8%) Yes, 90,673 (44.9%) No . Then: were423
(.29'"/0)rejected baJlots.for a total voter tumout o f 201.710 (51.9%). Report oftbe Office
ofthe ChiefElectoral Officer. GovemmeDtofNewfoundland and Labrador. 1995.
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sbec:a&dthctbe~ bdBviow'ofBilMaltbews. andtheplot to undermineher as kakr.
ma.iDIy because shedidn"t put IIJl.dl stockinletthe ability of peop'cto succes:sfilDyClOrl.!pire
against 8II)'ODC:" aiD.fioi it han1to be~ tbld Bills behaviourwas 00IL"ICi:tusIy ca.k:ualed
However. fi:lDowq the paty's eu:c:utiYe COUDciJ. rnr:ctinK held.ill October 1995. it
became c~ to Verge that something was YCI)' scD:rusIy wrooe- The IIJ1'UI8CIDCIIt the
party badcatered Do wib.Jotn~ 'NIlS txoust- Do qucsWn. LaschiDser wu hired
byLynn Verge to manage her 1995 Jc.Iersbip campUgn. He abo bBd beenretamed by the
party to help prepare fur two by-elections (in Grand Falls. wbEh the PC party 'WOn. and in
Gander. wtUcb.theylost) as well as the provincialelcction. wbichthe Tories expected'WOuld
be held ineitber spring oreatly fiill, 1996.
Thefirstpenon to briDa iI [the Laschingcr~I up was Robert Lundripn, and
to beperi:ctJybooe:stI dddt R:aJiz:cwtJlll he.....,hir:mg __ first.[thmk: it wu after
the meetiIlg wbcn I reaIizledthe infermccs he was makir:la. because what be was
_ . .... .... I'-""fulJypUlIolD~.-..--_bc_'
do iI~ cmugb.br ee to grasp UDlilIater- tbIll bBdabusedmy posftnn as
party ic:ader' by la...q: the puty mer imo an arrangcma:JI: with 10bD1..asdIingerthat
involved esseoDallyusiD& p8rty fuDJsto pay10bl La:binger fOrwork that beW
do ne on my kadcnhip c:anpign.,.
S8
assessment.
'fuh .............__I 00""'4' hadn~bean!myoDC........ ...roa dUng
[before the IIlICCtingl andit certainly was oever in my mOl,. because as far as I was
concerned we bad dooe a fim1astic job ofpaying an my leadership auopaignbills
proq>l!y m:llhot ........ 1Ustmy. I .... comp....1ytakenby """'"'"" I _~ even
realilJe Mm was being hin1cd .. It W8SIl't UDtill8ler that it really dawned on me that
what they wen: really getting at wasthat 1was baviDg the party pay party fimds to
lookaftera leadership debt. ADI was guessing • thetee was that there were people
wiD didn't like John Lasch:inser. citbcr because bewas fromDmario . or because be
bad worked on my leadership. When the meeting startedgettingout ofcoDttoI at
somcpoinl Gcuy~ aDd. couple ofotbcn. spoke up in a helpful wayto put
things in perspedi.ve, but when RobertLundrigan, Martin IJanmJondfrom Kilbride
dimict,.am Larry Vaters from the youth federation startedon 101m. Laschinger. Cal
[party presided-Ca1vD PaweD] didn'tstep in.to take coDboIand I was left as leader
to try to deal with what wasbeingsaid.3a
Verge realized a fCwhours later that it had beenpart of an organized and ongoing
strategy on theput ofa numberof people to ambushher - she saidit was bard to saybow
many and who werepart ofit - but she believedthat the people who had spoken up had
been prinEd. Was tim a conspiracy, or simplya manifestation of the more bitter aspects of
the &ctiona1ism. which bad split the party sincethe late 1970s?
Lym Verge lmewtbat because shewas only leaderoftbeopposition. sbc lacked the
power and thetools to bringthelDctioDal infigbtiogto an end.. Shesaid there may well have
been other factorswbX::h fed tlW; &ctionaIly-bascd plot : aspects ofber behaviour; aspects of
may not even havebeea aware ofwhich exacerbated the situation. Verge acknowledged that
the PCParty basbeen spJjt:andthis split basbeenwith the party for more than twenty years.
l-Verge.
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In the yearsthat fullowed 79. even with Pcckfurd's strmgth, and even with [Bill]
Doodybowmgout, I could9I:DJCrenmaots oftbe Doodycampaignandthe Peckfurd
C8lqBign. And a Jotofthe Doody people supported. LenSimmsin '89 aDdsupported
Loyola Sullivan in '95. And a lot of the people wIx:l supportedPeckfOrd in 79.
supported TomRikout in '89 and supported me in '95. I don't think whatbappeDed
after the '9S adcrsbip wasa maded departure. it was a matter ofdegree, but it was
more of the same. The Sullivan camp probably continued in various ways, Oval or
subtle.J9
Lynn Verge mew immediately fuIJowiDgthe party's executivecolJDCilmeeting that
she was in trouble. It had takenonly six months fur the party to openly work againsther.
This was an organized coospi:racy.
I knew tOralong timethat tbcrcwerea hiofpeoplein the puty andthe caucus who
really didn't fecilID)' wamnh towards me, but I thought they were practic:alenough
to want to use me enough as longu I was riding high in the polls.40
U nfo rtwlal:ely fur Lynn Verge, the tactics used by her detractors in October were
carriedover to theparty's efforts to mount an dfcctive election campaign. Looking beck at
the parry's preparations fortbe 1996 provincial election, ao;l with the benefit: ofhindsigbt,
Verge was disappointed that Bill Matthews. who had decided DOt to seck re-election, and
who she had askedto oo-cbair the campaignreadiness team. was very disruptive during the
election CBlDpllign. Matthews wascn:icalof9OlDe of the c:aqJSign straIegicsandpoliciesand
o ften caused havoc at ca:rqmgn headquarters by starting vigorous arguments with a I1\Id)cr
of thc: female volunteers about the prob'cms ofbaving a fcmalc leader and the role women
should play in politics. Some of thesel1fgUIDCDtS became quite heated at times. Verge
60
thought Matthews mry Im'e beenrmtivatedby a persoD81 change be bad made in hisumital
status at the time .
AroUDdthe~ thatbe pubticlyrrBdethiscb8rIge belOkime about it andbeabo lOki
me that bedoubted that be would run in the DeXt election. I believethat the main
reasonM1ybedidn'tnm was tbsl be didn't think bewould get re-elected,andthat be
had come to thisCODClusionlong before Brian Tobin came on the proviocial scene.
In retrospect I don't think BiDMBttbewswas ever comfurtable with me as leader .
Probably. mainlybecause I am a woman. Tbat's what I believe!'
The 1996 provincialelection campaign wascverythiug the Tories thougbt it would
not be. Most caucusmemberswereconvmeed they would be running against ClydeWeDs.
but it was Brian Tobin wOO returned to NewfuuDiIlmdfrom Ottawa to iead the Liberals after
Wells rc:signcdin Drct:amer 1995 . TheTories abo thought the election would be held in the
early fall of 1996, or ifearlier than thIt, in late spring. No one had any idea Brian Tobin
would caDa provincialelection for February . Despite putting on a good fBce. the PC Party
was unprepared. The Liberals produced a slick Red Book of campaignpromises., takinga
page from theirnationaJ cousins in the Liberal Party ofCanada, while the Tories rushed to
co bble together their efforts at policy reconstruction.
The Liberals produced an impressivetelevision advertisiDg campaign,with Brian
To bin offering comforting generalizations built aroUDd a~ theme:wtUchurged
Ne wfoundlanders and Labradorians to vote Liberal "For A Better Tomorrow." The PC
te lcvision campaign slnwed Verge in lDlfJattaing close-ups, beratiDgthe Liberals underC1ydc
WeDs.Tory~beadquarteIswas SWlIIJlled withcaIIs&omdisgrumled supporters who
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W8DICd the ads stopped. New ads \1tUe puUed together from bolage ofVerxe's first speech
of the campaign -aspeech manyjoUl'Dll..ltsts suggested was the bestofher career42 - in
which she introduced both the Tory KBIue Book" aDdthe slate of c:andXlafcs fur the party.
But aDdistricts wereDOt reprcscntc:d andeven though the numberofseats in theIcgisIatu:rc
had once again changed - reduced to furty-eigbt from fifty-two - the Pes initially bad
trouble filling a full slate ofcandidatcs.
After Vergewasdefeated n the 1996 clecOOn she m;igDedas bidet. The caucus. rot
smprisiogIy, ebcse Loyola SuItMmas the party's iDterimleader. Sullivanwas determined to
briDghis own styleto the Ieadcrsbip oftheparty andworked to distance "his" party from the
o ne led by Verge. In his opinion, theparty bad Kgivm away" the politicalrigbl: to Liberal
leader Clyde WcIls and the PC Party under hisIcadcrsbip would work.to win it beck,41
Sullivan contended Verge real1yrever bad a vision ofwbere to take the party,"
Verge,~, I!IIintaiDed she was trying to beinclusive. to invite DeW people to the party
"I__by .......jo"""""" who covered tho """'" who""""" tho
view that, in tbciropinion, tbespeech wasone ofthe bestofVergc's career . Thejoumalists
included Carmel Smith, CBC TclevWon News, andCraig lackson, TheEvening Telegram.
The Evening Telegramalso praisl:dthe policy docwnent in aneditorialpublishedFebruary
6, 1996 . saying "'1bc Tory documeDt offen a WQIth ofdetail, rot only on the major issues
o f tbe day such as debtnm:BgCIIJlD. edo:ationand bcahhremrm, but it also has coDSidcrable
detail on fOrestpoli:y, socialservi:esmjob creation in ruralNcwfuundland." The Evening
Telegram (St .lohn's, NFl. February6, 1996. 4.
43Loyola Sullivan, personal interview, October 10, 1996,
"Sullivan.
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and rmkc tbcputy attIactive to tbc:m.." She was not a toe-tbe-tiDepolitician; b:::r cbaIImge
was to lead theparty in the direction !be wanred it to BO. But the rebellious caucus refused
to aDowbctto do thai . The result ftomthe 1996 provincialelecmofur Lym Verge was
defeat for herselfand the p8rty. Shehad lost her own scat. and the plI:rtY t.d su1Ieftd •
serious setbeckwilh~ other bnw::r' caucus rucumers joiDiDabet mdefeat.
The six bmcr caucusmembenwho bad.held 0010 their sats were joiDedby eeee
oew~Jotm.Ottcntriu::r . TomOsbome. andBobFradL FOUl'oftheDinewimen
~ fium thegroup who bad supported Verae . I have c:aGcd these "progressiva" because
tbcy_"'V_-"the"""",,",,~ Tbey..,1udcd _IdOl"'"
and Paul Shelley. aswell as the newcomers Ottenbeimer andOsborne. both ofwbom bad
worked very bard for Verae durins the leadership. Abo elected were fuur &om the
" coD!lel'W1:iYe" group who bad supported Loyola SuIlMm:~ RogerF~ Ed
Byrne. aDd~ Hodder. and the newcomer Frmch. as well as SuDiYan himsel£ When
SbeilaOsborrc, motbct ofTomOshomc anda staUDd1 Verge supporter and workerduring
the 1995~ WODa by-e5ectionmSt.lobn' s West in July, 1996, the baIara: intbe
"verge.
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5
Co oc:losioa.
Why Lyna Vo",,'. Loadonblp Failed
Lynn Verge was unable to unile the Progressive Comcrwtive (PC) Party of
NewfuUDdlaDd ao:I Lahmdot . She t.d lost beeown seal in the 1996provincial dcction-
less than a year after she was elected leader- and the party sufteftd its worst electoral
de feat intwemy-fM: >-no Her leadcrsbipoftbc PC Pany t.d &iIed. It 1ilikd bccaux of
fuur inter-related filcton. First, she &ilcd because she wonthe adership oCa party which
was already split into two ideologic&Ily-basedfactiom which became more deeply divided
respond to the chaIleDgeoflelldersbip; unable to fulfil the iDberm:authority requftd oCher
os l<ade<.
5.1 Tb nalnp oIJd~"'.-bued F.crloII .n..
The most imnediate cbaIIe:Dge fix L)'DDVerp when she bcame kadcr of tbe PC
Party was to deal wXb.the imemal pm,. factioDaiism. Tbc rp:atest in1luenoc OD the caucus
was the cotqlCting wIucs ofthc two fIlctiom within the puty. Ideo logX:al factiona.l:iml isan
exp lanat ion for the motives of the major players because many of them bad conviDced
themselves that this womanwould UDdoubtedly take the party 'too fin' to the left. Because
Lynn verge bad.in theearly months ofher.leadership, demDost:I'Ued to theeaucus tbBt!be
While gmdc:r Iftiudic:e COIIbihdcd sigDificaDlJy to the motives of caucus. the
resistance I1DUD1ed by the DIIjority of tile PC Party iDflueDlials was, in effect. MJeologicaIly
based, C)ubia Fur:bs Epstc:iD wrote that ..emphasis on WOIIED' S IimitatioDsbecause of tbcir
sex-roie-a.ssociated status is an exctusioDary mechanism - an ideological ploy 10 keep
wo men out of tile running fur!Ji&h-nmkiog activity - and not DCCCSSBriIy a re6ection o f
mility." '
Thercalityi:lrtlle PCParty. wbenLym. Verge nBicta~ speech foUowina:
her narrow three-vote majority win of the party' s leadership. was a party divided. The
inr:emal5tJ'iZ within the party siomered for m)Sl oftheearly summer of 1995 after VCTlC'S
convemioo win.. Immediately lblJowiog her wm. m.oy DeW peopk wac elected 10 IeIlio r
posil:iomoo tbe party e:xr:aUve.2 Many ofthese were supporters o fLym. Verge. andcame
from the ranks oCtile progressivcs.. This set up an idcoJoPca1 suugg}c beeweee the I*tY
worked bebiodthe sceues,asc:auaas rnembenjoined wiIb oldpard. male exccutivecouncil
members to batcha plot at the puty's executivecoUDciJ. meetinI in October, 1995.
ICynthiaFuchsEpstein, Deceptive Distinctions: Sa. ~nJer. and the Social
Order (New Haven:YaleUniversityPress. 1988), 12.
2'fbe election oCtheparty executive was held the day following the Icadcrsbip.
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in an organized attempt to providethe caucus with. means to fOrcebet resignation. The
strategy did oot haw: lime to nm.its COline because panicerupted wiLhin the ranks oftbe PC
cacccs in November aDdDecember - just t-:J momm prior to the c:aD of the provizlcial
eklcti:>n. The pmic was~ by.drop offive po-.sin a well-pubticizl:dopinion poR
for the party and tmugbt out the wont in many ofthec:aucus mmilcrs.
5.2 The Cltallniae orGnder
The genderoftbe Ddcr aetuaDycontributed to the filctiouaIism &ctor. fOr while the
ideologically -based factionalism was. problem for Verge.as it wu for the leaden oftbe
party~ came~ her-and tb:tsewho wiD.mlOwbcr- the cleawge within the put)'
wasexac:crtmed by Lym Verge's gender. because • majority o f the caucus simply refused
to work:with a WOJDI;D.
Canadian research from the mid-1980s pam to the eeceecus challenge ttUs
preseered for Lynn Verge, as the first woman to lead. political party inNewfoUDdland and
Labrador. JaniDcBrodie suggeststhat iftbere is to bean attitude tbaDge cooccming the
\\'ben a mrional sampleofwters was asked in 1984 wbetbcr "more sbouJd be done
for womm' s equality ," eigbly-fivepercent ofwomen aDdeigbly~ ofmen agreed that
lJanine Brodie. WO"'f'n and Politics irr Canada(Toronto : McClellandand StCWBrt,
1985).29.
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more should bedone . Wbeo.de}egatesto the 1983 fi:dc:n1PC bdersbip colM:dioa. were
asked the same question. only fDrty-six pen::ent ofwomcn miltwemy~pcroeat ofmeo
agreed.. The fuUowiDgyear, sixty-chree percmt ofi:male deleptes to the DBtional I..iberaI
Iead=lUp <0'-• ..,.ed; wbiIe the fig= '" .... Ubmdde_ was tIrirty-ql<
percent." Thesedata show thd the rmst IICtiYe mr:mbc:rs ofthe natiooa1 PC mil LiJeral
partiesoftbc dar,tilt people who still take on the respoDSibitity to nominate thec:aDdida1cs.,
nm.the~ and often nm. tOr office themselves, wac out oftouch with the Canadian
electorate regarding the question.of wbetbcr or oot more should be done fur women 's
equality ,
At thepovinciallevel in NewfuWldland andLatndor, there wasa deep split within
the PC Party ever tbe acceptance of a woman as leader . One &ction within the party, the
progressives, believedstrongly that Lym Verge would have beena good premierbecaux
cf ber political bec:kground aDi experieooe, ard tbefact she was . WOImD. The other faction,
the conservatiYes., wfD1erecogniziDa: Lym Verge' s w-hb of potiticaJ. experience within
caucus. bad coaviDccd themselves tbIt she would steer thepa1y in the ""wrona: dim:tion."
that it needed to move to the rigbl. rot to the left, and thesydolism of a woman as Iea:Itt
oftbe party was inconsistent with tbrirviewoftbe puty. This attitude, it:wouldappe.r, is
popular in.westcm democncies. And, as Tom Brook:bas suggested. women. and men who
believe in a more equitable electoral system will have 10 accept iDcremeDtal chanse iflhey
'Brodie, 1985, 29.
67
~ Broot sugcstcd tt.I: "'thedBDceofsome dramatic~ughn theDCXl
fewyears.resubvin equal k:gjsIld:ive repre:saUb:m b WOmal is bishIY unlikely. Whatis
more: likely is a gradualim:mIse in the number of women directly involved in the powa'
processes, ecre women seekins direct political power, aDd more women and men being
elected who will promote gender equity."'"
Thereis an underlying theme dJIt emerges tlrough the inteniews tor this study-
ODe which speab to mexpllnd:ion udle behaviourof lOmeof themen idvotwd.. Francine
D 'Amico pmiICIU the argumemtbBt the very idea tbBtwomm's po6tic:al~ must
area of women in politics, and one which is relcwm to this analysis of Lym Verse's
leadership , is the argu:r:oent that attitudesheld by male party elites arc more relcwnt to the
success or faihue of women caDdidates than the biases or discriminatory attitudestoward
women whichuwy beheld by voters lit luge.
The question of public receptivity of bnaIt [political] etiles bas thus become a
pn:lIDioed: c:oocanof pubticopinjonanalysts. wOO gmc:raDyCODClude th8t voters do
DOt~ agaDt womenc:amJates. Yettbe teSIlS'Ch abo JDI..ittams that tbcre
are widely held~DS by [male] puty elites tlml faDUe c:andid8ta lose
ellCctions beause o fpopulilrresislaoce totbeirgendet. This is l:Iuec1uponre~
'Tom Brook. Gf!tting Ekcted 111 QmaJa (Stratmrd, ON: Mercury, 1991), 86.
6FranciDcD'Amico . "Women National Leaders," in Women/II World PoJiricJ eds.
FraDCiDe D'Amico and Peter R. Beckman(Westport. Conn:Bergin &~. 1995).21.
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ea:pR::alre!ileCdliomanalysisofa:tualeKOOnretu:rm. This rcscarcb.offers little
t:'Vidmcc in support oftbe view that votc:n discriminate against 'WOmenQIIlfidatc:s
~ because they arc women.1
PC Patty elites - puticularIy the caucus - disaiminated again:sI: Lynn Verge
because of tbe mofher "Eftist...~ tmdenciesaodber IOOdc:nte feminism. Her
polD:al. rmkcupwasadcadlycooi:inllkm.mVcqc's Icadersbip ofthc PC Party . It became
evident veryearly ioto her Ieadenhipthat a majority ofdle smallbut iDftuentia1segmenr of
the elite oftbc PC PartyofNewfOUDdlm1 andLafndorscood against her.
HealherMadYO£'s tir:diDgs support the posimm takatbylIllllY ofthose imervicwed
fur-this study,' wbe:Dshe wrote:
The barriers to 'WOnct in politics are 1DIOf5ciaJ. aDdoften iIr.rislllIe. Tbey lie both
inside andoutside thepolitX:alS)'SlaJr in the political~ in the stl'UCtUIt:s and
traditions oftbc polilicalimtiutPB. n the kkobgies ofme public-prM1e dicbotomy
and the gendcred division of labour, andin the !IOCio-ecoDOmic~es and
fiunily strUCtUreS that flow fioomtbose ideologjes. '
But whileLym. Verge badoveroolDeDBIl)'oftbose b8rriers in ber sevenaeeo.years in
public IifC, shew:derstooddie ral!OIl wbytmc was so mdl resisIaDce within the caucus and
pany elites to die DOtionofa WOIDll1lIeader.
Ma)bc aDre tbBnalot ofotber PC:OPE - because r-.-c spema lot ofmy life thinkiDg
lSytvia B. Basbevtin, Toeing 1M Li1tU : WOIIIell and Party Politics ill English
Canada (foromo: Univasity o f Torooto Press. 1985) , 147-148 .
'P=onol~, Lynn V..... April_ , 1997; AMn _ Octoba 16. 1997;
__.Octoba 14. 1997;KatbyDundadalc, S<p<embcr 12, 1996; CaMnPowcU.
October 26, 1996; Jack Byme , October 26, 1996; andJohn Lascbingc:r, August 17, 1996.
'HeatbeI'Macl\lOl', Wommtmd Polilics ill Cmtado (PderOOrough, ON.: Broadview
Press, 1996) 224 .
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abom: it - I knt:w I wasbreaDlg new groUDd. I>urinI the years tbI!It I sc:nocd as an
MHA. the public'M:Ill somediswx:e inlllXC:ptiDg a WODml in politics-a 'W01mD
as a rant.-aDd-fDe MIlA. a womm as a cabiod miDiscer, albeit. pcrbaps,a token
wo..... •
Verge reaIizaI thata a 'M)ftBD.)eaderand potmliaDy. womanprelllicr,!be would
be~ the c:baIIaIBe onn. ax:epted as a leader , sDpIy because shewas a woman..
She tooka p>sitM Uerpret.moDof the 1996 ekctioo rcsu.hs. While tIleR may havebeena
election,aboutfiJrty~ofwtencastbeJJolsbtbcPC Pwty. Lym Verge believed that
this level of support for the party !be led represented political progress for WOmc'll in
NcwfuuOOland lD1LaIrador, m;i badcircumstaIxcs bceo!K)mewbI!It. diffi:mJt, she could have
won,'!
Information gatbcm:Ithrough the irItc:rviC'ws for this study suggests that had Lynn
Vergebccnable to stayooaaxr oftbe PC Party she would have changed the party. She
of the political prooc:ssin the PC Party and the proviDce. Her po6tical teekgrouodaDdthe
way she rose through the ranks ofthePC caucus mofon:c this conclusion.
Two ofVerse's stauDcb::st malesupporters, MIlA Jack Bymc aDd Party Presideut
CaMJ.Po-=fl,.said tbIt the resl bmBc Verge scancdunable to actover, from.the perspective
of the party , was bet dose association with the province's women's 1DDvemcm.. 1be
Illyerge.
lIVerge .
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perception was that L)'DllVcrxe's femiDism.wa: a drear: to the ideologX:al t-se of the
pro viocial PC Party.
Befon: emeriog pubtic 6fi; Lynn Verge badbeen a mcmbc:r of the executM: ofthe
NatDnaI A£tioo.Cormittee (NAC) OIlthe Status ofWomm.and lDd SIeI'W!d at the IocalIew:I
wil:htbeComcr BrookSUtusofWomen' sCouncil. She was seeD by manyin NewfuUDdlaDd
andLalndorwbo c:alIed thI:uIJeMsfi:minisls. or supporters ofthe feministmovemem. to be
alcader . Dcspitethispcrceptioo. this was DOt a status Vc:rgcset out to~ ahhDughher
ascmdancyto the Icadcrship o f O De o f the provb:e'S rwetmjor political.r-rtieswas aided
and atcnedin pat rDe85I.R by IOIDC ofme JmSt mJuettiaI bdc:n oftbe faniDist moftUICIII:
in the province.12 Unfo rtuDalely fOr Lynn Verze. the PC Party was DOt n:ady fOr her.
George Perlin's theory oftbe opposition party syndro me tits the experienceofl995
PC Party closely, as the Newfo undland Tories were mired in a state of confusion and
purOD her best fiIceix tbe puhii:;ar:d MIIbd. diliger:tIyto put fOrwani olD election~
that was~ despitethe negativity arourKI her. Her speechto candidates wbc:nshe
anoounced the plII'ty"s pilldOnnand imoduc:ed their "Blue Book'" poticy document was
!lAm BeDis a fo.rmerPresident oftbe Newfuundlandand Latndor Couu;;i} on the
Status of Women, aDda loDg-mne fiiend ard coufllant ofL)'DD Verge. A nwnber ofrequests
weremade fur an mterview,lu shedeclined,saymg tbm: weresome thingsshe "'would have
to take to her grave. "
11
laudedby the newsmedia.13 But it was not mough. Theputy went down to defeatat the
poDs in the February election. She bad been leaderof thePCPany fur just 302 days. Her
exit:was as dramEdic as her entry, as a loss by just seven votes in her o wn riding prompteda
reco unt . lmpatiem and perhaps iJl..advised, two caucus members. Ed Byrne and Roger
Fitzgerald, publicJycriticizr:d their leader, saying she should leave before the reoo unt. 14 This
gratuitous gesture provXled• pubticgIimpoeat • party deeplydivid<dhdemaIJy.
Lynn Verge saidthe actio ns of ber two caucus colleagues We1C '"uPprofCssiooaJ.,"
pa:rticuIariywhenthe comments servedto publicly underminethe party leader.
What Ed Byrne and Roger Fitzgerald did on TV rea1Iy sOOckedme, but ina curious
way[_. """""<e6of""""'" thcirundemUnmghad been made pubtic TIUngs
are always easier to deal with when they're out in the open. But I was still blown
awa y by their stupidity and[ still can't understaDd it becausemy days were very
IllIDlbaedand they didn't haw to do tbBt. fmjust IIIDIZCd at it • .. [never did sec the
interviewand irs probebIyjust.as wen. WIlen[ did rcSgnit:was ahnost a relief to get
our:of tbcre. Theway [ too k:it came naturally . It's ax something [ bad plannedfor.15
Her experience as leaderhasgreatly affix:tcdthe wayLynn Verge thinks about public
life.but she saidthe experience basDOt chang ed ber as a person. She saidthat therewere
times when shefuund it: difficult to keep going. She understood the occessity of putting
forward the pen:cption that the party was-united. However. it. was DOt the behaviour of
13u.Tbc Tory document offen a wealth ofdetail, DOtonly on the major issues of1be
day such as debI~ education andhealthrefimn, but it also bas comidcrable detail
o n forest po licy, social servicesand jo b creation in rural Newfo undland." Editorial, The
Evening Telegram (St. John 's, NF) February 6, 1996,4.
"Tracey Banon, "Tories get burned: Party's image blackened by public spat over
Verge 's 1eadersbi:p." TheEvening Telegram (St. John 's, NF) February 29, 1996, 1.
"verge,
72
people who bad opposedher &lr theIeadc::rsIDp ttm shei:Jmd difficuttto take. What unsettled
her the lmSl wastile bebaW>urof people who bad supported ber , only to abandon her in her
time ofneed.
I fimction bestwhen I have at leastsome people around me who take tile positive
approach andwboeoergizcme, lmlwas 1:leiDs drowu:dinthis chorus ofbCgativity;
I found it dif6cu!t to keep going.16
Caucus members were walching Lyan Verge very closely after she badwon the
Ieadersbip. 1'hey were waiting for her to put her own stamp on tile new PC Party, to give it
new directi::ln UIder her Icadcrsbip, andto give that leadership JePimacy. But, according to
Harvey Hoddet, a potentially supportive memberofcaucus. she did DOtdeliver.
Wh:n she bceamcleaderit very quicldy confirmed fOr me why I didn't support her.
She became leaderin Mayand we were without a staff; she didn't make decisions.
[As a leader] you've got to facilitate unity. My impression is that sbcdidn't do a
great dealto wcbJmeLoyolaandbc wasn'temlnced to suggest that we are all part
of a team. Instead, what she did was she came in and closeted herself for Iengtby
periods of time in her o flice with her door closedl7
Caucus members who had supported Loyola Sullivan complaiDcd that they bad
become "strangers in [their] own household...II
Theparty was stuck andlooked to Verge to get them going again. Members oftile
rival Sullivan camp expected Verge to get the bell rolling and they say they were willing 10
''H_.
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work.w:i1hhe:r-or at least~ bathe bc:De& ofm.c to sec which direction she would take
the party . But her sloWDCSS at namiDga newteam andappoioting a IJl:W staff exacerbetcd
a situation that was bound to fiUl if nothing was done . Then she made another critical
mistake.
She made the nmtake ofkeepiDg the same House Leader• .kerepiDg the same critic
roles. Shedidn't c::ome in aDdsay ·I' m the Ieab'. I'mgoing to make mymark on this
party~ &WIlY.' She kept BillMatthews on as House Leader . wbi;;hcaused some
of her own suppo rtcrs to Idndofsay "why did I work.so bard Cosupport her?' So
right away there were some rifts within be!'own ranks as wellI'
Unfortunately, !lOmeof the caucus members who bad worked within Verge's
organizarion were also "ungracious in victory.- and the anger on both sides continued fur
a long time. Hodder said there were people in~ who never spoke to eachother for
months. For quite some time the patty just: could not find the means to put thepast behind
tbemand Ieam to work: together. 'Those who wereclose to the problem suggest Verge did
oot do enough to facetheproblem bead~n.
For her part, LynnVerge saidchat she found it extmnefy difficult to keep going-
especially in the last threemonths of 1995, when she was surrounded by a tmnendous
amount of oegacivily. Shesaw her former ally Alvin Hewletc succumbto theoegatiw fon:es
around thecaucus.
He keptruming to me, tellDg meabout all the aegativity . Tberc are various ways in
which you can process reality. There are !lOmepeople who can take a cbalJengeand
regardit as a dIaDenge aDdcoocermtte on what has to be done to meet the challenge
''Hodde<.
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and even t.ve some lim.woddDg at it. AD1 thenthereare other peoplewho presem:
you with an UDSUIttIOuntabIc problem andmoan and groan incessantly about bow
ir:npossiblcitis to beat.1l
Lynn Verge saX!that in..herpoliticaLlife she functioned best when shebad people
around her wfK:l took thepos;itM approach lIDdwbo meqi:zcd her - people like ber mentor
and advisorLomeWbedcr. She saidthat when Lome Wheelerretired it was a terrible loss .
Lome was coDStaD1lyreassuring Alvin or other people wbo were moaning aDd
groaningaDdexpressing doubts am seeing the worst. But without Lome mel with
Alvin, wfK:l badbeenmy ally, getting droWDCd in thischorus ofnegativity. I fuund it
difficult to keep going..n
Her expericncc as the first woman to lead ODe of the two major political parties in
NewfOwdlaDd am Labrador wasnot what Lynn Verge hadhoped it would be. She kDcw
there would be trcmmdous cba1lenges when she decided to seek the 'eadersbipof the party
- the cha1JeDge ofhaving the party accept her as leader. and the ebalIenge ofhaving voters
acce pt aDdsupport a woman as leader . While she was succcssfu1 in meetingboth those
challenges. the root of her fiWure was her inability to demonstrate to party elites -
particularly her own caucus colleagues - that a woman could be accepted as party leaderby
the rank.and file of tbe PC party of Newfo UDdlaod andLabrador, and a woman oould be
accepted as Premier of the province by the voters of Newfoundland aDdLabrador. The
burdenofshouldering this challenge aiooe is much too onerous to lay all the blamefor the
party's firilureson Lynn Verge. But. as leadet. she would have to have shouldered at least
"verge.
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part of theresponsibility fOrthe miNes and &iJuresof the psrty durmg ~ term u leader'in
late 1995 ami early 1996. She t.s cboc that. 8m: thosewho sbouldst.re that. raponsibWry
are tbose I:IICIIiaswabiD.the caucus who worked agamt ber10 the~ oftbe psrty" s
~ I hIM:arp:d thIf: tbe!e:i:Jm:s wilhin ClWCUS dictated eet":itihm: ofthe pmty by tbcT
own~ Tbrir actions ImlYiJr some time coqxonDe the future of the PC hrty
ofNewfo UDdlaDd aDdLabrwior.
FoUowina: her 1995.961eadersbip de_Ie. Lynn Verac did cot rule out . return 10
publiclire. But she gave DO indil;:amn ofwhen or where. or it: that might be. She was asked
by fonner nariooai PC Party leader Jean Owest to run in the 1997 fCderalelection in the
riding of HUDiJcr-st.Barl»-Baic verte, but dcc6ocd.D She mwmd to the pnctice of law
inComer Broo k. ill early 1997.
:UVcrge.
76
Bm UOORAPHY
Basbe vtin,. Sytvia B. Toeing tM Linu: WOI'k!'ft QIfl/ Pony Politics in EnglisJI
em-Ia. Toro lllo: UDi\usity ofToro Dlo Press. 1935 .
Baxter . Sandra, andMarjorie Lamiog. W'0InC'1I and Politics: 1'1w J'"l.Jible Maiority.
AnnArbor: UnivcrsityofMichipnPress.I983.
Beller. Dennis C.• aDdFrank. P. BeDoni Faction Politics : Political PllTtiu and
FoctioIIoJism ;11 Comparativtt Penp«tive. Santa 8ar'bBB. CA: Clio Press,.
1978.
Brodie. JaniDe. WOIWI'Ilind Pol i tics in~. Toronto: McGraw-HiDRyenoo.
1985.
Brook. Tom. Getti,., Ekct~d in Canrd:l. Sttatford.ON: MaaIry. 1991.
Browmcy. Keith. aDd Mkbacl Howlett. eds. lJw ProvinckI/ Slau: Politics i"
Canac:.h's Provincu and Toritoriu. Toromo: Copp Out Pitman. 1992 .
Brym. Robert 1. R~gionaJlsm in ContU.r . Toronto : Irwin,. 1986.
Bystydrzienski. rill M. cd. Wome11. Transforming Politics. Bloomington: IDdiana
Umvemty Press, 1992.
Cairns. Alan C. "The Govcrament and Societies of Can8dian Federalism.·
Canadi01fJounta1of Political Sci~1I4Y 10( 1983): 695-709.
Crosbie.John C. No Holib &:ured: My lifr in Politics. Tcrcrso: McCleIlaDi
a:Stewart. 1997.
O' Amico. Frmcinc. and Peter R. BccIaMn. eels. Womc"'I ;" World Politia.
Wespoe, CooL: Il<>p. ...Ganoy, 1995.
D)d. RaId. Provint:Id Politicsin~. 2d ed, Scarborough. ON.: Prmticc-HaD.
Canada. 1991.
n
Eccl<WIl. ""...... v_~ IUohud Jay. Mld>odICamy, /Un
MacKmzie m1 RU Wilford, cds.. Po/ilko/ Ideologies: A"1~.2d
ed, New York: Routledge. 1994 .
Foley, MX:bad. ed./detu TItat Shape Po/ilia. M.anchesrer:: MaDcbestcrUMusiIy
Press. 1994 .
FwxIc:rburk. Charles,aodRobert G. T'b;)t:.bm.Poliltall/deob:>giu: Left. ClntrY,
Rigltl.2dcd.NewYork::HarperCoI6ns, 1994.
Greeseee, Mark. "Ladersbip Crisis ill an Opp;tsition Party:: The Liberal Party
of'NewixDllm1.- InLeadnsand Pwtitu ill Cmtrardiatt Politics : ErpnUnas
of 1M Pro vilfCU. eels. lCcoDetb. R. Carty , Lynda Eric:bon md I>omaJd E.
Blake . Toronto : Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada.1992.
Hagopian, Mark N. Regimes. Muwmenls, and Ideologies. New York: Longman.
1978.
Hanrahan, Maura. Uncenain Refitge. St. John's: Bn:akwa1cr. 1993.
Hinicb,. Melvin J.t and Michael C. Munger . Ideology and lite Theory ofPolitical
Choice . Ann Arbor-The University of Michigan Press, 1994.
House, ID. "Tbc Moux lba1 Roars: New Di:rcctions in Canadian Political
Economy - the Case of Newfoundland.· In Regionalism in Cmtoda.
ed, Robert J. Brym. 152·168. Toroato: IrwiD.Publishing, 1986.
La.scbingc:r. lobo. and Geoffrey SteYc:DS. Leoden and !.usn' Mona1s: BockToom
Pol itics ill Ca1u:Ia. Toronto: Key PorterBooks.1992.
Laslett, Barbm'a. JobIrma Bremer, and YesimAm,. eds. Rethinking 1M Pol itiCQ/:
Got.*r. Resistm«, and dw Slate. 0JDa0:The University ofClDcago Press,
[995.
Levy, Gary, aod Gnbam White. eds, Provincial and TerrlloriQ/ ugiJ/Dtuns
in Conado. Toronto: Uflh.'ersity ofToromo Press. 1989 .
Lo~ Joni., andPippa Norris, ells. Genderartd PaTty Politics. LoDdon:Sage
Publications, 1993.
7.
Maclvor . Heather. Womm and Politics ill G2ndda. Peterborough. ON.: Broadview
Pr=, 1996.
Matthews.Ralph. l'1tt'Cnation ofRqioftollJepntdmcy. ToroDlO: University of
Torouto Pres&,1983.
_ . Ma=eo, IUclmd G. Pri<e. """ RDnoId-.. <do. lAod<n
and1.ladenltipbtem-la. Torollto :Oxfurd UniYcnityPr=s. I994 .
Paige. Glenn D. l'1tt' Scinrtiflc Study of Polltka/ 1.Iadnship . New York:: The
Fm:Press.lm.
Peckford. A Brian. 17te Past In The I'nulfl : ..4 Ptntmal Penpeetiw Oft
Newfmmdlturd'3 Futwn. St. JabD.'s: Harty C\I1fPublications.1913.
Perlin, George C. 1M Tory Syrtdrrmre: Leaiknhip Polina in tM Progreu fw
Cotuerva#lJe Party. Mo mreal: McOill-Queen's University Press. 1980.
_ _ . cd. Party Democracy ill O:",adQ: TM Po/ina of NatlONl/ PlU1)'
Comentlonr . Scarboro ugh. ON .: Prenticc-HaD CanadaInc.• 1988.
Punnett. R..M.&/ec:ting the Party LeoJu: Britai" in Comparative PenpecttYe.
l.oDdon: Harvester \\'bcatsheat1992.
Robin,. MartiD.. ed, Qmadimr. Provincial Politia : 1M Pony Systems of the
Ten P'ruvina3. 2d eel. Scarborough. ON : Prmtice-HaDofCanada. 1918 .
Sutherland. S.R. "The Problem.of Dirty HaDdsin Po1itK:s: Peace in the Vegetable
Trade.- CtmatBmt ./uunIaI of Political $ci ena XXVIII:J (Sept l:lDber
1995) : 161-167.
VianelJo. Mino . and ReDI1aSiemic:mka. cds. Gettt:In lrwqJllliity: A Comparative
Study of DixriM irtatlon tmd Participotion. Loodoo:: SAGE Publications.
1990.
Welsh, William A uotkn and E/i tu. New York: Holt., RiDehartand W"mstoa.
1m.
79
APPENDIX A
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TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEWS (LWed AIpbabcUoaIly)
1. Jack:Byme October26, 1996
2. Kathy DundenlaIe Septembe< 12, 1996
3. AlvinHewJett October16. 1997
4.
--
October14, 1997
5. lohn Lascbinger August 17, 1996
6. SenatorGeraldOttenbeimer October27. 1996
1. JohnOttenheimer October10. 1996
8. Dr. CalvinPoweD Octobcr26,1996
9. PaulSbelley October26, 1996
10. Loyola Sullivan October10, 1996
11. Lynn Verge April 9, 1991
81
.Jock Bynoe - IDle ...... October 26, 1996
[Jack Bymc..the DICttlbcr b St. Iobn's EastExtern ( DOW caDcdCape St. FnDcis in
the redistriued Home ofAsaeailly). ... the..MIlA to 1mb.mD~ to C'itbetofthc two
leadership hopefuls.throwing hissupport behindL)'DDVcqe. He played. vitaJ. role in her
I<adenhipl>d.Kn'D>g ..~ ........--I.aschinoa".]
A lotoftb: people- the long-timeparty people.from what I could gather- were
supportiDgSullivan. Why? Bc:cau9c it went t.:k. to the time she [Vc:rge]was in cabiDet. and
many peoplc considered that she wam't very fIexilJe. ADd people felt that maybe they
theparty. 0lriJg I8sI: &II, II::adq ~ the wiDl:er electiooaDd[Brian] Tobin comiIlB t.ek., she
was being undermiDedfrom within. I brought it up . nlDIileroftimes bJt notbmg c:banged
. . . ifthat hadDDtbsppeDed,. TobinIDlYDDt~ c::cxu: beck. IfLym had KOnm thesupport
from peopletbBthad opposed her during the leadership, that Loyola is now gettiDgfrom the
people thathadopposed bimdumg theIcadersbip,it would~ beena different story during
the last election and I doubt ifTobin would have nm come b&ck.. Tbere were a nwnbcr o f
reasons, but the predominant(ODe] was that some of tbese people - andit wu prevalent
dumgtbeeJecmn-just could DOt.:.cept a 1NOmanas a lc8der . There was a great deal of
bitterness [during the Ieaders!ripJ. It was a battIe-royaL I newt did makeany ncga1h'e
commeras aboutLoyola. I tried to teUpeop&c that wbm. this [the II:adcrshipnee) is over.
","bcthcrwewinor be,~ sotto work wiIh biEn. We cm't divide the party this way. But
there~ only two pcop6enmnirv. and tor us.that' s what eededup bappenina and at times
it becamepersonal fur SOlDC peopicon both sides. Peopic usedto say to me: •Jack do you
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know what you're up apimt? - You're up againstmoDC)'. the mova5 and the!bakers. ant
you ba...en't got a c:baDcc.. I blew it was saini: to beck»c . I f.t us up by about 30 \'Otcs.
But during the IeadcntUp [comemion) ilsdfat thehotel a bI: ofstuffwem: on and people
cbangai We had two Yates wa.lk:outDO.us O"'=l'SOUIC manpcttythiDg.~
MJbc two Verge dclcptcs wIlD left thecolM:lltion in a buff were Rolandand Angela
Keen,win got in a dispute with the party executiw over whetheror DOtAngela Wp an ex-
officio membc:tof tbe pmty. \Vbentbeparty~ruJcdagainstAnBeIa, tbetwo left the
convention and did DOtvote. Both bad beenVerse supportcn.
13
[Kathy I>urderdaIe. is a imDer preside:DI: of the Newfi>undlmd aDd Labrador
Federatio n ofMUDidptJitics. a ixmer PC candidate (tmsUCCeSSfid) in the 1993 provincial
election. IIlJd a mnner praidem of the Pro~ Come:natiYe Pa:rty's WOI:Dm'S
AssociatiG n. Sbr: abo 5iIe1'Wd as co-dJair ofLyrm Verge's 1elIdcnbipc:ampigD team.]
Clyde WeDs had asked me to nm. mr the Ubenals in the 1993 e5ection but my
by the Wellsgovcmmc:nt helped me decide thaI the Libera1 government bad to go - and.
would work to remove them &omoffice; 50 whenI was asked to nm. tOr the Progressive
Conservatives in Fomme-Hermitage I said "yes' . And it was like I was a lamb to the
slaugbler. So that was it. I was in then and I was tnnded a PC and it WBSfl't so mucha caD
to the party, as such.it was more a reaction against the way Clyde Wells andhis i 0 \'efDlDCDl
treated people. \Vbc:n ayde Wellslid asked me if.~ bedcftsted in rumring I toki him.
at the tinr: that (WUJled to !Cl'Ve out rnytemlas presideat oftbc R:derationlllJd. wouldn 't
run for any party. But within the e:nsuiDs 10 DlOIIlhs thiDp bid gotten really t.1. The
federation was pleading lOr c:oDSUltation ao;l input aDdwe were igDom1andwe were beiDa:
treated very badly. We were treatedwith c:oDterqlt,we were lied to, andwe were ignom:L
In the c:odilllJlldemcc:olmlitted. POtsuch much to the PC Party . but to seei:DgClyde WeDs
go, and I think: tberc is a difference•
I wasDCYCI'any ar:=: timofPC leader LenSinms and the people hehadaroundhim.
and in the begirmiDg, when I did get involved. I hada lot of problems with the way they
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conducted themselves - policy-wme. I wasn't particu1ar:1y comfortable aroUDdthese guys
-lIIld it wast/w:wguys. I bad semLym, bad watchedbet fur a numberofyears and I liked
her. Andona numbercroceasces she bad sought me out when I bad bccomepresidenl of
thefederation. I remember a couple ofweeks befure a convention in ComerBrook:I got a
call from her to invite me to hmcb or breakfast and it WlIS just to findout whoI wasand to
let me knowwb> she was, aDdshemaintaioed a relatiomhip with me over an that time with
DO bidden agenda, other than an exchange ofviews,beingsupportive and an exchange of
information. andI really likedthat, that's the way I thoughttbirtgs should work.
But in terms oftbe party itselCI was neververy comfortable in the presence ofthe
men who dominatedboth the public offices and the backrooms. The only way I could
describe it is that therewas waytoo rmch testosterone there . They were veryanxious for me
to nm in Fomme-Hermitage andonce: I committed myself to it I put my heartandsoul into
it.but tryingto talk:to Len Simmsor hiscbiefof~ thcywould knock:you in thebead10
timesin the firsttewmiDutesoftbe convcrsationjust in the Janguage they were using. [was
in a district where there was DO organization, DO money, aDd[wasn't from thedistrict. and
[was trying 10 do my best fix theparty, but it seemed to bemore important to them to have
thepresidentoftbc Federation of Municipalities. regardlessofwbo that was,so theycould
trumpet tba:t tactandhelp them raisea bir:more money provDcially,but I wasn't getting much
support and when I did get something it was because [ badto threaten every other day to
waIk imo St. 10M" and wring someone'sneck.. I don'!:know bow tDaD)' times[ beardtbeni
say 'Now Kathy, my dear ,' and other IinJepower playsill Iaoguage. So, for me it was
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frustratingand 1rever bonded with them.in a political sort ofway.
WhenI bad decided to run, Lynn caDedandonce again otlCtcd her support and her
encouragement. And because 1became mexofficio memberoftbc party asac::andidatc of
record, I startedgoing to convmions and got involvedwith the women's association. When
I became cbair oftbewomen's association and.was part oftbe party's executive council. my
relationship with Lynn ciec:peDed. ar: the p8rty~Iani I got a muchbetter ideaofwbere Lynn
was coming from and what she stood fur.
I thought that Lynn Verge would make a good leadetoftbe PC Party . WhenLen
SimmsdeciIedto resign 1n:memberit wasaround Christmas time and1called Lynn and left
a m:::ssagconber(~mlCbiDeencouraging betto nm fur the leadership. She called
me back and we talked about it fur a while and shesaidshe was seriously considering it.
Then Am1Ben called and we discussed whether or DOt1 would be willing to help and I said
I'ddo just about anything but fund-raising. that is DOt my forte . And then Lynn called me arxi
asked me ifl would co-chair her campaign. 1didn't n:aIIyknow what that meant.but Lynn
andI ta1ked about it andI thought:that ifLymt kit I coukldo it. then I'd try . I cOilid also help
coWlter-offtbe provincial bI1arw;:e that was gooe - especiallythe whole south coast - with
Glenn Tobin and Bill Matthews (the two PC MIlAs from the Bwin Peninsula ) supporting
Loyola SuIIivan. And in temI9: ofmy associaWn with the federation she was wise enough to
kmw thattherewas ar: least10 peopledBt I knew in everymunicipality in this province,and
they would know my DlIIDe.
We knew we would bebreakingnew groUDdbyofferiDg a WODlBll as leaderof the
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Progressive ConservativeParty - DDt only on a proviDcia!~ but wilhin the PC Party
ilscl£.The WB)" tbIIt the men dDugm.the 111m who~ the pmy. aDdwXhwham [ bad.
<:otDC inClOlDct ..nb. n the h yean ormy iaYD1vemerIt Ub the pat)'; [certaiDly bid their
view with regard to women in geoeral, and putic:uJuty with reprd to the PC Women's
Association. [knew that this was an 'old boys' club' andwe bMl Kllllle reaDySb'OD8 sexist
attitudes and views towards women thlI1 [wasn't pllIticularlycomfOrtablewiIh. And it was
so mething you couldn't fO~ lOr five minutes. in terms of bow you condu:tc:d yoursd£. [
knewtbat evenin tbeslig.b:lest way, it was about chaDging attitudes. andIIltitudcsDCCded to
be changed, even in the way [coDducted mysdfwben I was around them. What struck me
about Lynn becoming leader was that this wasall going to become easier . That we coWd
relax a liltle~ 'l'hst aslaOOardwasgoingto be!et that peoplc werc gomg to have to try
to aspire to in a public way, if DDt ina private way. whichwoWd have made life easier. It 's
all very naive DOW when I look bKleon it.
Chu tb:::n:., . tb:: MUNPCChb.~ saw )'O'q(. eduaIted lIED. who weresupporting
Loyo la SuIIiwn, who 'MR cIowtriabt abusive tode~ especially femaledelegates. We
C8IDlt ignoretb:: mJumce this rrust have had on youngpeople, puticula:dyyoung women.
We baddelegatesfromMermrialUnMnily who 'Mft tbm ad b.tb)Ul' Women's Studies
majors. and tbcy'rc having • look at this and they're sayins 'No. definitely DOt" rmin tb:
wro ng place. [just don't fit beee,' [think we turned o lf'more young people ill that process.
But whatamazes me about this is that we bad • districtassociation meeting herejust before
the conventioniastOctober . and ODe oftbc young women in our 8S'JOciation is abo involved
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in tb::MONPC Cub amshe said1 can't stand it any Imte, tbey're stiRup tbere figIKingtb::
Ieadc:rship. E\'erYmeetingwe SOto. they'restill up tbcrc. a yearand a halflater. fi&btio&.
I dime a grcat 8lm UDloCdifficultydealing with these pcopIc.ltjustotrmds me.
If~ don'tbdieYC in tile equality oCpeopleaDdifyou don't haYea fimdammtaJ.respect iK'
peoplercgardlessoCBCDkr. to m:: that puts on aDkiodsoCml fiabls. Because rudy do we
have single prejudices. If)'Ou have biases basedon geuder. they will bleedout Do other
areas . It hewmcs very difficult tora JW'Ciudiced penon to be fair at other levels. And tb::
hardest part oftbis fOrsome of us to accept is that these men haveenabling womcnaround
them who support them in this and pat them on the b8ctand say they don't teelllllll'JiDalim1
by it.
The power plays that grew out of the leadershipco nventio n carried over to tb::
imcmalopcralK'ms of tile party. An indication ofthe I*t)"s lackoCrespouse to the IciDds of
personality struggJcsthat wac BOmg on was the moveby the party exa:utive coamittec to
bold andi::rax:ecallsrar.hertban.face..to...facemcctiDgs.This proved to bea disaster. fOr the
process wtDch was DeClded to be put in place to heal the wo unds that came out: of the
leadership CllIq)llignnever even got started. 1'herc were\'aY few face-to...face ttJeelirIgs
where iBdividuals could inunct on a more penooal buis. And the bill was certaWy in our
court wbenitClll:De to the tint fewmeetiDgs oCtile plIrty. We bad won [the IeadmhipJand
it was up to us to mate the processofheaIiqJ:the wounds. But in the first:few meetingswe
found there wasn't a scnsitivityto our overtures. To come togctbcr as a group sbouJd have
been where wewould begin that whole process, andthe fact that it was avoided very early
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in the processby holding these confcreD:.e cans. which werelong alii tedious and boring,
dibl't do it. Tberebad been 90IDC p:etty rough tbmgssUdand done during thecampaign that
you almost needed some sort ofcatharsis or feD:e-mendiDg.
Lym. tmdsome fi::oce.mendiDg by ofIeriDg Bill Matthews the positionofopposition
house leader. But the rmveonly alienated [Verge's aDy] Neil Wmdsor, andatewotberof
the MHAs who had supported her. I think Neil fully expected.to beappointed opposition
house leader . I understand what she was trying to do in building a cohesive group by giving
a nod to the other side. I thinkNeil was very loyal to her throughout her campaign aDdhis
nose was out ofjoint.. AUtbatdD, ofcourse, was alieDatc some ofthepeople wOO bad been
onberside. Iwes e bitsmprised wtthbcr choiceofBill Matthews., becauseofaU thecaucus
members, Bill was the only 00: who refused to attend the meetingof the caucus and
executive council which was heldimmediately following the Icadenbip convention
In the last executive council. meeting [ attended, I finally decided I wasn't going to
take the deceit any ome alii so I deciIed[ wasgoing to make it clear I was DO longer going
to be involved.Othe£things\Ioaebappcoingwithin theparty following Lym 's win that gave
IDe the impression that some caucus members were growing uncomfortab&c because they
perceived 8 threat from women in the party . I bad beardthat [Waterford-Kcmnount MHA]
HarveyHodderwasgoing around~ that the firstthiogthey'd have to do is get rid ofthat
god-damn women's association. So I said to them at the meeting: Here you have an
association that gets very little support within the party aDdalmost DO support outside the
party, it has DO money and DO resources, so why are you so thre&tmed by it? I didn't get a
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stnUgbf: lII15M:S. I saw how those men used. women within tile s-tY. I didn't see women on
tbcexcculMQ)Ubdbeqeiw:nmyseaseofpower. I didn't:3ItlCwomen bcitls appoioled to
committeesand boards within the J*lYwithpositioDs ofpo-=r.
When Lym became Jc-da", thepeoplewe tile plWa' ill tbe puty, wbich were mostly
...... by tho """ .... bod"'I'I""'ed1.0,... SuIIivm, decided thoy would I'" up wiIh b<r
fur a while to see how !he would peri>rm. but it dXfn't take long befOre they were wortiDg
agamt: ber, Andooeoftbcways tbeydid this was 10 desexuali:zlC her. Tbcytold silly stories
about Lynn going to the airport to meet Bob and when they met they would shakebands .
Whatoonsense. Anyone who kmws Lynn and Bob Verae knows they are sickenlyirt jove .
They arm't dem>D:!lIr8Ii\'C tu aB.youIBve10do iswtre tile way they klok at each other and
you keow these two people are in love and they're dewted 10 each other. BUIthese men
foundIbis i>reignto tbc:m. or somcdlirlg. Now mI an oflhem. but a~ dealof them, even
tb:Jugh they \Wft IIImied men. Irated most 'MNDCIl they QmC mconract with as sex ot:;eds.
And ifauy \WlDll1was DN'to the J8tY, _ if_bad Ibc stigblest bit gome- mr her inlc:rms
of bXs, _ wasbil: upon bylheseiU)'!. But do)Oll think they wouJd suggest that she 5Cn"e
on a party co mmitt ee or toard?
I DC\U rai!ed the issue of tile way the "boys' of the pIrty treated womenwith Lynn.
But, I suspccI d:lBI: ifLym. wasIIWlR of it, she IcDicd to IUrD a bIiD.d eyeto it. Because Lynn
igm red muchofwbat these ' party mcn ' did in the t.claooms" she abo didn'l see die plol
they were about to unveil before beTeyes. She tends to be very goal-orie:medand [ don't
think she saw the terrible power play that was about to unfold before bet. They all weDI:
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down to confi:ontbet, they hada big caucus mee:tiIIg where they oonftonte:dbet. and by that
time theybad brougm peoplelib: Alvin Hewlett, wbo bad supported bet. on their side . Neil
[Wmdsor] who bad been nursing his WOUDds fur a oouple of months saw this as an
opportunity to get beck in so be supported her. as did Jack Byrne, who stayedtrue to her.
But the rest played right into Sullivan's andMattbcws' baods.andMatthews' hands \1IICfe aU
over it. I'm not sure what Loyola's role was, but be bad one. anda major ODC. but be was
cute emugh to say 'Now you fellows will haveto do tlM.' Bill [Mattbcws] did most ofthe
work. I can n:me:nDct goirlg 10elcctioD-Ra6ncss DKlCtiDgs and after the meetings Bill would
go after Alvin, and there's no other way to describe it, Alvin would have these temper
tanttums. And you oould see Bilrs Machiavellian touch, egging Alvin on and edging him on
with eoough truth spread into it about bet shortcomings - let's faceit she's not perfe<:tIID:i
she basalways been a procrastinator - and Bill would play on these and rile Alvin and some
of tbe others up.
But the realpklt wasn't reveab1 until the executiveool.UlCil meeting beki in October,
1995 - about six DDDths after Lynn bad become leader. Robert Lundrigan [port deGrave
districtpres:KJent] stood up in themeeting andaccused Lymofusing party fiuldsto pay John
Laschinger fur the work be baddone on her Ieadersbip~ Myself;Gmy Ottenbeimer
and JoImCarterwere the onIyoncsonour feet, outraged at what was being iDsinuatcd. The
attac:k:WMCOmiog fiomano~tbc room. DOt fiomjust tbisonedistrict presidenl, it was very
wen co-ordinated andI wasbaking at her [Verge) and it was almostas ifshe wasn't getting
it, likethepeunywas ootdroppiDgwithbel' . We badpeopJe who weren't in any camp asking
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what was going 00 andthenwe bad that fool oCa pBrtytreasurer staDdup andsay that be
wasn't in charge oCtile moDe)'. he didn't jcow where the rmDe)' bad gone,. eed thepresideot
said ttmhe De\'eI'appro~allYputy money ill'pI)'IJZd to Jalm La9chinger ao1 that.in tact.
no party moocy bad beenpaid to 101m.LascbiPget andthenother members oftheexecutive
got up and basX:ally caJlcd thepresident a liar -it wasvery ugly. ADd she sat up in tile
middleofit -just not gettiIIg it. When it did seep in andwhen sbc realized what was being
done. she was very raw by the end of tile day. She wastruly upset because she was so
innocent and it was so fitt-ti:tcbedto suggest that she might be misusingfums, she just
couldn't filthmn~ I meanil~ wouldn't go into bet brainthat someone would suggest this.
She calledme that nigbt around midnigbt. I decided to speakvery plainly withher. I told her
that she was going to haw: to get those fellows in caucus UDdercontrol - because this is
where that came from. the caucus - andshe was goiDg to haveto get them undercontrol
now . You don't have any timeaDdany other option but to do this. [carried on with my
coraectsacross the provio;:e and it wasn't long before I wastold that there was a plot to oust
her amto oust her before a.ristmas. Iftbere were two or threethat would staDdwith her .
that was aIL So. Brian Tobin and Clyde Wells saved her b8c0n before Christmas by WeDs
resigning and Tobin coming in aodcalling the snapelection. Then there wasa real flurry
about whowas goingto cross the &or aod who was staying- aDdthat was very real But,
ctberthan[Rkk] Woodfurd (MIlA fOrHumber Valley]. theyan decided to sinkor swimwith
her. So hereyou bad all this crowd doing their damage to her fOra year and a half; eroding
the support of ex officios and otbct party supporters. expcaing to get elected. Now they
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wen::caugblintbeitownSDUe. AD. the stUffthattbeybad beea doing to undermine berwes
nowstartiDgto reftcctbackontbem. Their intention originaIly was to bang her,aDd to bang
berbyhmclf: Now tbc:yVA:R all txmgby tbeir own doings. AD.tbegossipwithin the party.
and the growing public perceptionof the disconrent wasstartiDg to hauntthem.
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Alvin H.....tt ·I.fervie.. OetDber 16, 1997
My expcricocestarted with the Moores years aqj thereappeared to have been two
sub-tribesinthePC Party, aDdthe Moorestrb: wasllOrt orUIDIC~ anda tad more
right wing, aodthePcd:fOnI sidewas more on the sort oftlJe progressive side ofProgressive
CoIl'lCl'Wlive. He was a red tory and he got inDDvativeaDdthe same can be said for Verge.
Wlth lllieout and Simms therewasn 't a great deal tIEreOr ODebeiDg red and the otber one
blue. But certainly the original split was establisbed on red-blue1incsaDdit carried through
on perso nalloyaltics and estabIisbedgroupings. The ideological split certainly sfx>wed up
againin the Verge-Sullivan [Jeadersbip] because she tended to be more progressive o n a lot
ofsoc ial issues.
'Ibere ' s DO substitute for having a dynamic enough Ieadcrto unite the various forces
and be seen as a genuine conlcnder on the provincial scene. It' s bard to say where O De of
those leaves o ff andthe other one: sarts.
(Hewlett was asked by Brian Pccki:ml to serYe asa political executive assistant when
Peckford was appointed by Frank Moores to cabinet as Minister of Municipal Af&irs in
October, 1974. He stayedwith Peckford until the Premierresigncd in 1989.]
It became evidentvery early that be [peckfurd] was a red tory . He expanded
municipal government in a lot ofareas in rural NewfuUDdlaDd. He certainly believed tbeee
was a ro'e fur goverDlDCtll at an IeveJs. Whenhegot noMinesand Energy beplayed a very
activmt role with regardto Oam::hiIlFalIsat least maintainingour position on Cburcbill FaIls
..
and tben the exploration phaseof tile offilbore wasjusr getting underwa y in a big way when
he was Minister. and the first Hibernia strike occurmI early - within the firstfew mombs
- ofbisprem:iersbip .
He was obviously a bit of a red [tory] there beceuse be was using thepower oftile
state to iIqxess upontbcco~and tile fcdmd government that we bad a right to a say
in oflSboredevclopment and we bad aright to asbare oftbe revenues. Ottawa's position at
the time was that they bad a right to give us a sbareifthey telt like it, but we didn't have a
right to it. That was the beginning of that fight. That firmly placed him in the haDdsoftbc
red toties because the oil companies out west • maDy of them were operating in the
Newfoundland oflSbore - they were used to operating in the Alberta cortcxt, which was
very mucha free 1DlII:ket, fm: enterprise kind of thing.
On the Cburcbill Falls issue,be [peckford] bad a major dispute with Frank Moores
because Moores wamed to do a dealwith Rene Leveque, b1t Peckford wouldn 't go for it and
the dealbBsi:aIlydicd on the vine. He didn't think Newfoundland would get a good enough
deal and there wouldn 't be sufficientredress on the Upper Churchill. So the deal never
occ urred, Frank: would have went for the deal because it was business. Peck:ford liked
business, but only ifit wasprofitablefur everybody - includingthe people - through the
0°""","",,-
[Wbcn Brian PeclWrd retired, he left the lIClltinGreenBay district open, and Hewiett
st arted immcdiatcJy to canvass people in the district to support his own bid to win the
nominationto represent the PC Party. Because be was struggling to get support fur his own
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political battles, he didn't get actively involved in the 19891eaderslripcontest that saw the
party split over the caDdidacies ofTom Rideout andLen Simms. Rideout eventually won
the leadership, and Hewlett says that ifhe did get involved,bewould have supported Tom
Rjdeout.]
I'd say my inclination. bad [ beenactively involved,would have beento go with
Rideout because it would have been more atong persoDlll liDcs. That leadership was an
interim. affiUrbecause the ideologjcalsplit in theparty wasn"tso outwardly evident. But the
personalloyalbcs were there. Peddiml and~ supported RDcout. Rideout came from
the district oext door to GreenBay, which is my home district. [got to know him in the
Premier's Office because hespent a filir bit oftimethereas parl.iamenrary assistant when [
was cbiefofstaff: [was therein the Premier 's Officewhen he [Rideout} crossed the Ooor
from the Liberals into our party . So [ hadan attachment to Rideout. A fitir number of
Peckford loyalists went with Rideout. Certainly the rift that had started in the
PeckfordlMoores years badcarriedon through there. Had [ beeninvolved,[ would likely
bave beenon Rideout's side.
With Lynn Verge, it was ideological on my part, because Sullivan seemed to have
support from certainelemmts oftbc business oommunity, andsupport ofamajority oftbc
caucus. My concern. visa~Verge8l: the begDUngwas ideological in that our party Deeded
a contest and it looked fur a while that she might be atone. [called bet aside before she
anooUllCCCland said that ifsbe was goiogto do it [nmlbrthe leadership] I would support her,
evenano oneelse did, hecau3eI won't see the first womancandida:tefurtbe premiership of
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this province go befOre the microphones by benel£. In. my days with the Pcckfurd
government, we brought in the Status ofWomcn's Council Act, and we brought. in the
Women's Policy Office in the burcaucracy, which survivesto this day. So we bad dooe
certain progressive things that in tbese right wing times might:be regarded. as somewhat
supportiveoftbc &:miDist sideoftbings. PeckfOrd badbrought in a lot ofthcse refOrms aDd
I supportedthem. So, whenwe bad our first femalerunning fee the Icadersbip and poSSIbly
fur the preDricrship I just couldn 't stand by and let her go befOre the mikeswoe. So once
I diddeclare fOrher privately, we managed tbm in the intervening time befure she made her
publicannouncement to round up anot'hcr~MIlAs, and we badourselves a real contest.
At the beginning I supported bierknowing that I might have been theonly cee. My
supportwas springingftommy Kieologil:al base or blckgroUDd wilh PecldOrd because [I said
to 1D)'SClt] I ought to be ashamed ifwe were putting fOrward the first WOttJln candidate fur
premier and she bad to go allalooe before the people. [was glad when the other guyscame
along after. But for a whileit was touch and go insidecaucus. Therewere two solitudes
insidecaucus - there wasa lot oftl>ing and fro..ingbehind the scenes becauseSullivan had
a majority oftbc caucus andbe was doing hisbestto optimize that aDdml1lyput the pressure
on some oftbe boys to comeonsiJeand makeit lessofacoDlest, but as it turnedout, while
he bada majority, at least we bad a reasonable number to go befOre themicrophones with.
And people went:with her knowing fuUwell what her ideology was on a lot of Issues.
Theeducation issue was not front andceeee at the time but it wasbrewing. In her
capacityaspllrty aderVergc saidwecould refonn the education system without going the
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routeofthecollSlitufuml8lDl:lll.hnclL ~_~hadthe pcwer to eflkt practical
change, which was what NewfuundJalxlersWlUJted.aod it was~ Clyde Wells who
got into .IDlIking the case for going the ConstitutioDal route. Adopting that practical
approach, she was able to get what you might caI1soro:::small"c' conservative support for
herC8Dpljgn. Had she bc:enideologicalat that time -as in saying 'I WlUJta public system
tbar i<lbo1D1d wholly and 9O~ by the CarBdian HUIDIIl Risfd:s Act. no hiring and firing hued
on religion. ' she would have bad a bard time buiJdiDg the coalition that she needed to have
more than yours truly with her at the micropbone.
Tbe big thing we had!)il:lgn wait for us wastbIt aftershe go t the Ieadcnbip. [CJyde}
Wells decided to approach the [education} issue ideologically aDdthat fon:edher handand
she got ideological on it and as political and less practical. And, as a result. she found
herselfveIYm.dlon theoutside or tbc ddme subsequently after the Wells amendment went
through. But when the pnK:tica.l rcalitics started to work: themse1vesout in the school
de signation procc:ss.all ofNewfoUDdland and Labrador wassaying Lynn Verge was right
afteraD. A1tbetime in her sclJoolofthougbr. with regard to berownposition, therewas no
more thanfive or ten pen:ent oftile population [with her}. The rest were either for it or
agaimt it on various sorts ofbroad, gut terms . She was the only one who made a fine-tuned
analysis and stuck by it. But it was to her political detrimentifno t destruction.
There . the ideology contributed to Lynn Verge not becoming premier because by
taking the position she did. she maintaiDedher self,.respect from her point ofview' with
regard to her consceece andher long -held views oncertain things. But it kft her cripp'ed
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in to::polilical~ inNewfu1mdland andLabrador and immediately thereafter Wens. wm
baddone 1mthing and got lIDeonstitutioDal amendmc1t: started, then steppedaside aDd[the
LiberalParty] brought in (Brian] Tobin and with TobingoiDg up againstLynn. that wasthe
cue-two punch and thereWIlSZl't enough time to recover from the first punch. The
ideologicalsplit played. a bigrole with her because shetendedto take the lessconsenative.
more progressive approach to ideason education and she wouldn't let go oftbem.
She won the lcadersbipaDdthe eduaWon issue proved to bevery di:f6cuIt. ifoot
cripplingfur ter, Leading upto the move the Liberalswereplamling with swircbing leaders
and calling a quic~ election,there was a lot ofgr11dl1ingamongcertain members of our
caucusbecause they had supported Sullivan aDdthere ideawas at least that Sullivan would
havebeen more prat1ica1 about1mapproachto the education issue,andbewould have voted
'No' furmorepolD::alrt8llOll'i lIlId werould. as a caucus. gone through the fight. fought the
good figtKlIlId~ ifwe lostby fifty-odd to forty-odd.we would have fought the good fight
together as a nice neat coherent bunch. We would haw:come out ofit b8nle-seasoned and
not battIe-crippIcd But it bassince rome out with the second refermdum with Mr . SuDivan
at the bebn. that tbePC ClIUCUSncvcrtealtyacquitted.itsclftremcndouslywellin terms oftbis.
In the end it basicalJy became a persoDal thing with some members voting ' Yes , ' some
membersvoting 'No ' in the referendum itsclfand establWtingunanimity afterwards.
Lynn Verge took her stand on the education referendum to her pllitica1detriment.
It wasso Ialein the Liberal.mmdste, they played it smart.dJmgcd Icaders midstmun andjust
blewus out oftbe water because we DeVCr bad a chaDcc to recover.
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I was disappointed at various timeswith her as a leader, especiaIJy on the education
issue. I had a 1eadersbip role within caucus as chairman oftbe strategy coumittee that
planned Question Periodeverydayin the House when she was leader. I coordinated on a
dailybasis.sometimes bour by hour. sometimes minute by minutewith BillMattbews, who
was theHouseleader-who arosefiomtbeotbetCllq)-ard betweenthe two ofus we
ran the practical business of the caucus in the House ofAssembly Ill: the time. But in terms
of Verge, I neverdisagreed with her MIeologically at the time; the probbn was a manel'of
1eadershipstyle aDdthe ItJiIller ofpractral tbio8s 10 leada caucus. WhatI fulDld wasthat her
ideology was an obstacle to her being political In 1hi5game I became tired. as a youth,
watching the federalTories go to bedwiththeir conscience on election night. Unless you
win, you can't impIetmmyoW'platfunn. To my mind, some ofla' behavDur as leader should
have been centredaround winning . I'm not such an ideologue that I will sec myself be
defeated fur reasons of that sort. It was difficuh in the election that she led us against Brian
Tobinto defend her positionon many things because the education issue really crippled her
ina lot ofdmicts am a lot ofrnembersco~ that ber presence [in their districts during
the election] as party leader was a Iiabi1ityIll: the time .
She wasslowto moveon eutain thiDgs (like puttinga staff in place] . UDdcrordinary
circun:manccs,ifyou start early enough in a term, you can takeyoW'time andhire your staff
and get who you WBDl. The Uberalsactually dropped behind us in public opinion after she
waselected Ieader-Lymcamc off the Icadc:nbip in a position 10 win, or at least she would
have put up an cxcc1lcDlshowing in a general election. Time was the big problem. webad.
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we just didn't have euough time to get it all together and recoup our lossesfrombcr staDd
on the educaWn issue. So my coecees It that time were practiaal. No mltter bow good a
leader you are. ifyou can't, from your ideologicalpoint ofview. bridae a certain gap then
ueee's ec wayyoucanget the lDlitedC8UCWI to go up apinstsomdhiDg. Ontbc education
issue we badHarvey Hodder voting forClydc Wells and we badLynn Verze voting agaimt.
CI:ydeWells fur eDCtIy theSIlIDe tm9ODS. AM then)'OU had the rest of USdoing our differmt
things in between. So, it was a vuy difficultpiece ofbusiDcss.
If shebad beenless ideological about the whole issue, she could have takenthe
following position: 1 havealways been aftrm believer in neighbourhood ~hools, [haw
ahKtys been a firm believer in hiring teochers i1lmerit ; but [now have a newrole i" life, 1
om nowthe party leader whose job it is to upouse.the position ofthe caucus. and the ctnICIIS
workson COMemuS' and the conremKfofCt1UCUJis tJVer'Mftelmingly that we are with the 'No'
silkfor basicreawnr, not more complicated ones , so 1haw to chmrge my position because
I 'm the leader ofthis tribe and this tribe '.I position on this issw is • . . But she wouldn't
bring herself to do that. Today everyone is saying she was right. but at the time it was
politically disastrous for her. It caused allldnds ofdoubt about her Ieadersbip abilities,. in
general. We never reaIIy got to see what Lynn Verge would have been like as a premier
because shewasaippled on theway to theelection- crippled by her ideology and herown
personal senseofboncsty.
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Harvey Hodder .lDterview Odober 14, 1997
Myacti\lepmticipationinthcpanybcganin 1991-92 and it arose primarily out ofthe
fact of the approach that Clyde WeDsaDdthe Liberals were using on onmicipalissues and[
feb:at the timetim: their IDIIDIICt of operamg anddectiion making wasDOt conducive to what
I deemed to be a proper democratic process. It W8SIl'tas much the l8ct that they wanted to
have the City ofMount Pearl amalgamated with SL John's, as the methodology that was
being used to promole that . The bigh-baDded cordescendiDg manner in which they
approaclJ::d. I COImlIIDiI:atcd thisto Mr. Wells andto his Minister ofMwDcipal AfWrs, Eric
GuIIage,tellingtbem.tim: mNewfoundlandifthey waeted to have a series of amalgamations
take place, then theysbouldhave gone out and appoint the very most respected civil sernmt:
in the provincetbar:knew IWDicipalities-and that was Clarence RaDdall- to appoint him
with the maDdateto go out to lBciIilale the lJI:JIll1gaImti process. Thiswas igDoled in favour
of a big stick:approach. And thatbig stick:approach, to me.was far more 10 the right than
I was prepared to accept. He e:sseIltiaDy trampled on people and trampled on institutions -
municipalimtituWns. This was themajor reason why [ became active at the provincial level
and left municipal poli:tics.
[Hodder says he was courted by both theLix::IaIsand theProgressive Cocservatives.]
It was particularly stronger in January, 1996. I was caUcd by a representative of
cabinet, by friends ofcabinet, and aJsoby the IocaJ. Liberal district association. I was even
called by the caDdidatc who was running ror the LiberalParty and told that if[ wishedto
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corttest the electiDnas a Liberal be would bow out and DOt nm. To which my reply wasthat
I have great difIicultydoingtbllt. In 1991 wbenljoml the PC Party we weeeet eevea
pertent. ADdI didn'tjoinbccause I was assured ofgetting elected, ljoml because wewac
representiDga view point underLenSimms which was more humaDe,represeutedeore of
a pure form ofdemocracy that was evideut UDderClyde WeDs. ljoiDed out ofprireiples.
They stood for things that I helievN in: consultation at the IocaIIcveJ. they hadnot bad a
history ofthe big stick.approach to decWon making. So I would not he able to accept their
inviwion. 1sa:k1 to them. ' I thank.you for the invitation,' however 1 saidto them that before
the last leadershipconvention was over 1 pledged my support to Lym. Verge.
In terms ofphilosophy Lynn Verge and I havea lot more in common thanpeople
realize. We are both to the left wingofthe Consenrative Party in terms ofphilosophy. So
I bad a11udedtoLym Vcrgethat ifsbewonthe IeadersbipI would he bappyto go and bepart
ofberteamand to represent Waterford Valley .
Having said that to her, whenshe was t::ryingto put forward the party the bestway
that shecould coming up to that (1996) election, 1 could not in all consciousness go aDddo
anything else. The decision to join the Pes was a significant decision. I have DO doubt that
I could havewon Waterfurd VaDcy,probablywith an even higher majority in 1996 thanI did
ifl bad run as a Liberal. Butl can't do that. The PC Party bad done nothing-to me tomalce
me jump ship. But let 's say that in the 1995 education debate, where [ bad a d.istinctive
position thatwas difIm:d: thantbe mBjorilyofour caucus. Ifthey bad put a scenario forwud
that stated that you must toe the !iDe or else; then that would he very difl'emtt. 8\1: they
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didn't. TheyfilciJitalcdmy difi:rem viewP1d. which [ thinkand still think todaywas rather
progressive oftbe Progressive CoDSerVlltive Party.
I k:indofsmiJed at the Liberalstrying to court me because tbeykDcw [could win the
district . H they keew they could win the district without me they wouldn't of courted IDe.
So it was more opportunism on t:beirpart andfOrme to bepart of that [wouJdhavc been
opportunistic. [couldn't do that .
[IfHodder was a natural memberof the party's left, andbe agreed with Verge on
many issues, why did be suppon Loyola Sullivan in the leadership?)
We hadtwo people who baddistinctively dif!erent talents.Loyola Sullivan is more
to the right than[ am, but [ was very~ when I arrivedhere with this man's work
habits,with m, iDteIligeoce. with~ abi&:y to beable to a:eton wen with caucus. and with his
availabilityto ncwMHAs, and to facilitate their being comfOrtable in the oewroles that they
fotmd themselvesin.
It wasthat workaholic approach,his ability to makedecisions, that attracted me to
him. My perception ofLym Verg e wasthat sbe was more in tune withmypbilosopby, but
I didn't see anylcindofthe decisioD-makiog strengthsthat Loyola represented. I opted to go
with Lo yola. But everyone mew that in Loyola's team - and they mow today - that [
represented more ofa left wing oftbe Conservative Party.
I fuhLoyola would bee betterlDlDllgCl'ofaD cur resources. In tams of articulation
andsincerity they wereabout the same. Lynn biggest weakness was that she would igDore
her caucus - pur: it thisway, wbcn[arrived hereLyrm Vase did DOt do a great dealto make
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the newmembers vdxnne. She was the establishmeDt aDdshe certainlydidn't reach out to
us feUows. For example whenwe needed bdp with a question fur Question Period. some
I!ICIDbers didn't get much belp tiom her. On one occasion [ remember going to her with a
questi>n[ on hadon education and she gave me the impression that shedidn 't have time fur
InC. That happened to severalother members. So it was not without 1ogjcal. that these
membeIs,. who were kindofnew at that point.wouldn 't move to Lynn Verae . They felt that
she wasn't helpful to them..
Some people feh that sherepresentedthe older part of the party . There was some
mo~ in the <94 , <95, <96years to breakaway from the Peckford years within.the party
itself There was some feeling that as we move on and although tile Peckfurd yean
represented a great deal ofsuccess for the party, some people feh that awewere going to
be successful that we woukt have to move away from those years; and that therewas some
baggage carried by all members of tile PeckfOrd era and Lyon Verge, ahhough very open-
mindedin the 9CII!lCtbd she waswiIIingto encompass DeW approaches, was alsopart oftbat
era. And the RaSOn some of the newer members went with Loyola was because be
represented a fresh approach.
When she beceee leader it very quickly confirmed for me why [didn't support her.
She becameleaderiIlMayardwcWttewithout a staft she didn 't make decisions. In terms
of w HouseofAssembly, as leader you'd beucr nJlkesure that your team.are tile people that
an: on the from bmcb:s. You've got to mcilitate unity. My impression is that she didn't do
a great dealto welcome Loyola andbewasn't embraced to suggest that weare all part ofa
lOS
team Instead,. what she did was she came in an ckJsetcd herselffur iengthyperiodsoftimc
in her office with bcrdoor closed Those ofus who were represerUtive of the other side
weresttangers mour own boWleboId. I'msure we felt more like strangers than she inteDded
for us to bestrarJgc:rs. I'm Int doubtinghermotiwtion, I simply saying that there wam't this
'welcome back, let's get on with thiDgs.'
Thenshe made themiU8keofbeping the same house leader, kecpillg the same critic
roles. ShedidD.'tcome inaud say "I' m the leader, rm going to make my mark on tbisparty
right away .' She kept Bill Ma:ttbewson as bouse leader, which c:aused some ofher own
supporters to kioi ofsay "why di1 I 90Wk so Imd to support her?' So rigI:d: away therewere
some rifts within her own ranks as well During the 5UII2IDeI' of '95 she was very slow 10
make decisionsabout staJI So, wbcttu it washer sense ofbow she wanted 10 achieve unity,
or wbctheTit was bet sense DOt WIUItingto ruffle any reatbers. she endedup doing it wrong,
in my estimation.
In aD&imcssto her, I thiDk:she fei that where this was a twc-peescn race aDdwhere
it was so close [Verge won by just three votes] for the sakeofthe party it would have been
muchbetterifit hadofbeen 100 votes in the differeDce.Tbere were some caucus menftrs
within her organization thatwere so ungracious in.victory . There wasanger on both sides
and this continued for a long time . Therewere people in caucus who never spoke 10 each
other for months. Looking b&cleat it rightnow, it's not a very happy chapter in the history
oftbe PC Party . Tbc party could DOtgel itselftogetber after that for quite some time.
Tbere was amther mistake in thetiming ofthe elcctionofthe party executive. Tbe
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executive WM dccted theSunday~ i:lllowing the Saturday evening leadership. A very
big 1IIistake. OnSuoJayrnoruing tberewasa vaydeliberatcattempt to shutout of the party
executive anybody who was a supporter of Loyola Sullivan. So while L)'DD. Verge had
become the leader, therewas abo an attempt by that group 10 put 'their team' in placeat the
executive Icw:LasweD. 'IlDsonly added to the seeseof isolation aDdthe seaseoffrustration
within the plIl'ty, III the~1oftile party executive, among people who bad given manyyean
as a volunteer to the party and who were equally good PC!. only to fiDd that as a
consequence of who they supported in the leadership they were being shut out oftbese
positions . A lot of people Icft the convcution very upset that they bad been pushed out of
executive positions.
By the autumn of 1995 manyofthcse things hadbeenworked out aDd we were
beginning to see more unity betweenthe two 6Ictions at thecaucus level
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Senator Gerald Otteabeimer .lDterview October 27,1996
(SmororGe.ul~ bas .....bSory_the NewfuundIand andI.abno<W
PC Party , serving as party leader aDdOpposition Leader during part of theSmallwood era.
As a well-respectedScmtor . bebas often provided thepro...mcialputy withtime ly reminders
of its roots. SoUlCtSbave indicatedthat "'the Senator," wasone of the few party infIuentiaIs
who stood lirmlyagain5l:tbc irtcmal bickering thatwaswoddngto undetmincLynnVerge ' s
lead ership. When asked din:ctIy ifbe bad interveDcd,Senator Ottenbeimer saidbe didn 't
want to speakpubticlyabout theparty'sidaml~ual::Ibes. He did say that he bad continued
to support Verge tbrouglxtut her Ieadcrsbip .]
I supported Lym.Verge in the IcadenbipCOIMdion, have a very !Ughregard for her,
know her very wen aDdserved in cabinetwith her . Her leadership was typifiedby a deep
soc ial concern and a recognition that these social matters could only be bandied within a
policyo f fiscal respo nsibitity. Newfuundlard. im:spcctive of political parties.is in some ways
a very small-cconserwtive soci::ty. That msyweDhave beenanelemcot that worked against
her as a woman leader. Alsobeinga smaIl-c consemWve. o r traditional society. perhaps
peop le are more usedto a styIe of~ which is nme 'mlIcbo'in the sense ofaggression,
verbal aggression. It rIB)' havebeen also that certain traditional values, frequentlyfelt rather
thanarticulated.morc perhaps subjective rather than objective; that these may have been at
work - and may still beat work.oot o nly in Newfourdland society. but in that clement of
the Newfoundland society that makes up the Progressive Conservative Party. The
ConservativeParryis oertainIybased on a coalition ofinterests and I think, to a largeexteIIl,
theLiberalParty is as~n. but,the 'coaHl:ion' aspect is tmfe predominantin the Conservative
'Senator Gerald OttenheiJ:r:u diedJanuary 18. 1998.
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Party. And, tbee is no doubt that the Conservative Party, certainly whenit gets support to
furm a govemmml, it usually meaDS that thecoalition bas beenrenewedaDdthe coalition is
working. It is difficuJt to iIeDIifY an the aspects ofthe coalition, but some oftbem.are the
small-c conservatives who feel more comfurtable with the overall approach or inleUectual
framework ofthe party. Many people who put gmU. emphasison thewJuc ofindividual
Iibertics,iBiMluaJ.&cc:dom!I. iDdividualclJJiccs. the right ofpeople to bewhat they are, who
are apprebemive ofgoverII:DCD: imusiom Do areas where government is not nccessa:ry.and
peoplewho, without necessarily articulating it, support subsidiarity - theprinciple that the
org:anisationbest suiIcdto fulfila tUrw:tionis that organisation or kvel of government wbM:h
is closest to the problem; so that which can bedone by a colbDlUDity. should bedone by a
cormnmity, andwbat can bestbedoneby a provincialorder ofgovernment is done tbere aDd
only those things which a federalorder of government are required to do, in fitct. do it.
Subsidiaritybas a certainrelatioll5hip to decentrali7ationand a sharingof power. ADd then
there are people who take a historic or generational view ofpolitics, who are aware of
responsibilities in terms of future generations. Governments are not only for the electorates
of today , but alsoinascmeil is likea form oftrust that the living: set up rorthe yet to come.
Theseare aspects ofthecoalition. A stronger emphasis on provincial~.
I view the Conservative Party in Newfuund1aDdaDdLabrador ftum a number of
perspectives, taIi:qJ thepmBse tb¢ thereis a.l'C&'lOl1llbly cohered aDdconsisted:perspective.
orfi'anK:work ofva1ues, which typifies the party. andwbichhas beenfairlyoonstant furtbc
pu number ofyears. There is alsoa needto oountcr-belance that reed by the requiremcm:
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fur the ConscmdiveParty - aDdeveryparty - to update its approach .inspecific areas to
makcSUlCtbat its specific policiesare contemporary lIDdrelevant to the problcms oftheday .
The ongoing need fur partiesto analyzetheir specific policiesto ensure tbt:sepoliciesare
relevant is a contiDuiDg phenomenon; whereas years ago it could have been done every
nwnber ofyears, in today"s politics the rate ofcbange is incmlsiog and parties are having
difficufty coping with the inaeasc. So. on the one band thereis a consistent. coherent.
identifiable core of values and approacbesto socio-political issueswhicb typi:Iies a
political party -an intellectua1 frame of refereece, ifyou will. But the proc:essof
making that intellectual. frame ofrefermce specific .interms ofparticular issues basto be
comtantlyrevised.
You have the consistency aspect of it and the change aspect of it. I havetried to
suggest that while it is obviously very important to examine those areas where change and
modification ofspecific policies is necessary, it's also importam to recognize the consistent
andcontinuing kind of:framc ofreference - intellectual ftarncofreference -which the
party bas cstablisbed. You can adapt to specific thiDgs without having to cbange your
fundamental political values. Lym Verge sharedwith Brian Peckford.aDd with other
Co nservatives, a realization that we in NewfinmdlaDdshould.to the extent possible within
a federal state , determineour own future . We should be contiDuallyconscious ofour own
identily as Newfuundlanders and Labradorians. That doesn't make us less Canadians. it isn't
a negative. it isn't anti-Canadian. It's pro-NewfOundJand. And also that the federal
government should not intrude in lDiIlterS which are very local and specific to the
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NewfDumlandcbanK:tcr. I tbinkLymsbared that withPeckfurd. But I would. say that that
has been a sort ofcontinuing stmlm within the Conservative Party. Then therearc others
who. while not necessarily denyingthose principles.attachlessimport8DCC to them. 1berc
bas been this theme or this idea thatthe orderofgovemmcut best suited to makcdecisions
or to have a very large area ofiDput: ioto decisions is that order of govel'DDlCDt which is
closest to the problem and to the people. What others have called the principle of
subsidiarity. I think it bas been proven to be fiUrlyaceuratc. Tbere are others in the
ColJSerWti\re Party who would attachlessimportance to that.
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Joint OtteDheimer ~ mterview October 10. 1996
[John Otteubeimet, yotmgcr l:wtberofPC Senator GeraldOttenheimer. was a veege
supporter outsideofcaucus. Jolm waselected the MIlA for St. John's East in the February,
1996 election. ()bovK)Wily, he wasnotpart oftbc U:mcr circleofcaucusduring Verge's tenure
as leader, but his relationship with Verge and the Vcrgc caucus supporters who were re-
elected adds valuableinsight: to the way the CllUCWi split has DOW played itselfout after ber
defear.]
The Ieadcrsbipcom'eDtion beca:me very divisive because there were only two
candidates . Iftbere had beenthree, folD', five or even eight or so candidates the likelihood
of fiillout once thecampaignisover is muchlessbecauseyou haveso manypeoplecoming
toge ther andhopefully working around and supporting the new leader. It's very difficult
when there're just two - it's an tmbealtby position for any party to be in - and I think
it's fiUrto say thatwe su1feredasa party because wbcntbm: are only two candidates the lines
acedrawn, it's an 'usandthem'mentality - it's like a bock:eygame - someone bas to win
and sorreore basto Iosc. And.when you put all these personalities together afterwards., the
result is that the formationofpo6cy, which is the result ofa caucus working together, the
result is that theability is sotnewbat strained.. This wasn't carriedout with thesuccess that
it ought to havebeen carriedout, aftera somewbllt divUive leadershipcampaignwherethere
was a great split lJID)llgSt the existingcaucusas to, numberone, who ought:to havewon, and
secondly, whatthe policy ofthe party ought:to be. (The] party executive hada very limited
role to play in the formation ofparty policy. Clearly, the provi:Dcial executive is the vemcle
which drives the development of party membershipand works bard to have the: party groW
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and de\oclop inlUlilers. Thatis.as [see a. theprimary objcctivc:oftbe pro'o'incial executive,
but with regard to policy the provincialexecutive is nat an elected penon to the House of
Assembly , they are elected from within a group of people who support a party, perhaps
because ofitspolK:y . Lynn Verge:~wil:b.bcrtotbe leadership ofthe party a particular
background and awareness aDdeducation which would ba\'e , in my view, moved the party
to the left. I !ilJRlOfledberduring the bdership andtbatis why -iflabels mean anything,
[ don't mind being caDed a Red Tory in that sense because I sharedsomeofthc concerns,
which are primarily social, as opposed to economic. I suppose in that Jigbttherecould be
an argumenr: thai:theparty wasmoms: in tblJtdirecti>n,bJt to what extent it moved aDdbow
successful it was in being moved in that direction is another thing . But it was truly tested
becauseo f the split in the caucusto moveparty policy. Partiesare leadership driven andI
don't thinkNewfoundlaDd is aneJ«:eption to that . The success ofthc party is largelybascd
on bow the leader is perceived by theelectorate. IfL)'IUI.'sleadership bad continued over a
greater period of time , perhaps party policy might bave beendriven in that direction more
successfully. But we can only speculate because she wasn't there.reallylong enough to see
where it wasgoingandsecondly, thetime that she was therewas perhapspre--occ:upiedwith
the f3:lloutfrom what was a very divisiveleadership~ So it really made it very
di:fficuhtonaildown what we were about 8Ddwberewe weregoing and what our policy was
during that period oftime .
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Calvin PoweO-Interview October 26, 199Ci
The one thingI will say about Lym. Verge wastblIt I wasalwaysincluded. She would
call me two or time timesa week aDdwe would talk:policy. I bad saidwhen I was vice-
president thatmy undetstandiog is that as grassroots peopleand then as cxccutive, we want
to be into po&:y making. This was not lip-service [that we wantcd]. Therearc people who
havebeenon the executi\'e who badtried to become CBDdidates and people who have become
candidates. And we feel we have as muchrigbt to determine tbe direction ofthis party as
those people who are elected by the people in their di9t:ricts. because we, ourselves, are
electedby the party, andwe have to espouse the views ofthe party . ADd,what we wanted
was to be in there galhering infutmationfiom our district8S'JClcialioDS and getting in there and
saying, withthe guidanceoftheelectedcaucusand with theresourcesofthe fifth fioorl: this
is theway we woWdlike to see the partYs position developed on bealthcare, education and
so furth. I had asked to become part o f caucus meetingsand I was told "No . that wasjust
nottberiglnthirlg to do." And irmJediatelyaootberdiWdoncamc up and it was the 'we-they"
and it was very clear thatthey [caucus members] wanted to remainthe powerful people who
ultirmteJymadetbe decisXJns. L~service was given and that was it. But with Lynn Verge,
atIeastIcouki~tober. I would try to tri:Jgbertbe views [oftbeexecutive] that
were said andat the en! of tbc day, when she would be makingstatements, some ofthe views
that I had Il'JCDlioncd to her were included.
~ PC Opposition offices, including theMIlA's offices, secretarial, researc h and
public relltioDSstaft; are locatedon the fifth floor ofContCderation Building in St. John's.
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In recent times, siDcethe election [aDdsince the departureof Verge &om the party
leadership] the truthofthe matter is that the executivebas gone one way in terms oftryiDg
to do something abouttim aDdthe fifth floorbasgone the other way. Therehas been110 true
communication betweenleader amipresKJem, aDdtbBthas beenvery sad. Theteam that I bad
supported in Port de Grave just expanded to the whole Avalon and we felt that therecould
be, within the confiDesofNewfoundlaDd, resistance to a WOIDIIQ. in power. We bad been
through the Kim. Campbell fiasco and it was felt by the group involved that there were
circumstances set up to trip her [CampbeU]. We felt that we could set an example in
Newfuurdlard. But whenwestartedto move forward with our position for that"resmance
andbarrierscameuppmty&st-bcr pastbistory [and] some ofthe objectives that she had
achievedwhen she wasingo~ And her association with certain feministgroups. her
views and so fOrth. It was saidto us that perhaps we should give more consideration to the
overall best interest of the party in the long tenn. But that only strengthened our
determination more because we felt that we bad a cause andthat we now really wanted to
work bard. Whenwe~ to thecotM:Dtion, we really felt at that timestrong opposition to
our position. Therewas probably about a dozen to a dozen and a half of us who were
constantly bonDlrdcd by btiWIuaIs who \1YeIe saying that this was not right. this was wrong
what we were doingand so im:b.and that ifthe party was to continue going in the direction
thai:it sbould offoming gownmem thenyow ooIychance wasto support Loyola [Sullivan].
11S
Paul SbeUey-Interview October 26, 1_
[Baie Vette MIlA Paul Shelley was anotbcr ofLynn Verge's caucus supporters.
SheDeyis a young DIBD. who, according to hisown assessmmt,. tepmJeDts the DeW breedof
ProgressiveCo~. Forbim, tbeCllUCUSsptittbateruptcdi>Ik:Jwingtbc Verge-Sullivan
leadership race is DOW bellIed.]
WhenI cam::into nmasa Tory,Iwasblsicallyn.n::liogTorybccause[didn't likethe
Wells regiJ:re and what was happeniDg. So [ was reaDynm:ningami.govemmcnt. WhenI
bearof difli:tm: &ctionswithin thepaty [JJW it doesn't even dawn on me. AIl I know is that
the group that rmworking with DOW - the nine.or the 16 befbrethe last election, we get
togetber as individuals llId come up with our own philosophies,andbasically what I'd like to
see furtbe PC PartytblltrminvoM:d in now, because I think ilsdiffemtt than the ODe I was
imolved in before the last election. is themiddleoCtile road-a baIaDce -ofwbat people
are crying out for. whichis lessgovemmcnL
But thereason the ClIUCUS was sptilwasOWl' the gender issue. Some caucus members
could DDt see supporters, pa:rticu1ar1y long-timeparty supporters. staying loyal to a party led
bya WOImIl. Tbc mIjor problem fur the party wasthe &ct the ca:n:plignwas simply a two-
person race am befOrethe coJqJetiDgcamps got out of the startinggates there wasdivision.
The answer to our last leadership was to have a third penon nmniog. But because
there was only two people, the issue ofLynn being a woman rose to the furefront for some
people . And once you lose in a leadenhipoftwo people, you're going to have a bard time
hauling back those other people and there's still the reeling there. deep within. But the
attirudcright DOW, oYCrjustsix short months is that the Tobin-syndrome bas tDlIdeaUofus
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[DinePC caucus1DCDIbers] moredctc:rmiocd bnCYCt to senourownpbiIosopbjcsmel to go
on to win thego~ evm more thanit was the first time.
[For PaulSbcDcy, tike IIBIIYofb caucus coDeagucs.tile business ofdeveloping party
policy ~ the sole domainoftbc elcctedClllX:US. He suggests that with the c:baDge in the taces
around the caucus tabJe, there is a Deed to have another look at the policies oftbe party; a
need that must:considetthe ideas Of'DeWgmeration' Tories.]
There is a new group, a new &ce on the PC Party, aDdwe have to develop a new
philosophy that grows out oftbis DeWDCSS. l'berc's a.new ftustration within.the young«
geoem:tionof the party, which! consider myself to be a part o( saying that we are going to
set our ownagcnda. We're not going-to dealwith a pbiIosopbyofthe TOr1esofthe '705 or
'80s..W~watchedthis fur years. We want to become part ofit. but we wa1I1 to have our
say in.this party .
And becauscthecaucusgetsthe plll'ty'sagenda. we've got to be apart of the caucus.
Party policy and puty pIatfunn aD(;(){DC fromthe caucus. Theylisten to the party's executive
councilandto theparty's youth, but ultimately, it is the caucus that sets the agenda, andthe
caucus bas the finalsay.
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Loyola __- Interview October 10. 1996
We badgMnawaytbe politicaJ.rigbtto Clyde Wells aodI W1ID1cd tbcpartyto work
to winil beck. We're Iivmg inaprovn:e wbee there's a lot ofsocialbaDrds so wc'vereally
got to do our baIaDciog in this province. In Alberta andOutario they can be more exttcme
because they\re got the ability to see a better day in four years timeor five yean time. We
don't havethe flexibility. DO matter bow tough we get, to see a better day in this provincein
five or ten years tine. We're mtgoiogtoromeftomalBw-notproviDce, when:we are now,
and try to sell us as a have-province in theRSt afmy lifetime. That is DOt going to happen.
despite what the Liberals have been saying. that is just DOt going to happen. Our Gross
Domestic Product, our basic unemployment rate -just: IDlII'Binal gains. aDd.it would take
decades to get:us b&ck. to just the mid-point in canada. But we have to start moviDg tbetc
and shifting our thinIriDg as a party . A lot of caucus agree: with my view . Even befure the
Ieadm;bip , thermjority o f caucus memberssaw my views as being more represenlative of our
party and rqnseuted more ofan opportunity for our party , OWl' the long-term. to get beck
[in govemmetll}. I think I represented more ofwbat the party is and wbetethe party basto
go. Some peopk:around the province might have supported L)'IDlVerge because she bada
much highername recognition thanme and tho~ she would bebetter able to lead theparty
to victory. Some oftbe people wOO supportedher for that reason bave siDccindicatedto me
that in retrospect she did not articulate the certainbasic philosophies that the PC Party bas
tIaditionally stood fur . LymVerge's vision oftbe petty was perceived as beinganoverthe
place.
118
That Imrtus [the psrty} in tDItregard.. I think:1him: aa:omplisbcdgetting people to
see ourwayofthinkiDgofwbere\Wueed to be. Tbat's somethiDa that.as leader, I have told
ourpeopJctbat we wiDbe in fuD.gearto develop our policiesat the end ofyear two. When
year threestartsweare going to bereadyto go with our messageaDdwe'll have our ground
work andour organi2Mtionall in place.
I be~ tbBtthe mISOntheblIjoriyofthe caucus supported me was because I more
closely represented what the PC Party stood fur. [feel that [ fit the partYs ideology and
philosophy, probablymore so than our rmre recent leaders,at least[ fed [do. I come from
a business backgroUDd, but I've worked in the social areas too; I've been in bealthand
education and I feel I have a pretty strong socialeonseeece, but rm. a strong betiewr (that}
theengine that'sgoing to dme this proviIK:ebas to bebaed on cotmmn sense andeconomics
and that's got to dictatewhatsocialp:dicieswe adopt, rather than the other way around. We
need some strong right--of-<:entre policiesifwe are to continue to attract voters . I see our
major task as we'verelinquished a righi-wing agenda.andwe've gone more to the left. And
that's oot oW'ideobgy. I fi:el¥oe haveto be to the right--of-cemre. I think: we've alwaysbeen
that, that's the pen:eptionoftbc Progressive Comervatiw Party - our basic philosophies and
our views and we Deed to move back there.
[Loyola Sullivan made refCrencc to a May. 1996. Corporate Research pan wbich
reported that if an election were held at that time, thirty-seven pm::cnt of decided voters
would vote PC.anda September. 1996. paRwbichsuggested thirty-nioepm:emofdecided
voters would vote PC.}
Thesenumbc:rs, which arethe higbest numbers ilrtbe pBrty sece 1989, iDdicate more
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Tbcscmmbers,which are thebigb:stnumbers fOrthe pBrty sece 1989,indicate more
people are takinga serous look at us in the PC Party , and that the electorate wasmore
comfortable with our return to the politics they bad grown accustomed to . [ think the
perception oftbe people out there was thatthe PC Party [during Verge's leadership) was all
over the place - all over the map. andthat there wasn't any specificengine that colllrOUed
that machine. [think we need to have more ofa nuclear type ofa party that emanatesfrom
us [tbecaucus], mJroteverybodydoiDgtberownthing. A lot of people today are certainly
captives to the electo~ and people have a teDdency to say whatever is best for the
electorate, the peoplewho an: going to te-elcct them, andthat bas a tendency to breakdown
party strlX:tUre mt direction. [think weneedto have sound, eececme-besed policies. [feel
thatjobcreatDn withinsmaD.busiDessistbemaintbingthat's going to drive theCCODOmy, and
we can only have social programs depending on bow the economic sector performs,DOtat
the expense oftbe business sector . Thepriorities have got to bemordet because wecan't
have a normally functioningprovince unJess we've got our ecoeomic bouse in order . That's
got to benumber one. We (the PC Party] probably drifted from that.
As [ went through my leadersbip campaign[ didn't find any rifts developing or
anything long lastingduring the SullivmIVerge campaign. I foUDdremDaDtS of the 1989
campaign popped up from time to time. And that amlOyed me to know that therewere
differencesafter six: )'alfS in theparty wbm I've always viewedthingsas you go in, you work.
at it andwhen it's over, it's over.
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Lynn Verge - Inteniew April', 1997
Maybe JmrC thin a lot ofother people - because I've spent a lot ofmy life thinking
about it - I hEw [was breakingDeW groUld. During the yean thatI servedas an MHA,
the public went some distanoe inacc:eptinga woman in politics- a woman as a nmk-aDd-fiJc
MIlA, a woeenes acabiDet minister. aiJeit,. perbBps. a token woman in the sense that people
might have reached the pow where thcytbougbt:any weJl...rounded cabinet not only should
have somebody from Labrador and somebody from western and centtal NewfoUDdlandbut
also at East ODC woman. But a WOIDlll aJcr aDdpoteuliaD:y a womanprcmierwas a DeW and
different hurdle that was more thana considerable number of peop le could sunnowrt. I
cbocse to take apositi\>c inletpretation ofit. A1mngthe voting population at large just about
forty pen:em w tcd PC. Now, there woukl have been a varietyof factors at play, but I tb.ink:
it represeutsacertainamount o f progress.And I do still believe that the potential wasthere,
despitcthe .inlrigucwbichwastbcrc withintbcparty . Ifit hadn't bccnfor the Liberals having
Brian Tob in with the DlItional press corps serving as cheerleaders, if the Liberals bad
continued with Clyde Wens. o r they bada divisive lcadershi:psuccession along the !iDesof
what bappeIr.dwith the Pes in 1989, tbcnperbaps even with.theunconscious reluctance or
deliberate prcjudM:e ofthe voters or people within the party that it could have happened, that
I could have led tM Pes to victory. I didn'thave to compete fur thenomination. And that' s
how a lot of womenin the last twenty-fiveyears got there. They were probably set up to be
sacrificialJambs am tMre was a swingduring thec:ampaianand the nextthing. to everyone's
surpri.oJe they CIKIcd up gdtiI;Igejected, Somethings have changed in the eighteen years siDcc
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I was first elected. I've maintainedfor a long time that the generalpopulation is much more
open to advlD:es micblmgc than[are] institutDns in society, became institutions are always
dominated by people with vested interests. Institutions involvehierarchies - people with
power and ~wid:w.lut POwa'. And the people dominating the institutions like it theway
they've got it so they resist change. Politicalparties tend to lag behiod the voters. UDion
executives lag behind therank and file membership, clergy lagbehindthe laity, and so on. It
seems to me that in POlitics. getting a party nomination is a biggerhurdle for women than
winning the eJecti>n. Getblg the party oomiDationinvolves a women first ofaUdeciding that
she's going to do it. It's an unconventional choice. It involves risk.it involves gettinginto
a sphere that hasa very bad reputation and a lot ofwomen. andsome men.too,l suppose.,
never get beyond ~ir own mental hurdle,andifthey do then often when it's perceived that
the party bas a ebaocc ofwiming theyoften have to compete against people who've been
cosy with or havebeenclose with the dominant players. who'vegiven them the advantage of
advance information or eDCOuragement or contacts or campaigning. I think: parties have
evolved row to a p:tiol: wtere leaders understand that it's politically expedientto have a few
women. Not halt; but a few . In the last provincia1eleetion,I'd like to thiDk.atleast in part
because [was thereleading the opposition, Brian TobinandtbcLibcta1s went after prominent
WO~ fur nomimtions in seats that werewimabIetOrthe LMals andthey endedup getting
seven elected. Whereas if it hadn't been fur women's work over the last twenty Years.he
undoubtedly woukl havefunctioned ~ way Don Jamieson functioned or the way Joey
Smallwood had fimctioned.
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I hadbeenvery actively involved in the women's movement: ftom the start of tile
Corner Brook Status of Womm's Council in 1974, which was a year or so after' [ had
returned to Comer Brook to practise law. A \1lI0111Bn who wasmy mother's COlJlcmporary
called out of tile blue sometime in 1974BDdsaid that she wasinviting me BDda fewotbet
woreen to start a Comer Brook women'scouraL This was IDly soon after the release of the
federalRoyal CoJllttWl;sionon the Status of Women report. BDd[was deligbted. I suppose
because ofmy reading eed my thinking [ was more than readyfur that kind of in\lOlvemem.
From then on, [ was very active in the women 's movemcot. ADd what it gaveme was an
outk:t for my own thinking, the benefit ofbcaring other women's thoughts BDdexperieDces.
so that we went through a process o f discovery aDd1eamiDg aDdsharing .
Inanorganimi way we studied issues. We hadpeopleknowledgable in various issues
we were imerested in come and.lllOCt with our group or give speeches to public meetings we
bad. And thenwe moved into politicalactioo. We 9Claboutlo~ for various government:
POlicies.programs and we had a list ofgoalsand through-that [met some oftbc l»1iticians.
In particuIar, I mctBrianPcc:k:iJrd. who wastbeonly ODe ondle proviDciaJ. scene who reaDy
~ ....... everythiDgbappmedqWcldy. That bappmedto be !be fiill of1918 . Part
c fo ur women's groupsaetivitics duriDgtbctscycarswas an attempt to recruit women to ron
for pub lic office - for city council. schoo l boards,. and the bDspital board. the Wcstcm
Merrorial HospiralBoard bad some eJectedpositions at that time. All ofthose opportuDilies
came up am[ was im'Otvcdwith other'MJlrlell. in some cases as plllt oftbc group aDdin other
cases reallyas a priwlc cftDrtoff to theme. talking to MImeD. saying'you'd begood for that,
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wbydon't you nm?andIJCICIlSionaHy we'd have a woman go fur it. more or lesseagerly.and
we'd do whatwe coukl to get peopleout to vote. It was fiUrlybardto fiDdwomm wbc were
wiIlingto nm. Andat SO~ poinlduring aHtbat, a couple ofmyfiiends said -wbydon't you
ron? and that's probBhly wblJtgot me started tbinIcing about it. I would have regarded myself
as anatural~worker, like a campaign amnager, andthat's where I thought my own
strength lay. I reaIly never tOOughr: of myself as a politician or caDdidate. ThePeckfurd
Ieadersbip was quae exhilarating. Ann BeDandI worked together to become delegates and
we weren'texactly appreciIIted by the smallgroup ofrqpdar Pes in the Humber Eastriding.
Tbey weeetreallyveryactiveaDdheklan annualmeetingandelectionofofficers every year
or every two years. I renz:mbergoingto om meeting D which they had a hard~ rounding
up enough fOran executive. I was asked to be secretary, probably because I 'WaS a woman,
and I declined. We managed to get ourselves elected delegates with a bit ofwork andthen
that spring [ started tbinkingofthe possibilityofaetually running. In all hoBeStyifanyoDe
else had sought the nomination rmnot at all sure I would have even competed for it, it
wouldn't have been bard to talk me out of it. But wilbDonlamieson returning to lead the
Liberals, it seemed to me that most of tile active PCs[in Humber East] really didn'texpect
our party to wintbeelcction. Andrdsay:!JOlllCoftbcmdouhted. wecouldwin the seat. There
was a lot of talk ofClyde Wells runningfor the Liberals in Humber East then.ldidn't care
who it would be. I tOOughtBrian Pcckf'ordwasgreat. I liked whatbe stood:fur. [liked his
=gy. [bod been"""'"'" fur _ property lBw..rormduriDg the Ioadenhipprocess
and be iDmediately introduced a bill It UDdoubtedly bad beenworked up befb'" be became
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premier, but he inttoduced it ilD:nediatdyafter tJx; amvcntkxlaod Cabot Martin.who worked
for him.called me in Comer Brook and asked me to come into SL Jobo's to meet with him
to critique it. So I felt really good about the DeW administration.
Now, I bad no expc:ctationofbeing in the cabilJet. I hadn't CW1l thought of that
poSSIbility. Bob [her busbEmd] bad raisedit with me. but I bad said '00.' I thought ifl was
a Memberoftbc House ofAssembly that I'd be able to workon the inside on the issues that
I lad been wortmgon fiom theoutsKIe aDdthat by havingme on the inside and all the people
on the outside thatwe could get things done. I didn't have anythingto lose. I certainly wasn't
taking it for granted.
Tom FarrelLa cabind ministerin the Ff'lIDk: Moores goYClDDCDt, hadheld the Humber
East seat andMooreshimselfbad hek! the neighbouring seat ofHumber West. \\'ben both
decided DOt to run, the west coast ridings were up for grabs. Both Farren and Moores
disappointed a lot ofpeople in.the ComerBrook area because they really didn't pay too much
attention to their districts . The Liberals went through a hotJy-eoD1estedcandidate selection
process for the Humber East district, with [Comer Brook businessman] George Colbourne
winning.
Getting the PC DOmination by acclamation gave me an adWDtage over the Liberal
competito r. TheLiberals lost a week:doing their run-offand when I got the DOmination by
acclamation, I wasout k:nockiDg on doors the next day andthe troops really rallied. Those
who had beenimolYed an ab!g wilhFm'CD ami~ aodothenjoined in. LorIX! Wheeler
became my C&qlaign.manager andwe really put a good team together.
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Lome~ bad beentbioking ab:>Ul thenomination,but decidedagainst it. Ifbc
had decided to run.I would have stepped aside. But I badmy own raISOlIS fur nmniDg. I
had a positive reason for 1'UIIDiog. I would have beenSlItisfied to eod up as a beckbench
member with the Pes winning the goW'rllDJCIll. or ifwe lost the election, aDdI badwon,
sittingasanoppositionmcmber. I was prett:y unsophisticated. I badno tbougbl: ofbeing in
thecabinet.ADd. if I bad lost that would bavejust: been threeweeks away from Jawpractice,
Iifu wouldhavegone on. It wouldn't have beena big deal. There was a big sweep in public
opinion a week or ten days into the campaign andI got in on Peckfurd's coattails by quite a
big nmgin. AIli towards the eod ofthecaql8ign Peckford put out a release sayina- that he
would have a woman in.his cabinet. So peoplestarted saying to me that I might bein the
cabinet.
[Lynn Vergedeteods berdccisionto appoint BiD~oppositionbouse leader.
He bad bekl the poUion befure Verge became leader . But because ofhis vigorous work 10
defeat her, why would she appointedhim to the position again?]
I bonestlyfelttbathewasthe best caucus memberfurtbatjob. And it seemed to me
to be a happy coiDcideDce that he probably 'WOuld be themost important member of caucus
given his stature within the group to have on my side, to try to mekl the group. He bad
supported Loyola Sullivan although I bad the impression at that time that be didn't have
anything in.particular against me. In retrospect, perhaps what bebad against mewasthat I
am female . But we'd always bad a good relationship.
[During the SUlDlDeI' months of 1995 Lynn Verge took a stand on the education
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reform issue whichcausedsome problemsfur her caucwJ coBeagues. PremierClydeWeDs
hadcalleda province-widereferendwnon 1h::denomiDatioDB1scboolissue,with 1h::vote:to
take place September S, 1995. Verge cameout wiIh a cootroversiaJ. staod on the question-
a stand that didn't win support within ber own caueus.]
TherewereIIIeIJbers ofcaucus which represemed districts with a high percentage of
Catholic and/or Pedecostalvoters, wbo wantedto emtncc the Catholic aDdPentecostal No
Campaigntotally, aDdthere were others who wanted to stay out o f it or who wanted to
position themselves fur eitheroutcome and some oftbc caucus, and I was ODe oftbcm,
although I don't think any ofus opposed -I certainly didn't -the option ofcontinuing
optional religiouseducation. At any rate. I was calledupon asa political leaderto .make
public my own personal cb;)icc in the referendum aDdmy position aDd my reasons were ,
admittedly, verydifficultfor people to undc:rstaDd. It seemed to me that a lot of the caucus
who wanted a No vote: were relieved that I voted No, but ofcourse my reasons were very
different from the reasons oftbc Catholic aDdPe:ntecostal church leaders. I took:quite a
beating,whokmws bow it filtered out a month or two later, but Ill: the time the DeWS media
and the commentators beteved Iik:ca miDdIcss herd and it was appallingwhat little critical
thought went into that whole exercise and the reporters aDd commentators seemed to
emo tio nally respond to what they beard ChrisDecker and Clyde Wells sayiDg and I don't
thinktbeyever stopped to read the tcxt oftbe constitutional amcodmcntor realizedthat what
counts withaco~ ammdmmt is the wording. What thepremieror the minister of
education says on television isn't going to belooked at by the Supreme Court ofCanadain
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theeve:ol ofa Ia!ercbaIIcIlgeofsome DeW EgisIation or administrative practice. That caused
some probJcaB willmcmcus. psrtjcuIarlyammg those whose constituents voted No heavily.
But we got through that. [su&red some daDlge because ofit and some oftbe reporters
created the impression that: [ was iDsincere in my approach. which I think was the most
damaging criticism.ofan.
I canrcmcmbcrif:was the tb:m"MCkin November, the House was sittiDgaDdLiberal
memberswerebec:kJirlaoneaftemoon. DannyDumaresque[aLiberalbllck:beo:hMHA] and
a coupleofotbers wereshouting across that we and I haddroppcd like lead bllIIoonsin [the
Decima] poll that hadjust beendoDe. ADd that, believe it or DOt,spooked some of the
caucus. Now it wasabout a week later that the poll actually came- out and the poll certainly
wasn'tanythiQg like theLiberal beckIers led our guys to believe, but they were spooked and
tbeybehaved ina velYpoliD:ally immature andl.II](fucipliDedway. I suspect that before that
and<ertamIy during_ andaftcrthot,-.of awcus wmo vay blatemodly wxImoHDng
me bytaIking "otftberecord" to [CDC Television Icgis1ative reporter] DougLetto aDd other
reporters. Therewas major self-inllicted damage by tben, I was pretty sure that wasgoiDg
on during the reporting ofthepoD. TheCBC Morning Show did a commentary about goings
on in our caucus which. bad to come nom the caucus. tbeeewas too much detail furthem to
bave got it any otbet way. I was prdtysure ofat 5castone memberofcaucus who bad fed
it all to PeterGuIlage[a~with The Morning Sbow] andcuriously I was the
onlymemberofcaucus who thought that theremight be a spring eJec;:tion. Therest ofthem.
fur whatever tm!OII, thought tbEd: therewouldn'tbe an election until at leastthe 6Ill, if oot the
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springofl997. ADd I think.I wastbeonlyODe who scriouslytbought thatBrian Tobinmigbt
become thenext Liberal leader .
I reIIICttIber in early December. partly in response to some oftbe caucus pauic, but
largelybecause ofmy own beliefthat we were ooking at an early election in 1996, I tried to
acceleratethepolicy~ process. I put together a crack team. with a tight deadline
that:nluded me:mben ofcaucus and people from outside caucus andI rememberwe met in
early December and they all agreed to a time frame that:would see a draft by the end of
January, with February allowed fur caucus to work it aroWld and it was supposed to be
finalized by the second or third week:of Man:h to take to a convention - the party' s
proviQ;;ial cooveolion wassupposed to be arouo! the end ofApril- I was thinking that we
might be looking at Clyde WeDs resigningin January. a competitive Liberal leadership
convention some time around Marchand an election in April to June time frame .
The bebaviour of some of the membersof caucus in. those weeks in November
sbocked even th:mselves. We closed fur Christmas it seemed to me. with people somewhat
subdued. And then during the Christmas bolidayseverything started to unfold. [went into
election mode before New Year's Eve. I remembergoing to a drug store in Comer Brook
acouplc ofdaysaftetCbristmBsandlUlllling into Jodine Tobin [Brian Tobin's wife] who said
that sheand Brian and their children bad arrivedan bour carlier for a vacation, and [
immediately .knewsomething was up because they bad never. ever come to Comer Brook
Christmas time before.
1 called [caucus member] Rick: Woodfurd that evening and told him about my
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suspiciom. Ew:ryoac had to scramble to save bh or herown skin. By thenthey mew that
it:wastoo Iate. But there were a few surprises. The biggestsurprisefor ee was.of course,
Rick defecting , and the other was that Fabian Manningwas behaving for a week or so as
though he was wobbly, and I didn't expect any ofthat. The oocs who stayed with the PCs
bad to support my leadership, thal'sall they bad or could have .
I wasdi<;appoin1ed that BillMattbcwswasoot vay helpfulduring the campaign. even
though I badasked him to co-chair it. It's very bard fOr me to explainwhat might have
motived someof tbose people . I know Bill made a major chanse in his persooallife duriDg
those months. He left his wife and bedisplayed-I can't think ofanother verb to describe
it:- a relationsl::Dp withaoother woman from his district that caused a scaodaJ. in his district..
Around ~ time tbHtbe pubO.iymde thischange betold~ about it and bealso told me that
he doubted that be would run in the next election. I believe that the main reason why be
didn't run was that he didn't think be would get re-elected, and that be badcome to this
conclusion bog before Brian Tobin came on the provincialscene. In retrospect I don't think:
Bill Matthewswas ever comfurtable with me as leader. Probably, mainlybecause I am a
woman. That's what I believe . I didn't immediately see the connection betweenthe erratic
behaviour of Bill Matthews and theplot to undertniIIIe my leadership because I didn't put
muchstock imo the ability ofthe:se peopleto successfullyconspire against ee or anyone else .
I still find it bard to believethat Bill's behaviour was consciously calculated to takeme out
oftbe Ieadmbip position and to put Loyola. Sullivan in. Undo ubtedly therewas a lot going
on that I diIn't witnessandthat I migIt:on hIM: guessed was bappening. Loyola didn't seem
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to me to be an that impressive in ClI1EUS meetiDgs.F~ he'd bomhBrd people wilh
words and w:ilhdiscussi;)oofddails. He'd de!Jcribc aD. the trees but he wouldn't seem to~
a concept ofthe woods. I really didn't seese that bewas inspiring members of caucus. In
filet, more than once at a caucus meetingit seemedto me that he was tumiDgpeople of[
[Howevcr,1ODowi:lgtheexccutivec:ouocilmoc:tillg ofthe party inOclobet, it became
clearerto Verge that something wasbeing cooked up. Tbc executive council of tile party is
made up of the provincial party executive, the fifty-two district presjdems or their
representatives, the caucus,. fOrmer membersofcaucus aDdcandidates ofrecord. It is the
m<gorrepresentative body oftbc keypeople in the party. The executive council met 00 the
Sunday ofa weekendin late October, 1995 in S1. Jotm's, fullowing a well-attetxlcdpolicy
conference which bad beenbeld 00 the Saturday. TheaccouDl ofhow Lynn Verge became
awareoftbe piotto undermineher-which was set in motion during the~ coUDCil
meeting- andhow sbe reactedto it, provides valuableDIigbt do how she was handicapped
by ber own party going into the provincial electiontbat wascaIledjust threemonths later.]
I.wasat the bead.tablenext to party presjdent Cal Powell andI think Cal reaDydidn't
do a crisp job ofsetting an agendaand keeping people on track. Part oftbe routine was a
treasurer's report. The treasurer, Randy Dawe, whoalways seemed to beout to hmch, gave
his treasurer'sreport. A member oftbe executivecoUDCil questioned something in the report
- it wasa straigId:JrwanI question-aDd this led to an eruption on Randy's part as be said
in an emotional way that the books were being kept by the leader's staff; so be reaDydidn't
have them in his possession. The matter ofwbcre thepsrty's books werekeptwas a matter
that was De\Itt in question. It wasDe\lttanil:em ofcomrow:rsyum.il RaDdybecame treasurer.
Always before the books were kept in St. John'!! whereaUthe party records were, at bead
office . Probably for the most part in thepast. the treasurer bad lived in or near St. John's.
When Randy became treasurer at first be wanted to have the books at his place in Bay
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Roberts, and he seemedto view his role as tn:asurerto bea bookbepingjob. So aftertbis
was thrashed about and after I arranged to have the party auditor, wOO is a chartered
accountant,to meet with him,I thought we bad an understanding that themenial daypto-day
bookkeeping work and the fetching of the Jmil and the blink deposit would be done by
SODE body in St. 101m'sclose to me iJr the :sake of rquIarity aDdcontinuity and Randy wouJd
have reports as often as be wanted aDd fi.ill access. But his role would be a higher level
function - one ofmanaging the party's finances and ofdeveloping a plan for COllttOlling
expeedfneesand raising revenue. There wereongoiDgdifficultics with Randy aDd be did
erupt at the meeting. blurtiDgout that he was the treasu:ret but be didn't have the books.
Whatwasquestioned was John Laschinger's azr&ngc:IDIn. The first personto bring it up was
RebertLundrigan.and to be perfectly honest I didn't rea1izewba1bewas hintingat first, I
thinkit wasafter the meetingwhenI realizedthe inferences he was making , because what be
was IUntingat was that [hodn' fully paKI101m""""""'e<,mtimating - o1tboughhe didn'
do it explicitlyenough for me to graspuntil later-that I bad abusedmy position as party
leader by having the party enter into an arrangementwith John Lascbinger that involved
essentially using party fimds to pay Iohn Laschingcrfor work that he had done on my
leadership campaign. In fact, my leadership C&Iqlllignbad raised money, and this is all
dOCUIDe1tted, which fully covered John Laschinger's fees. That was finished business by the
timeI becameIcaderamwith theparty president and the full executive I bad the party enter
inlo an arraDgClDeDtwith 10mLascbinger to give us advice o n planning for the next election,
on developing a plan to prepareourselves for the next ek:ction and on re-organizing our
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publicly-fuDded opposition sWf' and tbcn,. in perticu1ar, on wirmiDa the Grand FaDs by
eb.ttxl. whichtook pB:e in thespring aDdthen the GaDderbye~n wbichtook place in
the fall The 'NOd::that we bid John I..ascbingerdo io;luded penonal sc:rvices provided by
Jom bmselt a trip to the pro't'irx:c to nm fucus groups. and• written report settina out his
tDtings and his reconmmdarion:sand .draft outline of an electiDn prepInIionpIaIL Inan
c£fixt to tty to DYoIwthekeypIs)as and makethemfeelvalued and happy about all ofthis.
I arranged fOrCal Powell. theprovincial president.and BiDMd:tbcws, with the expectation
that Bill would c bair the election preparation conmittec. to speud a weekendwith John
Laschinger in Toronlo in the final week oftbe Ontario c:ampllign. And through Jolm they
spent time at Onlario PC campaign headquarters and talked to and obi!ietwd the key
strategistsin that victory - as it turned out. And whenBiDMatthews returned to the next
caueus mecting(lI1eady June ) bewas~ bewasbebavina: as tmugh bewastloatine on
a cloud. He was c:ndnDcd by this e:xperim;::e. He wasreaDyexcited. And I fek at that point
thai:the caucus was bccom:inI cobcsive . Tben we won the by election in Grand Falb. Mike
Mackay won in GraDd FaDs bya bi&margin. Len Sinms was~ helpful in that~
and LenSimms was. YaY positive factor. He badJeft a positive legacyfix the party. We
should ba"C WOI1 Gander , but the organization didn't quite do it. That came IDIJCh iater in
early Octo ber.
I felt ambushed, pertly because I honestlyhadn't beard anyonesuggest such
a thing (before the IIlICC'tin&) and it certainly was never in my nm.t.becauseas fill' as I was
co ncerned we bad done a fiurtaslic job ofpaying all my Jcadenbip~ bills promptly
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andtba1: waspast history. Iwas~takezlbysuzprise. I didn't even realizewhat \liI1lS
being hinted at. It wasn't wnillater that it really daWMdon me:that what they were reaDy
gettingat was tbat I was baviDg theparty pay party fundsto look after a leadershipdebt. All
I was guessing at the tEe was that therewere peoplewbo didn't 5kc John I..aschinger, either
because he was from Ontario, or because be bad worked on my Jeadersbjp. When the
meetingstarted getting out ofcontrol,. wben Randyerupted - which shouldn't have been a
surpme because he did it every executive mcctiDg- at some point Gerty Ottcnheimcr aDd
a couple ofothers spoke up in a helpful way to put things in perspective. but when Robert
Lundrigan, Martin Hammond from Kilbride district. aDd Larry Vaters from the youth
federation started on John Lascbinger.Cal didn'tstep in to take control and I was left as
leader to try to deal with whatwas beingsan Lookingbeck at thesession, even a few hours
later. I reaIittd that there bad been an organized str3legyon the part oftwo or more people
to ambushmc - it's bard to say bow many and whowen: part ofit - but I do believe that
tbe people who spoke up bad bemprimed. I couldhaw:squat Larry Vaters, because be !mew
thedifference, but whe1heI: or not bewas bright crough to have understood, I don't know,
be had sat in on the meetings oftbe executive wbcttthe issues about JolmLaschinger were
discussed and approved. The term 'compiracy' suggests to me:something planoed.,deliberate
and co-ordinated. From whatI've observed over tile years, most people aren't industrious
enough or bright enough to do the organiation. But what I do think happeDed after this
leadership. and it bappencd after the '89 Rideout-Simms Icadersbip andthe 79 Peckford
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leadership.was a continuation ofcamps.J
Because the '95 Ieadcrsbip was so long (almost three anda halfmontbs-twicc as
long as theothertwo Icadcrsbip contests) and becausethe competition wasso nasty towards
theem and someof the nastinessbecame publicized,whichmade it evenworse,aDdbecause
the result was so close, seems to me the division might bad beenmore proooUDCCd. ADd
where I was only IeOOeroftileopposition. I reaDydidn't have the power or thetools to bring
to an end more promurx:ed mlistance that BrianPecldDrdwould have bad as premier . There
may wen havebeen oUa' factors. too ; aspects ofmy behaviour. my function as leader which
I'm not even aware of which exacerbates the situation. In theyears that followed"79, even
with Peckfo rd's strength, aDdeven with Doody bowingout, I could sense rmmants oftbc
Doody campaign lUd the PcckfimicanpDgn. And a lot o f the Doody people supportedLen
Simms in '89 and supported Loyola Sullivan in '95. ADd a lot ofthe people who supported
Peckford in 7 9, supported Tom Rideout in '89 and supported me in '95. I don't think what
happened after the '95 IeadeDbip was a marked departure, it was a matter of degree , but it
wasmore of tbe same. The Sullivancamp probably continued in various ways, overt or
subtJe. ADd when Loyola bec:amc leaderafter my defeat lastMarch" from whatrm told, be
basn't saidthis to me, but other people claim to have been told by bim and people workiDg
for him.that his mainmission andhis stafl's main mission was to put hispeople on district
executives - in other"words to stack:the next convention and the one that's scheduled for
Jrhe term "camps"within politieaJ.parties mento the intcmal srouPing ofiodividuals
withinthe party to promote • particu1arcandida te at po&y .
I3S
Gander DeXl April, to protect him.froma Ic:adersIrip chaBeDge. They baveu'tmElde any secret
about that,. in fact they've beenquite blatant about it.
To put it into context. I went through two other proviDcialPC Icadersbipcontests,
the 79 one. which was very soon after my activeinvo1vemeotwith the provincial Pes-I
badnever beeninvolved with any other party-but prior to late 1978, while I bad a lively
interest in politics and watched. I wasn't activefyinvolved with the party. [went to the 79
leadership as a delegate supporting Brian Peckford. [bad to compete in Humber East fur
a votingdelegateposition,am [ was one ofa relatively small minority of Comer Brook. area
delegates who supported Brian pcckford. By fitt the majority ofdelegates from that area
supportedBillDoody. AId then[went through the 1989 Ieadenhip when[ supported Tom
Rideout, andthen the third leadership in 1995 when [was a candidate myself.
After 79, thepeoplewho supported Doodywere relatively slow to accept Peckford's
victory. But what I think. brought about apparent cohesion was first ofall the fact that Bill
Doody bowed out of proviDcialpolitics [and was named to the Senate} soon after that
Ieader.ihi:p. and secoo:1ly, Brian PecldOrd'sSUCCCS!lin the election that fiill was by :farthe most
importantdevelopmenl. TheleadershipcorM:lJlion was in Mmdl alii the ek:ctionwas in June
andiD:mediate1y after the leadership Pcckford tried to integrate an camps andgave cabinet
positions to Bill Doody and the others who badrun for the Ieadersbi:p. He didn't give his
competitors a chance to complainabout being droppedor sbumod. Vcry, very qWcldyafter
the leadership he calIcdan elecWn, and rigbl aftertbc election call, whenDon Jamieson came
back,a lot ofpeoplethought be [peckford] would go down in flames. In filet be won. And
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M mainchaIIeDgers. Bill Doody included. decided oot to seek re-election and in fact bowed
out, leaving rD>Stortbe field to pcekfi>rd and with hisvictory. bebad power. While bewas
premier fiomtbe outset [beausebe~Fnmk:Mooreswho badrdired fiompolitics).
Peckford eow had his own mandate within tbn:e roonths aDdhis oppoDCllls and detractors
[within the party) really didn't have anywhere to go. Iftbey wanted to be part oftbe
government and part oftheparty, they bad to uleast pretcnd. to support Brian Peckfocd.
And I realized, noticing varioussubtle behaviours and col!DDCDlS that some oftbe people
who hadsupported Doody were very, very slow to embrace Peckford, and I don't know if
someoftbemevern:allydid. DuringaDtbose yearsperiodicallysomething woukl happen to
remind me that tbm: was still a Doody fiIcIion acd a PeddOrd faction. BecausePeckford bad
power within the party. bewasable to provide a more cohesive leadership.
[Has her experieoce as leader affectedtheway Lynn Verge thinksabout public life?)
FoUowing the party 'sdckat in tbe 1996 provincial election I recognized as soon as
theeiection resultscame out thatmy timeas leader wasvery Iimited. The roost I could hope
for was that miracuIousJythe recount woukl resuh man upset (oftheoriginal resutt J. but I
knew the odds werevery much against that. Or that a controverted elections application
might overttun the result and then I'd win my SC8t. And I woukl stay on as leaderon a
caretaker , inlerim. basisto attendto businessandgive people a chance to adjust before putting
the party through another leadership process. The party just couldn't take another
co~kadenbip that early. 1bld:was tbe most that I coukl imagine. I knewfor a long
time that there werea lot of people in tbe party andthe caucus who really didn't feel any
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warmth towards me, but I thought they werepracticalenough to want to use me eu;)ugh as
long as I was ridil:w: high in the poDs.or even afterBrian Tobiris victory to tic up loose eDlis
from the eJection ami try to leadus tkougb. a smooth traDsition. I don't think this experiebce
bas changed me., a person. Tbc worst plIrt ofi!:m me was what happenedin the &I1,when
I knew that peopJc\W:rC UDdcnnining. But-I UDdmtoodthe ma::ssityofappearing united and
putting on a happy face. That:was very difficult. The behaviour ofpeople who bad opposed
me for the leadenbip wasn't particuJarJydifficultto take , it migId:have been disappointing;
but what was very hard to take was the behaviour ofAlvin Hewlett.who badsupported me
quite beartiIy. Alvin is one ofthe most negative people who I've ever worked with, but it's a
reflection of his own insecurities. I saw Alvin succumb to the negative furces around the
caucus. He kept rwming to me, telling me about all the negativity and I'm a person who
functions best when I havepositive influences around me, when I have people near me who
give me energy. Thereate various ways in whichyou can process reality. There are some
people wOO can take a clBIIenge and regard it as a challenge and concentrale on what basto
be done to meet the chaI1eDge and even have some fun working at it. And then there are
other people who present you with an unsurmouutable problem and moan aDd groan
iD:essattJy about: bow iqlossibe it Wto beat. ADdI fuoction best when I have at least some
people around me who take the positive approach and who energize me - like Lome
Whee ler , it was a tem'ble loss that Lome retired before I became leader, although be still.
colllribuled. He Yo'8SbBsicaIly only a phone canaway and any time I asked him to come aDd
meet with me face-to-face or any time I asked him to come and<:bat with the caucus as a
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group or individual members, be didn't besftate. But DOt baviDghimin theoffice daily was
a terribleloss. Lome wascomtamfy reassuriDg Alvin or other peop~whowere Jmaning and
groaning and expressing doubts andseeing the worst. But wilOOut Lome and even Alvin,
whobad been my aJly, gcttiIlgdro'ollDl'dintbBclmusofnegativity.l found it di:f6cultto keep
going.
[To LymVc:rge.it wasabo unthinkablefor party members to uodermioe other party
metmers or squabble in public. She described theactions ofsome ofher caucus coDcagucs
" "unproresmnaf' - ,,.roouJarlyw . puty _ to pubticly .......... thcpany_.
That ispreciselywbat b:lppeDed wbm two ClI1JCWimembers weerpublicin a CDC Television
interviewjust after theelection k>ss.]
What Ed Byrne andRoger Fitzgerald did on TV reaIly shocked me. but in a curious
way I senseda certain .reliefbecausc their undermining bad been madepublic . Things are
alwayseasierto deal with when tJ:qr'rcout in theopen. But I was stiUblown away by their
stupidityandI still can't understaDd it because my da ys werevery IlUIDbered and they didn't
baveto do that. l'mjustamazr:d IIIit. That afternoon [oftbe Tuesday fullowing the election
on Thursday] Tom Marshall [her lawyer] in Comer Brook bad got the date set for the
recount. which was less than a week away . So, once I got the dateI put out a news release
of two sentences. I didn't think therewas muchcbance that the recount would change the
result. I tbJugbl maybe a ten percent chance. Thenews release weD1 out at mid~ and the
caucus were to kl when! met with tho se oftbem who werearotmd ona ore-on-ore basis.
Ed Byrne bad beenin my office that morning and I bad tokl bim before the release went out .
Arom::dmid-aftemoon, Ed came in to see me andbe was holding thenews rejeese . He was
very nasty . It was theonly real bit ofnastioess since the election. Ao:I he askedme in a
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ra1berpoinlcdway'wtBt tim was allahout? NowI had aheady tokl. him.in the morningthat
I was going to have the recount done. I rememberhe was holding the rek:ase aDdhe asked
me 'tow kmg are we going to have to wait to find out about this.we've got wod:: to do, the
House of Aw:mbIy is opening in two or threeweeks? And 1 said, 'Ed. it's lessthan a week
and then:coUDl would take perhaps two days.And then he said that Doug Letto bad ca1Ied
aslcingbimtodoanintcrviewaboutthS. AndI saidto him, 'Ed.pleaseyoursc:lt but iflwere
you, I'd wait UIItil the~wasever, it's only a week.' He really anDOyed me with the way
bespoke. He left:ardamember of the staffwbl was in the TV room told me later that when
the news came on apparentlyEd rushedout looking positively, as ifexpeeting to see himself
on TV - as ifhe wasgoing to see something that would pk:ase him. [never did see the
interview. But later that night all hell moke loose . A fiiend told me and then the phone
started to ring. 1neversaw it and it's probablypst as well. [went through with the recours,
which curiously wasalmost tberapeutic .
When 1did resign it wasaImost a relief to get out oftbere. Theway 1 took it came
naturally. It's DOt something[had pJam:.od fur. I boDest1ydidn't expect to lose Humber East.
The~ people didn't ten me about the polling that bad beendone which showed that
I wasneck and neck, and losing the seat wasa big surpriseon eJectionnight. Wbcn I went
on televisionwe didn'thave thecount fiom thespecialpoDs. but I bad a pretty good ideathat
we weren't going to wintbeuniversity. which wasthe big spc:cia1polL Ifmytotal focus had
been HumberEast" the way it had beenin otherelectionsand I had lost. it would havekilled
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me, but my focus wason the entireprovinceand my own -=-t was rc:aDy secondary andI
suppose that was reflectedin the RSUIt.
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APPENDIXB
THREE INCIDENTS
WIDCH OCCURRED
DURINGTIlE LEADERSHIP DELEGATESELECflONPROCESS
Progressive Conserv.\tive PartyofNewfu undlaod andLabrador
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AppeDdixB twc of".....,,,,,..,",, pub6clyduring
the delegation selection processand ODe which did oct become public.
The Fogo lneide.t
Themost~ andperhapsthe worst, oftbese iDo:ideDts occurredat the delegate
selectionmocting onFogo Island, wbenyoung people (trost ofwbom wereDO more than 14)
wereenticed to wteti>ttbcSuDivansiate by an offer ofa voucbetofftee Cbinese food from
the local take-out. In order to receive a voucher for the free food (at a vaJueof SI0.00)
voters lit the Fogo Island delegate selection meeting were required to show their completed
ballotsto oneoftbe two youthdelegales fOrtbe Sullivanslate. who were strategicallylocated
next to the two ballot boxes inthc room. Despitceffons byVergc supporters to have Sam
Wmsor, the chairman ofthe mcetiDg.stop this violation of the secret ballot. the showing of
ballots continued as Wmsor refused to intervene.
La1ertbal: ew:niDg, when Verge was informed ofwbat bad gone on, she inmediately
1aunched a protest w:Ih the rulescommittee ofthe party , andwrote be!'own DeWS release to
announce that she had done so, as her mediaconsultant was on Fogo fslaDd aDdwitnessed
the event. A bearing was beld in the o ffice of the Opposition Ieadet in Confi:detation
Buikling, with both """ps rep=eoI<d by Iawyen - Valerie ManbaJl eod MOob,,'"
McNicbolas for the Verge camp and Tom Wtlliams fur the Sullivan camp. The rules
committee of chairman Warren Babb and members Kent Morris and Randy Hiscock,
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deliberatedfur _ daysmilo..... the boomg_ ...........__n, They Osued
a DeWS reeese stating that they bad owrtwned the~ ofthe fogo IsJandplrtionofthc
delegate selection process for the dimict ofFogo [a secooo meetingwas held the following
week inCarmenvillewhenthe 60al six delegates were selected to represent Fogo districtat
theco nventio n]. The ruling meant the fivedelegates elected on the Fogo IsJand sideoftile
distri ct could DOt attendthe convention. [Tbe six elected at the CannettviIlemeetingwere
permitted to attendtheconvention]. Verge therefore requested the party executiveto allow
the carmJates wh> badbeendenied the opportunity to bedelegates [aDd who she knew bad
supported bet'because oftbe slating] to attend the convention. However. without providing
any explanation. the party executive m1edthatDO delegates from the Fogo IsJand portion of
~~~~be~ro~tbcCOD~n.
It is rot clear wb=tbcr~Ia SuDiwD. was awareo f tbe tactic to win delegate support
from YOWJg peopleon Fogo lsIandwith wucbers ror Cbioese food, but it is lik ely that bedid.
He personally visited the islandthe day before.but left early the day of the delcgate selection
meeting[whichwasheld in the eveniDgJ to catchthe Fogo Island ferry to return to St . Iohn's.
The two key Sulliwn~organizerswho ~at tbemcctirlg were Bill Welsh and Alec
Smw, Welsh was a party veresen andb&ckroom worker fur nmIY election campaignsat both
the federal and provincial levels and Snow was the Tory MHA for Menibek and one of
Sullivan 's nine caucus supporters. Both wereasked to intervene and stop the showingof
ballot s. but both refused, with Welsh saying that there was nothing wrong with what was
going on. It was clear before the voting process started that WcJsh and Soow bad
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on:b.:strated the affilir. with Welsh counselling the two youth represeut.ativcon what to do.
The ChinesefOOd voucher scheme was. in tDct. quite inlricate. The vouchers werestamped
on the btck by the local b&nk. proving to the owner oCtbc 0Uncsetake-out that the moDe)'
to pay tOrthe freefOOd had beendeposiIed.. There is an unconfirmed suggesmn within party
circles that as much as $1.000 was deposited in the bank. bcwever DOne of the people
interviewed would discuss this issue. As well, representatives ofthe bank and the Chinese
take-our refused to di9cussthe vouchers- or their role in the scheme. The scheme weerI:ike
this.:Themoney{$I.000) was deposited in the local bank: and in mum the bank: stamped100
oftbe foodvoucherswlued at $10 each. One voucher was provXfedto each voter after the
ballot wasshown to iDdicatcthe eJltR Sullivanslate bad beenvoted tOr. Tbcn, over the next
few days, thevoterbought thevoucher to the Chinesetakc-our: to be redeemed tOr freefood.
The owner of the restaurant then brought the vouchers to thebank where hewaspaid his
money . Therewere suggestions that the Sullivan team bad tried severalother vote enticing
gimmicks. but they bad all back-fired, losing scarce campaign DIODe)'. The Fogo Island
schemewould ensure the~ speD:only the moDe)'it needed, as after a period oftimc.,
any money not covered by the returned vouchers would be returned to the people who
deposited it - Welsh and Snow.
Theseactioos wen:: clearfyin violarionoftbedeImcratic principle of tbe secret b8IIoL
Why, therefore, would Sullivan and/or his team of supponers Clq)loy such tactics? The
theory of~dirty bandsin politics, .. from SoL Sutherland's "TheProblem ofDirty HaDdsin
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Politics : Peace in the Vegetable Trade"" helps explainthe actions ofpoliticians and their
operatives under these kindsofcirannstances.
Sutherland argues that the conventional dirty handsproblem is DOt particularly
significant and that a much more serious test ofthc moral quality ofpublic life in socicty is
bow thatsociety embIestorrml rctrospcCtion upon aid judgement oftile inevitable episodes
of tmwise,intcmperaIe or imrmralpoliticalaction by Ic:adcts or potential leaders. The actions
of the Sullivan supporters werealloftbcse -tbcywere unwise.intempcrateand immoral
Sutherland argues that it is -the deliberatecorruption ofdemocracy that should attract our
scnniny .M5 By counselling the youth delegaJ:cs to do what they did, the Sulliw.n supporters
were deJiberatelytrying to corrupt detmcracy by WKIermining the sanctityof the secret ballot
at the delegate selection meetiDg.
In one oftbe suhtitlesofthe Suthcdaod artie£, the author asks "How CanWe Escape
the Dirty Hands World?, Byposing the question, there is an acknowledgement that there
exists a counter argw:ncntto the sWement that, in politics, the ends always justiijt tile means
- no matter bow corrupt these ends may be. The essential rressege of the critics of
derrocracy - "that there existsan unbridgeable gulfbetwcen those who leadandthose who
are led"- only serves to support the Machiavellian theory that ifthe masses are permitted
access to power; tbermre likelytbestalC and society wiDbeplaced in the "gravest ofdanger"
~S.L Sutberlaod. "TheProNem ofDirty Hands in Politics: Peace in the Vegetable
Trade. " Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science. XXVIU:3 September, 1995.
fSutberland. 1995.
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because oftbe stupK&yandigmraDccoftbcmasscs. Inothct words, leaders bavearight to
leadtlernasses.and in.leadmg[or, il:*ed,. inseekiDg Jcadcrsbipl, have the right to breakthe
rulesew:niftbisNle 1::mIkingnmsagaimtthe collective good. To return to tbeexamination
of the Fogo [Sland situation. it was apparent that the SuIlivm team, for whatever reason or
reasons. was convUx:ed that they could DOtcount on the peopc of Fogo IsJaDdto vote for
the slate which had coamitted thctmelvesto support Sullivan at the convention unless a
proportion of them were bribed to do so. Believing Loyola Sullivan would be-the best
leader ofthe PC Party , they weerahead andknowingly broke the rules in order to reach the
goal ofelecting him theirparty jeedee,
SutberIaDd coDlinucswIh the geaIth lOrthe answerto the question of bow to escape
the politicsofdirtyhands bychallcngiDgtbedefinilionoftbe "dirty handsworld, " arguing that
the dirty balds polb:ianIWSt beoonvinr.ed thatat soee higher level it was somehow "righ1"
to have done wrong and therefure the politician bas beenennobled and tempered by the
trauma of baving undertaken a course: ofaetion from which ordinary persons would sbrinl.:.
This is a theorythatrigbdy belongs in another politica1era. Sutherland takes issue with the
assumption that the typical dirty bandsscenariohas a known consequeoce,or a predictable
conseq uence for thedirty bandsleader. Thereis no guarantee, argues Sutherlaod, that in a
given set ofcircumstalx:ein the modemworld ofmass communicationIIDdmass media could
such a series ofcause [the dirty bands deed] andconsequences (the plamed resuhsof tbe
deed] plausibly interactfOrthe pmdictedresult. In other words, in Coday'ssociety, the means
do DOC always guarantee a prcdjctabc oUkOme, andmost often won't. Sutherland suggests
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that becauscpoliticsisesgeDliall;ya9OciaJ. activity, ..dirtybands" politics willioevitablycomc
underpublicscrutiny[ie.; Fogo Island]. Had the rules committee of the PC party DOtbeen
made aware oftbc incideut00 Fogo [sJand. and had the newsmediaDOtbeenmadeaware,
a decision too~ the e5ectio0 ofthe Fogo bland delegates would beVel" have bappc:ned.
and consequently, ifwe were to use an obvious, yet ..,listic, equation, Loyola Sullivan
would have won the leadership convention because his five Fogo Is1and votes would have
tippedthe balance in his mvour by just two votes.
However. simply playing with the numbers does not provide us with a legitimate
analysis, because tbeee was a tremendous fiillout from the Fogo [sIaDd affilir that, most
observersagree.bad significaotramifialions tOrSullivanamongelected delegates from other
districts and particularly among the ranks of the ex officio delegates. Unfortunately , there
was no dataga1beredfiomdelegal:es to support tbisclaim [orany other, for that matter] . But
there is little doubt there was negative fillIout for Sullivan from the Fogo Islanda.ffiUr. The
issue was talkedabout among de&egates, party officials and the newsmedia before and during
the convention.
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The Trouty Incident
Amtbet incicIeut involvillg ""tcr coercion aDdbusing to a dekga1c selection meeting
backfirMfurtbc SuIliwnteamintbcdistrict of Trinity North. This incideDt wasocver made
public.B~ loads of fishplantworkers were tramported to the area of thc delegate selection
meeting in C1arenvi1le from the upper part oftbc Bouavista Peninsula, from coIIDIJWlities
aroundTmury, where a fishplart mmaged byLoyola Sullivan 's brother. Blaine, was located,
The plantwasn'toperating at thetime andthe vast majority o f the workforce was coUccting
incomethrough The Atlantic GroUDdfish Strategy (TAGS), the federalprogram which paid
dislocated 6sbermen and plantworkers during the moratoriwn on fishing. For IIKJst,. the
TAGS fundingwas co ming to an end. and trainingopportunities wereminimalin the area.
Workers were called by plant management and told a meeting to discuss training
oppo rtunities withrqxesettatives o fKey-In TechnicalColJege was being held in CIarenvi1le
at the Legion Club [which was located next door to the Kin Centre, wherethe delegate
selectio n meeting was being held that same night] , and they were requested to take along a
fonn of idcntificaOOn,.ahhough they weren't told why they woukl needthe ID. However, in
order to vote at a delegate selection meeting of the PC Party, the voter must show proofof
resideoce inthe dist:rEt. During the drive from the upper portion of' tbe Bonavista Pcninsula
to CIa:renville. these plant workers were bandedsbeets ofpaper containing tbenames oftbc
Sullivanslate at the PC meetingandasked to go next door following their own meeting to
vote for the people on the sheet . They weretold then that was why they wererequired to
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bring aIongtbcirID. Vc:rgeorganizcrs in the district heard ofthisploy-earlier in tbeday and
madenumerous ptK>necalls ink> the area to mfurmpeopcofwbat was being attempted. Key
individualswithin the Trouty fishplant workfurce were called by Verge orgaoi7.ersand told
wbar:was being lIItempIed. As the delegate selection meetingprogn::ssedand it came closer
and closer to the time vOting would stop. supporters from both sides grew anxious. It was
obvious from the turnout that up until ba1fan hour before the close ofthe vote the Verge
team was ahead, but only with a narrow lead of30 to 40 votes. Theanxic:tywasbecause
neither side knew whether or oot the Trouty fisbplant workers would come over from the
meeting next door andtum the tide for Loyola Sullivan. Blaine Sullivan.spent most ofthe
nigbJ:nervously pacing around the room at the Kin Centre where thePC meetingwasbeing
held, slappinga roBedup wad of delegate sheets against his thigh. Then it started to happen.
Thedoors oftheLegionClubopened and well over lOOpeople came streaming out . Iftbey
came DeXl dooram voted theway theSullivanteam washoping , they would tum the results
ofthe TrinityNorthmcetirlg. However, instc:adofcoming next door, many ofthe people left
in the dozen or so cars and pick.up trucks that were parked on the Legion Club side oftbc
parking lot . Those who bad 00 ride beck because they bad come in the buses seemed
confused, wandering aroUDd the area where the buses were parked., as the buseswere aU
locked and the driverscouldn't be found. It was a co kt night in February andit wasn't long
before about 60 ofthe plamworkets startedcomiIlgover to the PC meeting. The Verge team
had anticipated this and fonned a V-shaped wedge so that whenthe people enr:ered the
meeting ball they would have to passthrough the wedge. As the crowd moved into the
ISO
building the Verge delegatesSIBrIed speaking with them in pups of meand six.suaaestiDa
that they~ bemgnmripuIalcd. by the SuIIiwn brotbcn and if tbey were soing to vete tbcy
bad a choice,. mitbcyoould wte br ibe Verge sIBle. Many ofthe workers agreedthB they
had bcc:n IIIiIDipuJatcd IlDdthat then: was a great dea1ofqeI' IIDdftustration mmng the
worms. mmy ofwbombad Idt themcetiDs wiIh the Key. iD.people i::tdisgust. Most of the
workers whocam: into the PC meetingwere wo men. The finalresultsoCdIc Trny North
delegatesdedDn sbowed tt.l the pkJyby tb: SuDivm.1cmlt:.:k&'Cd, as the Verge slate won
by more than100 votes,
The Cbicbn Wan
The ramificatioos for thePCParty from the Fogo IsJaDl incidentwere even greater
whenLoyola Sullivan charged that supporters for Lynn Verge badpurehased a large amount
of take-o ut chicken from a Mary Brown 's outlet in Glovertown for people attendirlg a
delegateselection~ in Port Blandford in the district ofTerra Nova. Perhaps the Imst
inlerestiDgaspect oftbis iDcidcol washow the pubO:finmd out about it and bow that public
exposure involvedthe other leadershiphopeful. Loyola SuIlMn.
Verge supporters GIem:J. Greening(a former PC MIlA iJ r Terra Nova] ao:i caucus
me:ut:.er Alvin fkwktt were in the Terra No w. district orpaizirlg suppon for Verge for the
delegate selection meeting. The meeting was scbedubt fOr a soB11 dw:rch baD in Port
Blandfurd, which is locatedon the exIIcDI: eastern endof thedSricL Most oftbe suppo rt
fo r Verge in the district came from the western end, aro und the Eastport Peninsula IlDd
Glovctown areas, a drive ofahout an hour to Port Blandfurd. The meeting was scbcduJed
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for 7:00 p.m GrecniDg and Hewlett were liDding that people were reluctant to make a
cotD11irmem: to drivetbBtdistaDrearourw:llbe supperhour, inthe middleofthe w:il::d:er, to vote
at a delegate selcction meeting. Greeningcame up with a solution. l'hey woukl hR a
number ofbuses andprovide the people who would makethe trip with a supper·time meal
- a ftsnack packft oftake-out chicken aDda soft d:rink. W'tthtwo busesloadedwith Verge
supporters. some ofwbom were undoubtedly instani: Tories, they pulled into the Mary
Brown' s outlet on the Tram Canada Highway near Glovertown. Greening ordered aDd
personally paid for more than ISO snack packs of clrickenand soft drinks. While the
assembled Tory CDtourage waited patiertIy in the buses for this massiveorder, Loyola
Sullivan pulled into the parking lot on hisway to amtbcr meeting with potential delegates
furtherwest in ceIllnIlNewfu uodJand, looting for a quick:bite to take with him on hisway.
To SuIlivan'ssurprise [and Greening's gb:] ISO Verge supporters trooped into the take-out
[ 0 pick up tber snack pack.and soR drink:- an weamg Verge buttons, which bad been hastily
distributed to tbem.as theyexited the bus. Sullivan apparently left in disgust - without his
chicke n.6 Laterthatevening the Verge sJate easily won the de'egate selection meetingfor
Terra Nova district.
The incidents at Glovertown aDdFogo Is land quicklyenteredthe category of tbc
media cliche aDd the public was made aware of these measures being employed by both
leadershipcamps. The media was soon eategorizin& the Icadc:rsIUp race as the ftchicken
'GlennGreening. Personal Interview.
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wars, " fiutber tarnishing the public image oftbc PC Party in Newfoundland aDdLabrador.
More aIIegatiomwereraiged by the Sullivan side about Verge supporters providing freefood
for prospediYe voters, puticuIarIy at Paton CoJlese. a student bousing complex at Memorial
Univers:ityin St. lobn's, wberestudmls were provided wKhsubmariDe saIXiwic:bcs llIda soft
drink in return lOratteudance at delegate selection meetingsin S1.lohn's East and S1. John's
Centre .
Verg e never denied that berteam got involved in this kind o f activity. but she did
maintainthat the activilies never involYed a mlaOOn ofthesanctityoftbc secret ballot,wtrich
theSullivan people had done on Fogo IsIaDd. She suggested that there wasoothq wrong
with candidate~ proYiiing reftesbments for people atteDdingdelegateselection
meetings, as kmg as the refrestmEots weren't alcoholic beverages and the SllDCtity oftbc
secret ballot wasmaimained. She said that while refreshmcnb like take-out cbicken or
sandwiches wereprovided by her representatives therewas DeVer any suggestion that ~
influen ced the outcome of a vote, because the individualcotdd still vote for any of the
representatives ofeither oftbc two candidates.
The m::dia's cblice ofdescriptive phrases for the PC leadership race continued to be
less than appealing to theparty . The "chicken wars" scenario soon gave way to "foodfights"
1'3
andVerge supporters tried to make light of the situation by commissioning local cartoonist
Kevin Tobin to draw a likenessofVerge as the woman in the Mary Bro.....n Chicken logo,
wit h the slogan "I'd rathe r have Lynn
Vergeft-a send up of the chicken
outlet's own advertising slogan "I'd
rather have Mary Brown.ft
TIle Verge cartoon was then
put on T-shirts to be sold as a fund-
raiser. HoY.1:'Ytt.......hensomelong-time
party members found out about the T-
shirts and the cartoon. theyexpressed
their disp leasure so loudly within the
ranks of the party that the Verge
people were forcedto cancel the public
sale of theT-shirts.. Someweresoklto
Verge insiders to recover costs, so
there are a few collectors' items still
around. The party people were upset
The Kevin Tobin Cartoon
I'd Ratherhave Lynn Verge .
with thesend-up of the chicken warsissuebecause they believedthe image of the party would
be tarnished even further; this image was ofa factioned party . They argued that making fun
of the situation would only exacerbate the cleavage. The Verge people who initiated the
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chicken T-shirt ideathought otherwise, suggesting that poking fun at the situation wouJd
make lightoftbe cleavage, thereby sending a messagethatakhough there was a recognition
ofd..iflemJ::cswilbin theideologicalmakeupoftheputy. thesediffereoces couJd beovercoee
throughaccoJIm.ldation and compromise - in a sense, theyweresuggesting that while the
differences dideDt, they weren'ttlm big a deal and everyooewithin the petty would benefit
throughaccotmmdation. But people outside the Verge camp. an;! a few within it.,didn't see
it that way.
What did it aU ..eaa?
Did tbc:se di'tytaetics aod dirty tricks indicate:something more than an expI'CSSionof
competition within a political party? The evidence of these dirty tactics supports the
argument that the major ideological conflict within the party explainsthe willingness by
individuals who held a different ideological view thanLynn Verge and her team to work
against her and to use any kind ofmanipulative tacticor dirty trick they couJd muster to
tmdermineher. This thesis baspresentedevideocc to suggest that because of who Lynn
Verge wasand what she represented, shewas never given a real chance to take the PC Party
in the directionshewanted.
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